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"As the coasts become increasingly populated, more and more people are placed
in harm's way. Thus far, science has not found effective ways to reduce most
hazards. Therefore, citizens must look to strengthening communities. Building
safer buildings and strengthening infrastructure are important steps, but it is the
manner in which societies are built that largely determines disaster resilience. A
vital part of effective disaster planning—whether for mitigation, preparation,
response, or recovery—is an understanding of the people and institutions that
make up each community, including their strengths and their weaknesses, as a
basis for developing policies, programs, and practices to protect them. In the end,
it is human decisions related to such matters as land use planning and
community priorities that will build stronger, safer, and better communities."
— H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment,
2002, Human Links to Coastal Disasters
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AEC

Areas of Environmental Concern (North Carolina)

BFE

Base Flood Elevation

BW-12

Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012

CAMA

Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 (North Carolina)

CCC

California Coastal Commission

CCCL

Coastal Construction Control Line (Florida)

CIP

Capital Investment Plan

CMP

Coastal Management Program

CZMA

Coastal Zone Management Act

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

GLO

General Land Office (Texas)

LCP

Local Coastal Plan

LUP

Land Use Plan

MHW

Mean High Water

MLW

Mean Low Water

NFIP

National Flood Insurance Program

NOAA

National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration

SFHA

Special Flood Hazard Area

SLR

Sea Level Rise

TDR

Transfer of Development Rights

TDC

Transfer of Development Credits

TOBA

Texas Open Beaches Act
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COASTAL GEOGRAPHY

Image: EPA modified by CCCL

Dry Beach

Land between the MHW and the vegetation line

Mean High Water

An average of all high water heights observed over the National
Tidal Datum Epoch (19 years)

Mean High Water Line

Intersection of the mean high water with the shore

Mean Low Water

An average of all low water heights observed over the National
Tidal Datum Epoch (19 years)

Mean Low Water Line

Intersection of the mean low water with the shore

Submerged Lands

Lands covered by water at any stage of the tide; subject to public
trust

Tidelands

Lands below the mean high water line and generally subject to
public trust

Uplands

Land above the mean high water mark and generally subject to
private ownership

Vegetation Line

Line on the shore where vegetation begins; usually the line where
recent storm activity reached

Wet Beach

Land between the mean low water line and the mean high water
line where the sand is repeatedly covered by water action; usually
flat firm sand without vegetation

Definitions primarily from NOAA at http://shoreline.noaa.gov/glossary.html
Definitions
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate change will change the way we live. No longer will the environment be a static
condition, a certainty upon which other variables depend. Rather, it will be a variable itself,
and it will make us plan for the future like never before. Already we are beginning to see the
effects of change along our coasts. Rising seas and more frequent hurricanes present a
dynamic environment that threatens infrastructure long thought to be safe. Our cities are illprepared for the dangers of the next century. Fiscally, we are spending more and more to
repair the damage. Long-term planning that accounts for climate change is needed to ensure
that money spent today will reduce our future risk.
We have the opportunity to not only build resilience today but also prepare for the future,
to build the infrastructure that will be the foundation for our cities in the next century. This will
require innovation and new technologies. It will also require tough decisions. Some areas will
be too vulnerable, despite our best efforts to hold back the sea. Infrastructure and homes will
need to be moved away from the threat and the shore opened up to the public. The political
obstacles to this strategy will be severe in many places, but consideration of them should begin
now.
Numerous legal tools already exist to assist federal, state, and local governments in
conducting managed retreat away from the most vulnerable coasts. Scattered publications,
toolkits, and websites describe a broad range of legal, policy, and regulatory tools. These tools
have, with little fanfare, been used by communities around the United States to implement
managed retreat. This Handbook collects examples, case studies, and lessons learned from
some of these early innovators in the hope that their lessons can inform future efforts to limit
the exposure of our communities to coastal threats. The key legal issues raised by these
examples are also discussed.
The Handbook is organized into five sections. Each describes a potential tool, provides
examples and information, and then present the lessons learned for that tool. The tools
described herein are not the only tools that can or should be used. In fact, significant
innovation will likely be needed to address the novel challenges posed by climate change. The
tools presented here are simply a selection of those that have been implemented and that can
inform future actions.
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COMPILED LESSONS LEARNED
COASTAL PLANNING


Require planning at all levels. State mandates can improve local planning. Mandates are
particularly effective when they identify clear prioritized goals, establish guidelines, and
provide technical and financial support for local officials.



Coordinate planning efforts. State and local governments need to coordinate their planning
efforts and regulations. The goals at both levels need to be consistent and complementary
in order to be effective.

SETBACKS AND ROLLING EASEMENTS


Using a combination of set distances and erosion rates for setbacks can provide minimum
standards for areas that lack historic erosion data while also acknowledging that erosion
and sea level rise are unlikely to affect the coastline evenly and that approaches in one area
may be inappropriate in another.



Plan for change. Setbacks should be designed to account for acceleration of erosion and
sea level rise due to climate change. This can be done through the use of a safety factor or
by planning for routine updating of the setback distances. Updating setback numbers
would, ideally, not require a state level legislative response, which could be slow and delay
necessary changes.



Act now. Setbacks should be established as soon as possible in order to set property
owners’ expectations for the value of their property. Minimum lot sizes and “savings”
clauses can also be used to avoid takings challenges. However, when structures are built
seaward of the setback line due to a variance or permit, it should be clear that the owner
takes on the financial risk and that no public funding will be provided for future relief or
rebuilding.



Combine tactics. Setbacks and rolling easements should be combined with a prohibition
against coastal armoring in order to best implement a policy of managed retreat and
protect the long-term health of beaches. Rolling easements must be combined with policies
to prevent coastal armoring in order to be effective. Coastal armoring would both destroy
the beach (thereby negating the public access purpose of the easement) and prevent the
beach from rolling inland.



Provide an enforcement mechanism to ensure that setback provisions are complied with
and conduct regular evaluations to determine if the setbacks have been effective.
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Be specific and explicit in legislation. A state wishing to implement a rolling easement
should explicitly create one in state legislation. The initial creation of the easement may be
considered a taking and require compensation, either monetary or through an offset.
However, this compensation will be far less substantial than that required to purchase a
home outright, and it will also secure public beach access.



A rolling easement could also be acquired through the use of exactions. Private owners
seeking to build or expand coastal properties could be required to allow a public easement
as an offset to the negative externalities of coastal development.



Use required disclosures to inform the public about risk. Sales of coastal property should
include a disclosure requirement that informs prospective purchasers of the risks they face.
This may not prevent takings litigation, but it will promote awareness of the costs of coastal
living, which will assist in the implementation of further policies.

PROHIBITING COASTAL ARMORING


Take strong action. Coastal armoring has significant external costs to the long-term health
of the shoreline and to public access to the coasts. A statewide prohibition or rigorous
permitting requirements for coastal armoring is an effective method for preserving the
coasts in those areas where feasible.



Act quickly. Legislation and regulations should be enacted as soon as possible in order to
limit the number and scope of existing structures that will be grandfathered in under the
old permissive standards. Legislation should also limit, to the extent possible, the repair,
rebuilding, and expansion of existing armoring. It should also transfer responsibility for
funding the maintenance and replacement of existing structures to private landowners so
that the costs of maintaining coastal armoring are internalized by coastal landowners.



Use multiple tactics. Legislation, exactions, or agency policies prohibiting armoring should
be coupled with setbacks, rolling easements, rebuilding restrictions and other managed
retreat tools.



Place the burden of proof on the landowner. Coastal development permits should not
allow the existence of a seawall or other hard armoring to be sufficient evidence of the
safety and stability of a development site. Placing the burden of proof on the landowner
serves both to raise awareness with the development community and to save government
resources. This will also limit harm in the case of a catastrophic event or failure of the
armoring.



Break the sea wall cycle whenever possible by preventing development that relies on the
continued existence of coastal armoring. Such development will require substantial oniii | C o m p i l e d L e s s o n s L e a r n e d
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going funding to repair, rebuild, and expand coastal armoring to keep it safe. Managed
retreat is not only about re-locating existing communities but also about preventing new
development in vulnerable areas.


Requiring landowners to promise not to build coastal armoring in order to receive a
development permit can be a powerful coastal development tool and can be used broadly
to accomplish managed retreat. When exactions are used, agencies should be careful in
how they spell out the legitimate government interest that is being served by the exaction
and should be sure that the burden on the landowner is proportionate to the benefit to the
public.



Pursuing mitigation fees for public harms resulting from hard armoring (such as lost access
to public beaches) can provide needed revenue to pursue other managed retreat policies
but should be used only in combination with other regulatory policies so as to avoid the
appearance of selling the coast.



When coastal armoring has proven ineffective, been substantially damaged by storms, or
encroached on public lands governments can take this opportunity to require the removal
of existing structures.

REBUILDING RESTRICTIONS


Implement building restrictions and zoning decisions as soon as possible. These actions will
only affect structures built after the regulations are put in place, so to avoid having
buildings grandfathered in under old regulations, these need to be put in place promptly.



Draft building and rebuilding requirements with future hazards in mind as well as current
hazards. Sea level rise and climate change are likely to exacerbate the risks faced by coastal
communities. Buildings in some A zones will soon have to face V zone-like hazards, so
regulations should require buildings in A zones to comply with all V zone requirements.
Consider implementing regulations not only for the 1 in 100 year flood but also for the 1 in
500 year flood.



Prohibit repetitive repairs. Limit the number of times a building may be severely damaged
by coastal events before it has to be removed entirely. This is an excellent way to prevent
the costly public expenditures that will be required by repetitive losses along the coasts.
Stating these requirements explicitly in advance of a disaster will put the community on
notice.



Educate the public about the risks associated with coastal living and the ways in which
building restrictions address those risks. Conduct education campaigns when and where
possibly. Partner with scientists and policy experts from universities, environmental groups,
and other advocacy organizations.
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Place the burden of proof on the private property owner. This will both require the
property owner to educate him or herself about the risks facing the property and will
reduce the resource burdens on government agencies.



Coordinate zoning, building restrictions, setbacks, easements and other coastal
management tools within a coherent coastal management plan to ensure that all tools are
working towards complementary goals.



Coordinate federal, state, and local building and rebuilding requirements to the extent
possible. Conduct this review and coordination before a disaster so that property owners
will be able to begin repairs as soon as possible after a disaster.

ACQUISITION


Relocation is key. Municipalities and states considering a buyout program must consider
where they want development to occur, identify those areas, and build in elements of their
buyout program that assist homeowners in relocating to those desired areas. Some ways to
do this are providing incentives for relocation within the district, providing assistance for
down payments for low-income residents, and identifying areas of safe growth in a
development plan. Areas for targeted development should be identified well in advance of
a disaster. And new housing should be priced to be equally or less expensive than the
housing that was acquired.



Incentivize homeowners to remain nearby. This will not only assist in maintaining the tax
base but also retain a greater sense of community. Government agencies can do this by
offering bonus payments for homeowners to relocate nearby or by developing new housing
areas.



Move quickly. Buyout programs are most successful when initiated immediately after a
natural disaster. Plans should be made and put in place in advance so that they can be
implemented quickly after a disaster. Placing deadlines on accepting offers can be an
effective measure to make homeowners make a decision. Staff should be dedicate staff to
process applications quickly.



Identify priority homes based on greatest vulnerability.
particularly cost-effective areas for buyout programs.



Make homeowners aware of the benefits of acquisition. This is true for both conservation
easements and buyout programs. Conduct a targeted information campaign to educate
homeowners on the dangers and costs associated with remaining in a vulnerable area.

Repetitive loss areas are
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Keep the program cost effective. Place a cap on the amount offered for homes or
easements. Use a standard formula to determine property value in order to avoid long
negotiation periods and hold-outs.



Create floodplains. Attempt to buy large continuous areas of land in order to create
floodplains that can act as barriers to future flooding. Return to areas after the fact and
offer programs targeted at ‘orphan houses.’ Offer incentives for neighborhoods to move as
a complete block. Target small locations: a program does not need to be large to be
successful.



Take the opportunity to invest in improvements. When buying properties, consider public
spaces that would most improve the community. When rebuilding in safer locations,
consider new building codes, solar power, and other design changes that would make those
areas more desirable and resilient.



Publicity and transparency are key. Working with NGOs can increase flexibility of programs,
and working with the public builds trust and allows the community to have a voice in how
the acquired land is used.



Consider a combination of options such as acquisition through eminent domain coupled
with the use of a conditional lease in order to lower costs. However, recognize that this
path will provide protection only against the future harms of sea level rise and not against
coastal storms that are affecting coastal properties even today.



Be flexible and creative. Conservation easements can be designed to adapt to everyone’s
needs, making them more beneficial to landowners while still achieving the buffer needs. .
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INTRODUCTION
Ocean shorelines, with their economic resources and recreational opportunities, have long
been coveted locations for development. The same proximity to the coast that makes
development desirable also threatens those very structures: rising tides, eroding shores, and
coastal storms all threaten property and public safety. As climate change accelerates rising sea
levels and possibly worsens hurricanes and other storms, the threat posed by such hazards will
increase. Ironically, development along the coasts impairs the shoreline’s natural ability to
withstand these same hazards.
As a result, many coastal communities are trapped in a cycle of risk in which they are
developed, devastated by a natural event or disaster, and then rebuilt and repaired only to be
struck again.1 As a classic example, Dauphin Island, Alabama, has been substantially destroyed
ten times by hurricanes in the past forty years and yet, after being destroyed once again by
Hurricane Katrina, commenced rebuilding.2 Dedication to community and resilience in the face
of adversity are traits to be admired, but government officials must balance our natural
tendency to persevere against the social and economic costs and risks to personal safety posed
by continual development in vulnerable locations. Federal funding spreads the risk exposure of
coastal living across a greater population, which means that individual property owners
internalize less of the cost of living in such risky areas.3 Since 1979, Dauphin Island has received
$80 million in federal funding – more than $60,000 per resident – plus an additional $72 million
in federal flood insurance payouts (although Dauphin Island residents have paid only $9.3
million in premiums).4
Policy makers and the public at large are becoming increasingly aware of the expenses
associated with repeated coastal disasters. Hurricane Sandy in the fall of 2012 cost $65
billion.5 Hurricane Ike in 2008 came in at $27 billion. Hurricanes Wilma and Rita cost $16
billion each in 2005, not to mention Hurricane Katrina at $125 billion. Hurricanes Ivan and
Charley cost $14 and $15 billion respectively in 2004.6 This list says nothing about a host of
billion dollar storms in between, much less other types of disasters such as flooding and severe
storms that cost billions every year (144 weather disasters over $1 billion since 1980). Nor does
it capture the personal costs: the loved ones lost, the people displaced for months on end, the
personal belongings and memories destroyed, the communities disrupted.
If it seems that big disasters have been occurring more frequently in recent years, it may be
true. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the number of
natural events that inflict at least $1 billion in damage (adjusted for inflation) has risen from an
average of two per year in the 1980s to more than ten per year since 2010.7 And the federal
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government has begun playing a larger role in disaster relief, meaning more federal funding
expended at each disaster.8 Between 2011 and 2013, Congress spent $136 billion on disaster
relief.9 In comparison, in 2013, the federal government spent $65.7 billion on education.10
These bills are only expected to increase as climate change exacerbates weather conditions,
and public expenditures for repeated disaster relief are always controversial.11
In the past, government has promoted coastal development to encourage economic growth
and expanded tax base.12 Increased development and larger, more expensive infrastructure
raise the cost of each disaster. The three primary options to respond to a rising sea and
increased threat of hurricanes are protection, accommodation, and retreat. Traditionally,
governments and private owners have been reluctant to abandon coastal properties or to turn
to flood-friendly uses. As a result, they have stressed the need for protective structures (such
as seawalls and other forms of hard armoring) to defend coastal development from the sea.13
However, policy makers are becoming increasingly aware of the limitations and costs of hard
armoring.
Rather than rely solely on coastal armoring structures, policy makers will need to
turn increasingly to land use reform and a policy of managed retreat from the shorelines.
These policies avoid disasters by building resilience, preventing or limiting coastal development
in vulnerable locations, and reducing the impact of coastal hazards on infrastructure. Such
proactive non-structural solutions are often more cost effective than coastal armoring over the
long-term as they do not require on-going maintenance, re-building, or repair.14 A long-term
policy of managed retreat can limit a community’s exposure to coastal hazards, save lives, and
limit the expenditure of public funding on vulnerable infrastructure and response
mechanisms.15

Purpose of this Handbook
Other academics have written about the numerous legal tools that are available to
legislators and regulators to respond to coastal hazards and to conduct managed retreat.16
This Handbook builds on those works by providing practical advice drawn from examples of
locations where managed retreat has already been conducted or is on-going. It describes legal
principles and precedents that can serve as useful guides for the creation of new policies, and it
identifies lessons learned and recommendations based on previous experiences. It is important
for policy makers to recognize that managed retreat has been done before – sometimes
successfully and sometimes not – and that we can learn from those examples to build a more
resilient coast.

2|Page

Managed Coastal Retreat Handbook

REFERENCES
1

See Travis Brennan, Redefining the American Coastline: Can the Government Withdraw Basic Services from the
Coast and Avoid Takings Claims?, 14 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL 101 (2008); Orrin H. Pilkey and Robert S.
Young, Will Hurricane Katrina Impact Shoreline Management? Here's Why It Should, 21 JOURNAL OF COASTAL RESEARCH
iii (2005); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 TULANE LAW
REVIEW 61, 63 (1985).
2

Rob Young and Andrew Coburn, Column: Sandy Reminds Us of Coastal Hazards, USA Today, Oct. 31, 2012,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2012/10/31/hurricane-sandy-new-york-new-jersey-coast-line/1669745;
Justin Gillis and Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays, Repeatedly, the Critics Ask Why, NEW YORK TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/science/earth/as-coasts-rebuild-and-us-pays-again-criticsstop-to-ask-why.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
3

See, e.g., RAYMOND BURBY ET AL., SHARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: HOW TO CONTROL GOVERNMENTS’ LOSSES IN NATURAL
DISASTERS (Westview Press, 1991).
4

See, e.g., Young and Coburn, supra note 2; Gillis and Barringer, supra note 2.

5

NOAA
National
Climatic
Data
Center,
Billion-Dollar
Weather/Climate
Disasters,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events (last visited Aug. 7, 2013). NOAA calculates costs in terms of dollars
that would not have been incurred had the event not taken place.
6

Id.

7

Id. See also, Brad Plumer, The government is spending way more on disaster relief than anybody thought, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/29/thegovernment-is-spending-way-more-on-disaster-relief-than-anybody-thought (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
8

See, e.g., Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and James Orr, How Will We Pay for Superstorm Sandy?,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Dec. 20, 2012, http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/12/how-willwe-pay-for-superstorm-sandy.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2013); J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George
Zanjani, Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk, in MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK
(NBER Conference Report, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
9

DANIEL J. WEISS AND JACKIE WEIDMAN, DISASTROUS SPENDING: FEDERAL DISASTER-RELIEF EXPENDITURES RISE AMID MORE EXTREME
WEATHER (Center for American Progress, 2013), at 1.
10

New
American
Foundation,
Education
in
the
Federal
Budget,
Jun.
21,
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/education-federal-budget (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).

2013,

11

See, e.g., Rick Ungar, Oklahoma’s Two GOP Senators Repeatedly Opposed Disaster Relief for Others in Need,
may 21, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2013/05/21/oklahomas-two-gop-senators-repeatedlyopposed-disaster-relief-for-others-in-need; Brad Plumer, Why the fights over disaster relief in Congress keep
getting
worse,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
Jan.
4,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/04/why-the-fights-over-disaster-relief-incongress-keep-getting-worse; Klaus Jacob, Time for Tough Question: Why Rebuild?, The Washington Post, Sep. 6,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501034.html(last visited
Aug. 7, 2013).
12

See e.g., NOAA, State of the Coast: Economy, http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/coastal_economy (stating that in
2011, 45% of the U.S. gross domestic product was generated in coastal counties); NANCY S. PHILIPPI, FLOODPLAIN
MANAGEMENT – ECOLOGIC AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 29-30 (1996) (describing economic interests associated with
coastal communities); JOHN R. LOGAN AND HARVEY L. MOLOTOCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987) (describing local political pressure for economic growth as

3 | Introduction

Columbia Center for Climate Change Law

motive for not limiting development in hazardous areas); Leonard Ruchelman, Natural Hazard Mitigation and
Development: An Exploration of the Roles of Public and Private Sectors, in MANAGING DISASTER: STRATEGIES AND
PERSPECTIVES (Louise Comfort, ed., Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988).
13

See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING COASTAL EROSION 29, 56-61 (1990) (describing the main methods of
erosion control as hard armoring projects including dams, groins, seawalls, revetments, and breakwaters); NOAA,
State
of
the
Coast:
Shoreline
Armoring:
The
Pros
and
Cons,
http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/shoreline/shoreline_armoring.html (stating that millions of federal, state, and
private dollars have been expended annually on shore armoring and protection).
14

See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Anticipatory Planning for Sea-Level Rise Along the
Coast of Maine at 5-1 – 5-2 (Sep. 1995). For a discussion of the long-term costs to each state from climate change
impacts, see the fifty state reports prepared by the American Security Project, Pay Now, Pay Later (2011) available
at http://americansecurityproject.org/issues/climate-energy-and-security/climate-change/pay-now-pay-later (last
visited Aug. 7, 2013).
15

See generally Brower, David J. Brower et al., Reducing Hurricane and Coastal Storm Hazards Through Growth
Management: A Guidebook for North Carolina Coastal Localities at 29-30 (1987).
16

See, especially, J. GRANNIS, ADAPTATION TOOL KIT: SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE (GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER,
2011); J. Peter Byrne & J. Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE (M.
Gerrard & K. Kuh, eds., 2012).
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TABLE OF COASTAL MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Numerous legal and policy tools are available to promote coastal managed retreat, not all of
which are discussed in depth in this Handbook. This table provides a brief overview of available
tools, as consolidated from other sources in the managed retreat literature. See, especially:
J. GRANNIS, ADAPTATION TOOL KIT: SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE (GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER,
2011).
J. Peter Byrne & J. Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
(M. Gerrard & K. Kuh, eds., 2012).

Tool
Climate
Adaptation
Plans

Description
Climate adaptation plans can address
coastal hazards as part of a state-wide or
local adaptation effort

Identifying areas for priority development
Development
and areas for retreat can promote
Plans
managed retreat as part of a larger
development strategy
Incorporate increased hazards from
Hazard
climate change into HMPs, and then use
Mitigation Plans the HMPs to guide comprehensive plans/
zoning process
Coastal management plans integrate a
Coastal
variety of managed retreat policies into a
Management
comprehensive and coherent plan to
Plans
guide development
Use capital improvement plans to study
Capital
the vulnerability of their infrastructure to
Improvement
projected climate change impacts and
Plans / Land
then decrease investment in
Use Plans
infrastructure in vulnerable areas

Example
California Climate Adaption
Strategy; Florida Governor's
Action Team on Energy and
Climate Change
Maryland Smart Growth
Initiative
FEMA-Approved State Hazard
Mitigation Plans – Colorado’s
Drought Plan and California’s
State Hazard Mitigation Plan
Texas Coastal Management Plan

Maryland Growth Act and Smart
Growth Imitative; California
Coastal Act

Transportation
Plans (and other
Utility or
Agency Plans)

Incorporate managed retreat into siting
decisions in federally-mandated state
transportation plans; allocate
infrastructure to less vulnerable areas

California Department of
Transportation Guidance (2011):
instructed staff on how to
assess sea-level rise risks when
planning infrastructure projects

Flood Insurance
Reforms

Requiring insurance in flood-prone areas
can protect homeowners and
government funds by providing other
means of relief; it can also signal the true
costs of coastal living

National Flood Insurance
Program
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Tool

Downzoning

Zoning Overlay

Setbacks

Building and
Rebuilding
Restrictions

Building
Moratoria

Exactions

Description
Limit potential uses and intensity of use
in areas vulnerable to the effects of
climate change to decrease development
potential
Provide an additional layer of zoning
requirements in specialized areas such as
coastal hazard areas
Require new development to be sited
upland to avoid flooding; base setbacks
on erosion rates or sea level rise to create
a rolling setback
Require strict construction standards in
vulnerable areas; limit the extent or
number of repairs after disasters
Impose a temporary moratorium on new
building permits while regulators update
comprehensive plans and zoning schemes
to account for projected sea level rises
and other climate change impacts
Grant development permits with retreat
conditions (e.g. no armoring, setback
requirement, rolling easement)

Example
Connecticut Coastal
Management Act

Greenwich, Connecticut

California Coastal Act; Maine
Sand Dune Rules; Kaua’i, Hawaii
Maine Sand Dune Rules; South
Carolina Beach Front
Management Act; Florida
Coastal Construction Control
Line
Florida 1989 two-year
moratorium on building on
coastal islands; Nags Head,
North Carolina
California Coastal Commission
prohibition on armoring

Condemnation

Establish policy of declaring homes too
close to shore (and therefore exposed to
erosion and storms) as being unsafe for
habitation

Pacifica, California
(condemnation due to erosion
of coastal bluffs)

Private
Information
Disclosure

Require property sellers to disclose risks
to the property from climate change, sea
level rise, and erosion

South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann.
Section 48-39-330
California: Cal. Civ. Code Section
1103.2

General
Information
Disclosure
Buyouts
(Acquisition in
Fee)
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Make publicly available all the maps and
models used to create state climate
change adaption plans; identify
vulnerabilities and risks
Acquire land in vulnerable areas and
convert it to open space to protect
remaining infrastructure and buildings

New York City report “A
Stronger, More Resilient New
York”
Ames County, Iowa; Grand
Forks, North Dakota; Soldier’s
Grove, Wisconsin
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Tool

Description

Example

Conservation
Easements

Acquire an easement on all or part of the
vulnerable property such that landowner
agrees to limit development in specified
manner

Maryland Environmental Trust;
Wapello, Iowa; National Park
Service

Transferable
Development
Credits

Sever development rights from property
ownership; landowners in vulnerable
areas can sell their development rights to
landowners in less-vulnerable areas
seeking to expand

Tax Incentives

Base property tax assessments on current
use values, instead of fair market values
(which would be influenced by
developers), making it more costeffective for landowners to hold onto
undeveloped land

City of Malibu, California, Local
Coastal Program; Collier
County, Florida

Virginia Conservation Easement
Tax Incentives
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PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Coastal management is a rich and complicated area of policy and regulation. No one
publication could thoroughly address all of the related laws and policies. However, two areas
that require some background familiarity are the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and
constitutional takings challenges. Neither will be addressed comprehensively, but an overview
is included for those readers not familiar with the challenges presented and should serve as a
reference for background information.

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM*
In 1968, Congress created the NFIP to provide
subsidized insurance to communities in areas
particularly vulnerable to floods. Private insurance
rates that reflected the actual extent of the flood
risk were becoming prohibitively expensive and communities along river and coastal shores
were left exposed to risk from storms and floods. Federally subsidized insurance was meant to
enable coastal development while promoting hazard mitigation efforts. However, the program
has been criticized for promoting vulnerable development and spending federal tax dollars in
an unsustainable manner. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (discussed
below) may address some of these concerns as it is implemented over the coming years.
Through mapping, insurance rate-setting, and developing minimum floodplain regulations, the
NFIP has the potential to promote managed retreat and hazard mitigation.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the program. FEMA
designates Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) as those areas expected to be flooded during a
100 year flood.17† Local communities located within or partially within SFHAs must develop
floodplain management plans to address potential floods and buildings must meet minimum
construction requirements in order to qualify for federally subsidized insurance.18
Despite these requirements, coastal storms caused significant damage to shoreline
properties. Many buildings were not built according to NFIP standards and required costly
repairs after being damaged – costs that were not met by the low premiums. Some premiums
did not reflect the true risks of flooding. When building standards changed, or the risk of
flooding increased, homes were “grandfathered” in – they paid according to what the risk was
when the home was built rather than according to the current level of risk. In addition, the
mandatory requirement for homeowners with a federally backed mortgage to purchase flood

*

Images: FEMA Flood Facts.
It is important to be clear that a 100 year flood is not a flood that occurs once every 100 years. Rather, it is a
flood that has a 1% chance of occurring (or being exceeded) every year.
†
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insurance was not strictly enforced. 19 This meant that during times of disaster many
homeowners who had not purchased insurance still received federal aid.
All of this meant that NFIP was spending more money that it
recovered through premiums. After the 2005 storm season, NFIP
had an estimated $23 billion in liabilities, far exceeding the $2.2
billion in premiums earned annually.20 As of September 2011,
the NFIP had a debt of $17.75 billion and was widely considered
financially unsound.21 The NFIP requires regular re-authorization
from Congress, but Congress has at times been slow to
reauthorize the floundering program, which left homeowners
who needed insurance to get mortgages in limbo.22 In order to address these issues, the
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act was passed in July 2012.

Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012
The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (BW-12)23 extended the NFIP for five years
and made modifications to the program’s structure. Some of the key provisions of BW-12
include raising insurance premiums, creating a technical mapping council, and studying the
possibility of transferring flood risk to the private sector.
To address NFIP’s ongoing financial problems, BW-12 phases out subsidized rates for newly
purchased properties, lapsed policies, and new policies covering properties for the first time.24
This will occur slowly: new rates will increase 20% per year starting in 2014 until the full risk is
reflected in the rate.25 A portion of the 20% of existing policyholders that pay subsidized rates
(approximately 1.12 million of the 5.6 million policyholders) will see a 25% annual premium
increase until full-risk premiums are reached.26 BW-12 also removes grandfathered rating,
which means that homeowners will be required to pay premiums based on the latest risk
assessment and maps rather than the risk assessments and maps that were in place at the time
of construction. For those that are affected, this could result in substantial increase in their
premiums. Homes built before the first Flood Insurance Rate Map (Pre-FIRM) was created for
their area will see a 16 to 17% increase.27 For a single-story structure in high risk, non-coastal
AE zone, a $250,000 home might see the following changes in policy depending on the
elevation of the property:28
Subsidized Premium
Before BW12

Rates Premium Rates Elimination of
Subsidies (Oct 1, 2013)

Lowest floor of property is 4
feet above base flood elevation

$3,6 00

$553

Lowest floor of property is at
base flood elevation

$3,600

$1,815

Lowest floor of property is 4
feet below base flood elevation

$3,600

$10,723
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Table from FEMA Quick Reference Guide, September, 2013.
It is important to note that in the table above, the homes at or above base flood elevation
actually see a reduction in their insurance premiums. Moreover, these changes will not be
implemented immediately. Primary home owners in some cases will keep their subsidized
rates until or unless the policy lapses, the property is sold, the property suffers repeated
damage, or a new policy is purchased.29 Even so, as a result of these changes, developers and
new buyers may be discouraged from purchasing homes in vulnerable areas.
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Graphic:
FEMA

Opponents of managed retreat argue that raising insurance premiums will mean that only
wealthy individuals are able to live along the coasts. However, the 25% increase will only affect
non-primary residents (e.g., second homes and summer homes), businesses, and severe loss
properties.30 The second-home owners and at least some of the businesses are less likely to be
the backbone of neighborhoods and communities that government funding seeks to preserve.
As for severe loss properties, proponents of managed retreat argue that it is unfair to use tax
dollars paid by inland residents to allow other citizens to live along the coasts; and that
subsidizing housing for homeowners in vulnerable locations means placing those families and
communities who can least afford to lose their homes and possessions in danger from floods
and storms.
What is certain is that increased NFIP premiums will create political pressure for state and
local governments to further subsidize coastal living. Government officials should study the
long-term costs and benefits of promoting coastal development in vulnerable areas before
committing public funds.
In addition to changing premium rates, BW-12 also creates
a technical mapping advisory council that oversees
improvements of floodplain maps to ensure premiums can
more accurately reflect risk. 31 These are important as
outdated flood maps are often relied on by policy makers,
leading to hazard mitigation plans that do not reflect the true
scope of the risk, and by homebuyers and their lenders.
BW-12 also allows the federal government to study the possibility of transferring some of
the flood risk from the nation to the private sector through reinsurance purchasing. 32
Reinsurance would allow the government to make a payment to private insurance companies,
who would then assume future flood losses sustained from disasters.33 This assumes that
private insurance companies will be willing to enter this arena, which is not certain.
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FURTHER READING
Raymond Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management: The U.S. Experience, 3
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 111 (2001).
Howard Kunreuther and Gilbert White, The Role of the National Flood Insurance Program in
Reducing Losses and Promoting Wise Use of Floodplains, 95 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION 6 (2011).
Jessica Grannis, Analysis of How the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (H.R. 4348) May Affect
State and Local Adaptation Efforts, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER (Aug. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/Analysis%20of%20the%20Flood%20Insurance%2
0Reform%20Act%20of%202012.pdf.

Mary Myers, The National Flood Insurance Program as a Non-Structural Mitigation Measure,
U.S.-ITALY RESEARCH WORKSHOP ON THE HYDROMETEOROLOGY, IMPACTS, AND MANAGEMENT OF EXTREME
FLOODS, PERUGIA, ITALY, NOVEMBER 1995, available at http://www.engr.colostate.edu/~jsalas/usitaly/papers/45myers.pdf.

CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS & COMPENSATION
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from taking private
property without providing just compensation. This is most classically embodied in a physical
taking, when the government takes control of a parcel of land through eminent domain for a
public purpose. However, it may also apply to laws and regulations that proscribe or restrict
development. This section will briefly describe some of the most notable case law on takings.
It is important to note that the focus of takings litigation is not whether or not the
government is allowed to pass a law or adopt a regulation but whether or not the government
will be required to compensate the landowner. Managed retreat may not be feasible if it
requires substantial payments to private landowners, so much of the discussion within this
handbook will focus on whether or not the government is required to pay. However, even in
cases where an action might be constituted a taking, it must be clear that government can still
choose to enact that regulation; it will simply be required to pay the landowner.

Permanent Physical Occupation
Legislatures cannot enact a managed retreat measure that amounts to a permanent
physical occupation of private property without compensating the landowners. A “physical
occupation” applies not only when the government takes complete control over the property
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but also when the government requires the landowner to permit someone or something to
access her property.
This principle derives from the case Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, a New York law required landlords to allow cable companies to
place equipment outside their apartment buildings on a permanent basis. The court held that
the law worked as a taking, and the principle stands. An easement which allows the public
access to a portion of a beach property amounts to a physical occupation and is therefore a
taking. This applies when an easement is first created, not when the easement shifts (see
Chapter 2 on Rolling Easements).
Restrictions, Exactions and Public Dedication of Private Property
The government can use its power to approve and deny development construction and
other permits as a mechanism to impose development restrictions and to obtain exactions.
The government can restrain an owner from building a seawall (see Chapter 3 on Preventing
Armoring) or limit the number of times an owner could rebuild after a coastal storm (see
Chapter 4 on Rebuilding Restrictions) by granting a development permit only if the builder
agrees to the government’s terms. These are not traditional physical occupations, but they
may still face takings challenges. For example, an exaction that requires an owner to dedicate a
portion of his property for a public purpose or to grant an easement for public access to her
property may be considered a physical taking. In order avoid begin considered a taking, the
restriction or exaction must serve a legitimate public interest (such as public health, safety, and
welfare) and must meet two further criteria:


Rough Proportionality: In 1994 the Court first articulated the “rough proportionality”
requirement in Dolan v. City of Tigard. That is, the burden placed on the private owner
must be in some way proportional to the benefit being conferred on the public.34



Essential Nexus: According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,35 the government may only condition the granting of a
permit on an exaction if the action demanded of the private owner serves the same
purpose as a permit denial would have served. The government cannot condition a
permit on the performance of some unrelated task.

Government officials must be mindful of the limits of restrictions on use, exactions and
dedications of private property for public purposes, but, used prudently, these devices can be a
valuable part of the legislator’s managed retreat toolkit. Government can use exactions and
conditions on building permits to obtain transfers of land or to obtain easements that allow
government agencies to actively manage portions of land in problematic areas. According to
the Supreme Court, “Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their
conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such
regulations against constitutional attack.”36 However, agencies should be careful how they
justify the proportionality of their demands and the connection between the externalities
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caused by the developer’s proposed project and the mitigating activity proposed by the
agency.37
The Koontz Complication
In June 2013, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District38 that may require government agencies to be even more careful in how
they justify imposing conditions on building permits. In Koontz, a landowner held a 14.9 acre
wetlands property and sought a permit to develop a 3.7 acre portion. The Management District
was unsatisfied with the offer and gave Koontz two options: either develop one acre and
conserve the remaining, or proceed with developing all 3.7 but pay for improvements on other
wetlands some miles away. The owner rejected both choices and the permit was denied.
Koontz claimed that the denial violated his property rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that government’s conditions must meet the tests set forth in
Nollan/Dolan even when the government denies the permit: “It makes no difference that no
property was actually taken in this case. Extortionate demands for property in the land-use
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property but because
they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation.”39
Moreover, an exaction that requires a landowner to pay money (rather than dedicate some
portion of her land to public use) may still be a taking if it runs afoul of the Nollan/Dolan tests.
The Koontz decision was based on the tradition that the government “may not deny a benefit
to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.”40 In this case, the government cannot
deny Koontz a building permit because he objected to an unconstitutional demand by the
government. That would be an unconstitutional condition.
The dissent noted that this ruling might place a significant burden on government’s ability
to obtain exactions. But, as the Court noted, an “unconstitutional condition” is not the same as
a taking, so Koontz is not entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment – he did not
lose his property and he was not actually required to pay for improvements on other land. He
may still be entitled to payment under Florida state law, but that is a matter yet to be
determined by the Florida state courts. In fact, the full impact of Koontz on the managed
retreat picture is unsettled. It may be that, in practice, Koontz will be a modest extension of the
rules previously established in Nollan/Dolan, requiring clearer justifications for exactions.
However, any agency seeking exactions must be mindful of how the case is being interpreted in
its state courts and how that might affect the agency’s proposed process.

Regulatory Takings
In some cases, government regulations affect property so significantly that the regulation is
deemed to be effectively equivalent to an exercise of eminent domain power, even though the
owner retains title to the property. A brief discussion of regulatory takings is provided here.
Further discussion and examples as they relate to floodplain management can be found in:
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Jon A. Kusler, No Adverse Impact: Floodplain Management and the Courts, ASSOCIATION OF STATE
FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS (2004), http://www.floods.org/NoAdverseImpact/NAI_AND_THE_COURTS.pdf.
Deprivation of All Economic Value
If a proposed regulation will deprive an owner of all economic value in the property, the
regulation may run afoul of the holding of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992),41 and
the government may be required to compensate the landowner (see Chapter 2 on Setbacks for
a discussion on the facts of Lucas).42
According to the Lucas decision, regulators cannot simply circle problem areas on a map
and proscribe all development. But Lucas has very limited application.


First, Lucas applies when a regulation removes all economic value of the property. If
there hasn’t been a total reduction, the Penn Central balancing test (explained below)
will be applied. Even if a statute severely restricts development of a coastal property,
remaining uses like fishing and swimming may “constitute economically beneficial uses
that still inhere in the property.”43



Second, regulations that prohibit an activity that is considered a common law nuisance
are not takings. Under Lucas, governments may still prohibit landowners from engaging
in activities that have historically been considered nuisance. This raises a more difficult
question about the ability of governments to label new types of activities as nuisances.
For example, a legislature may declare an activity to be a nuisance (such as developing
too near the shore or building seawalls), but its ability to make such a declaration “stick”
in this context, absent a common law tradition of that nuisance in the state, may
depend on the disposition of the courts.44



Third, in dealing with Lucas concerns, government can still prohibit development on
lands that are in the public trust (such as beach areas where the public has a preestablished easement for access) (see Chapter 2 on Rolling Setbacks and Easements).

What about a total proscription on construction for a limited time?
Regulation that wipes out economic value only for a limited time is not necessarily a Lucasstyle compensable taking. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (2002),45 an agency imposed a moratorium on development in the Lake Tahoe basin
until it could devise a plan for the area’s future use and development. Affected landowners
claimed that the moratorium was effectively a taking of their property, but the court disagreed.
Such moratoria, which agencies may find valuable as they take stock of the coastal areas in
their jurisdiction, are unlikely to be found to effect takings, if not too lengthy.
What if the developer is aware of the regulation, pre-purchase?
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Disclosure of the regulation does not eliminate the takings concern. Disclosure can provide
other benefits (such as putting owners on notice and building awareness of the risks of coastal
development) but will not guarantee immunity from a takings claim.46
Reduction in Economic Value
Potential regulatory takings that reduce the economic value of a property but that do not
deprive the owner of all economic benefit are evaluated under a balancing test derived from
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (1978).47 The test comprises three factors:
The economic impact of the regulation on the landowners; the extent to which the regulation
interferes with legitimate investment-backed expectations; and the character of the
government action.48
To bolster its case by providing value, government can confer transferable development
rights (TDRs). TDRs are credits essentially created by the government that allow an owner to
exercise his right to build, elsewhere. As Penn Central illustrated, TDRs have economic value, so
conferring them helps blunt regulatory takings claims by retaining economic value for the
owner.49 (See Chapter 5 on Acquisition for discussion of TDR).

Cautionary Principle
Because of the absence of bright lines in the doctrine, legislators working towards managed
retreat must recognize the general contours of the doctrine and proceed cautiously, basing
their regulations on rigorous scientific work, while being mindful of the charged feelings that
attend these issues. A legislator’s political instincts are relevant here, for this process is greatly
influenced by collective notions of fairness.

FURTHER READING
J. Peter Bryne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on Regulatory Takings
Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 625 (2009).
Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and
Public Access along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 533 (2007).
David L. Callies and J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law:
Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust Exceptions and the (MIS) use of InvestmentBacked Expectations, 36 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 339 (2001) 339.
Dennis J. Hwang, Shoreline setback regulations and the takings analysis, 13 UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII
LAW REVIEW 1 (1991).
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Hyo (Charlene) Kim and Caroline A. Karp, When Retreat is the Better Part of Valor: A Legal
Analysis of Strategies to Motivate Retreat from the Shore, 5 SEA GRANT LAW AND POLICY JOURNAL
169 (2012).
Jon A. Kusler, No Adverse Impact: Floodplain Management and the Courts, ASSOCIATION OF STATE
FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS (2004), http://www.floods.org/NoAdverseImpact/NAI_AND_THE_COURTS.pdf
James Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: how to Save Wetlands and
Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW 1279-1399 (1998).
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CHAPTER 1
COASTAL MANAGEMENT PLANNING
Managed retreat from vulnerable coastlines is only one element of coastal management,
and it should not be pursued in isolation but rather should be incorporated as part of a
cohesive, comprehensive coastal management plan. Long-term retreat from vulnerable
shoreline begins with a plan that limits development, promotes environmental conservation,
recognizes the importance of natural cycles of beach erosion and nourishment, and encourages
public access to the shore.
Coastal planning occurs at the federal, state, and local levels and these plans should be
coordinated to ensure that they pursue the same goals. The discussion that follows outlines the
general framework of federal, state, and local planning with illustrative examples. In order to
promote managed retreat, such plans can and should include explicit language that makes it
clear that retreating from the coast in order to prevent repetitive losses of life and property is a
priority for coastal management. No isolated effort towards managed retreat will be entirely
successful. Rather, the principle of retreat needs to be emphasized throughout the coastal
management program.

FEDERAL COASTAL PLANNING
In addition to the Coastal Zone Management Act (discussed below), the federal government
has a taken a role in coastal planning in specialized areas of the coast.
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 189950
Congress enacted the Act to ensure free and open navigability of the nation’s waterways.
The Act prohibits any action to excavate, fill, or alter the course, condition, or capacity of any
port, harbor, channel, or other areas within the reach of the Act without a permit. 51 The
building of any wharfs, piers, jetties, and other structures is prohibited without Congressional
approval, and excavation or fill within navigable waters requires the approval of the Chief of
Engineers.52
In a 2009 decision, United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit
ruled that four coastal property owners had violated the Act because they refused to remove
coastal erosion structures. The structures were lawfully constructed on the homeowner’s dry
lands, inland of the mean high water mark, and were intended to protect private homes from
erosion and storms. However, due to sea level rise and coastal erosion, the structures
intersected the ocean and were found to be a trespass and violation of the Section 10 of the
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Rivers and Harbors Act. The property owners were therefore required to remove the
structures.53 The court noted, “While the Homeowners cannot be faulted for wanting to
prevent their land from eroding away, we conclude that because both the upland and tideland
owners have a vested right to gains from the ambulation of the boundary, the Homeowners
cannot permanently fix the property boundary” between private and public lands.54 (See
Chapter 4 on Prohibiting Armoring for more on preventing coastal protection structures and
public ownership of the tidelands.)
Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) of 198255

Coastal Barrier (16 U.S.C. § 3502)

Prior to the CBRA, the federal government had
A sandy coastal feature such as a bay
subsidized and encouraged development on coastal
barrier, tombolo, spit, or island that
barriers. This resulted not only in the loss of natural
is subject to waves and tides and
resources as these barriers were damaged but also in
protects landward aquatic habitats
increased threat to human life and property and the
from direct wave action.
expenditure of millions of tax dollars every year to
combat the risks faced by property owners on these
barriers.56 The CBRA therefore designated undeveloped coastal barriers as part of a protected
system and made this system ineligible for most federal funding (including the National Flood
Insurance Program). As a result, individuals who choose to develop and live on these hazardprone areas bear the economic burden. A 2002 study by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
estimated that between 1982 and 2010, CBRA saved $1.3 Billion in federal taxpayer money.57
National Marines Sanctuary Act (NMSA) of 197258
The NMSA protects areas of marine environment deemed to have national significance,
including some coastal areas, by issuing regulations and implementing penalties for violations.
The NMSA was last reauthorized in November 2000 and reauthorization is currently in
process.59 The NMSA does not have a direct impact on managed retreat but policymakers
should be aware of any sanctuaries within their jurisdiction when creating state and local
management plans.

COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT
The primary role the federal government has taken in coastal management planning is
through its promotion of state coastal planning under the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA) of 1972.60 The CZMA is administered by the NOAA Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management (OCRM), and it aims to “preserve, protect, develop, and where possible,
to restore or enhance the resources of the nation's coastal zone.”61 One of the explicit goals of
the CZMA (§303) is to “minimize the loss of life and property in coastal hazard areas,” a goal
that can be achieved in the long-term through gradual retreat from vulnerable coastal areas.
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The CZMA established two national programs: the National Coastal Zone Management
Program and the National Estuarine Research Reserve System. The Management Program is
the primary focus for the purposes of this Handbook. The Program requires states to create
and implement coastal management programs in order to qualify for federal funding grants.62
Grants are awarded to assist in the initial development of coastal management programs,63
administrative costs,64 coastal resource improvements,65 projects to protect coastal waters,66
and coastal zone enhancement.67 In Fiscal Year 2012, NOAA invested over $65 million in
federal funding and directly supported 675 jobs.68 Thirty-four of the 35 eligible coastal and
Great Lakes states and territories participate in the CZMA Management Program. ‡

Reverse Federalism
The CZMA is unusual as a federal act in that it gives states greater power than the federal
government.69 It contains what has been referred to as a “reverse supremacy clause.” 70 Section
1456(c) of the CZMA requires the federal government, “to the maximum extent practicable,” to
ensure that federal practices are consistent with approved state plans. A similar review
requirement exists for private actions that require a federal license or permit, such as oil and
gas exploration, development, and production.71 Congress has described the state CMP
consistency review process as the “single greatest incentive for State participation in the
coastal zone management program.”72 In fact, the state compliance aspect of the CZMA is so
important that when the Supreme Court limited the scope of the consistency doctrine,
Congress amended the Act explicitly to overturn the Court decision and expand the power of
States to control actions that affect their coasts.73
When a federal agency proposes an action that may affect the coastal zone, the agency
must provide a written statement to the state explaining that the action is consistent with the
state CMP.74 The state agency may object to the activity, and the two agencies may then either
submit to the Secretary of Commerce for mediation75 or the state may bring suit in federal
court.76 In rare cases, the President may, upon written request from the Secretary of
Commerce, exempt a federal program “if the President determines that the activity is in the
paramount interest of the United States.”77
The State CMP and the ability of the state to review and influence federal actions to be
consistent with the CMP give the state a powerful tool for coastal management. This tool,
however, depends in great deal on the quality of the state CMP and the ability of state agencies
to enforce the consistency requirement.

‡

Alaska withdrew from the program in 2011 (discussed more below) and Illinois joined in 2012.
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States participating in the CZMA Management Program. Data from NOAA.

Future of the CZMA
The CZMA has been in place for 41 years, and NOAA has begun to look at how the CZMA
can continue to inform coastal policy in the future. In 2006 and 2007, OCRM partnered with
the Coastal States Organization to conduct a series of meetings and workshops with coastal
managers, stakeholders, and federal agencies with the goal of making recommendations for
administration and legislative changes for an improved CZMA. 78 Although these
recommendations have not yet been implemented, state level policy makers should be aware
of these activities and should be prepared to engage if they want to shape the future of federal
coastal planning.

STATE COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
State Coastal Management Programs (CMPs) translate the overarching principles of the
CZMA into actionable goals and regulations. They represent an important opportunity to
coordinate federal, state, and local actions by setting out clear goals and providing direction to
local governments. The following examples illustrate the types of planning goals that can be
accomplished.
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Texas Coastal Management Program
The Texas CMP was authorized under the Coastal Coordination Act of 199179 and approved
by NOAA in 1996. The program is administered by the Texas Land Commissioner in the General
Land Office (GLO), who is advised by the Coastal Coordination Advisory Committee.80 The
Texas CMP provides coastal enhancement grants to state and local entities to increase and
improve public access to beaches; to protect and restore critical areas such as wetlands; to
improve water quality, natural hazards response, and information and data availability; and to
conduct public education and outreach activities. 81
Annually, the GLO receives $2.5 million in federal
Texas’ Coastal Zone
funds under the coastal resource improvement
program (CZMA §306/§306A), program enhancement
Texas’ coastal zone is the general
area seaward of the Texas coastal
(§309), and the state’s coastal nonpoint source
82
facility designation line, which
pollution (NPS) control program (§310).
Federal Review

roughly follows roads that are
parallel to coastal waters and
wetlands within one mile of tidal
rivers.
The
boundary
encompasses portions or all of 18
coastal counties. Texas has 3,359
miles of coastline and a coastal
population of 6,121,490 as of
2010.

As discussed above, due to a “reverse supremacy”
clause in the CZMA, federal actions within a state that
has a CMP is required to comply with the CMP and can
be reviewed by state authorities. In Texas, the GLO
conducts a Federal Consistency Review of all federal
construction projects, permitting or licensing actions,
and federal financial assistance projects in the coastal
zone. In fiscal year 2012, the GLO reviewed 241 federal license or permitting actions and 138
financial assistance projects.83 The public is also invited to make comments on coastal projects
under review, ensuring that local communities have a voice in the process.
State Permitting
Overlapping jurisdiction between federal and state agencies can further complicate an
already complicated permitting process for common projects. In order to reduce redundancies
and streamline this process, Texas implemented a Joint Permit Application Form (JPAF) and
established a Permit Service Center.
JPAFs simplify the permitting process by providing a consolidated permit application to be
simultaneously distributed to multiple authorizing agencies. The Permit Service Center
provides technical advice to individuals, small businesses, and local governments on the permit
application process. This is a service to the individuals, who may not have the technical
knowledge or expertise to complete the applications properly. It also benefits agencies by
troubleshooting applications before they are submitted. This ensures efficiency and reduces
processing time. During fiscal year 2012, the Public Service Center assisted with 211
applications, including 151 JPAFs. The average processing time was just 3.5 days.84
Reporting Requirement
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Section 33.204(f) of the Texas Coastal Coordination Act requires the GLO and other
networked agencies to prepare an annual report on the effectiveness of the CMP. This includes
an evaluation of set performance measures and quantifiable actions. 85 This reporting
requirement serves an important role in ensuring that the coastal plan is effectively executed.

Storm surge damage
from Hurricane Ike in
Galveston, TX (2008).
There were once 4
piered
structures
along this section of
the seawall. Photo:
NOAA Flower Garden
National
Marine
Sanctuary.

A Note on Alaska
Alaska has more coastline than the rest of the 49 states combined86 — some 6,640 miles of
general coastline and 33,904 miles of tidal shoreline87 – yet it is the only coastal state currently
not participating in the federal Coastal Zone Management Program. Alaska originally joined the
program in 1979, but the implementing state legislation contained a sunset clause, and the
program lapsed in 2011 when the Alaska state legislature declined to extend it.88
In 2012, the Alaska Sea Party, a grassroots organization created to promote coastal
management, tried to resurrect the program. Their petition eventually became a ballot
initiative, but it was defeated; nearly two-thirds of the votes were against Ballot Measure 2.
Only an estimated 25% of registered voters turned up to vote.89 The ballot faced strong
opposition from a “Vote No” organization that was bankrolled with $1.8 million funded largely
by oil and gas industries.90
Opponents of the Alaska Coastal Management Program argue that the state program limits
resource development by adding bureaucratic red tape. Supporters argue that the state needs
to maintain a balance between resource development and environmental conservation in order
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to preserve quality of life for its citizens and that a state plan gives local communities greater
say in coastal development.91
Without a CMP, Alaska lost approximately $2.5 million in federal funds annually. Even more
importantly, Alaska lost its ability to use the CZMA consistency requirement to influence federal
agency activities and federal license or permit activities in the Alaska coast.92 As a result, the
Alaskan coastline is primarily managed by the federal government rather than the state itself.
Some commentators have suggested that this may be detrimental to state efforts to
promote adaptation and retreat, as the federal government may have greater interest in
promoting development of off-shore oil and gas reserves than in protecting local coastal
communities.93

Rodanthe, North Carolina,
September 2, 2011. These
raised homes once had
yards of beach between
them and the sea, until
Hurricane Irene hit the
coast. Photo: FEMA / Tim
Burkit.

LOCAL PLANS AND STATE MANDATED PLANNING
Coastal management planning requires extensive local coordination, and local planning and
implementation therefore play a critical role in achieving broader state-wide and regional
hazard mitigation goals. 94 Increased and improved local planning has been consistently
requested by academics, 95 environmental organizations, 96 developers, 97 and the American
Planning Association.98 Local plans provide the best opportunity for public participation and for
community tailoring. However, local communities sometimes lack the commitment and
resources to develop the detailed, comprehensive plans necessary for hazard mitigation.99 This
lack of technical knowledge is particularly pronounced with respect to coastal hazards as
climate change adds a novel layer of complexity.100
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State-Mandated Planning
State legislation that mandates local planning can assist with these problems. Specifically,
state-mandates can:
 Provide explicit authorization to local governments to address coastal hazards and
coastal development;§
 Secure funding for the creation and administration of local plans (through the CZMA or
state initiatives);
 Identify specific goals for local plans and set priorities for communities; and
 Establish minimum requirements for plans and implementation measures.
In the 1990s, a research team led by
Raymond Burby of the University of North
Carolina and Peter May of the University
of Washington conducted a multi-state
assessment that showed state mandates
improved the quality of local plans. 101
The team compared local plans in
counties that had no state mandate
(Texas, Washington, and inland North
Carolina)** with those in states that did
(California, Florida, and coastal North
Carolina). They concluded that the
presence of a state mandate improved
local plans and that North Carolina’s
coastal state mandate was the most
effective of the three that were
studied.102
Planning mandates can provide
structure and facilitation for local
plans. 103 Facilitating features of state
mandates are those that guide state
agencies to assist local governments. This
can be through provision of funding,
scientific information, or technical
expertise.104
§

California State Planning Act of 1937
(Cal. Gov. Code, Chapter 3, § 65100 et seq.)
California was the first state in the United States to
mandate local planning. A 1971 amendment required
local governments to incorporate plans to reduce risk
from earthquakes, landslides, and floods.
Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972
(Fla. Stat. Ann. §§186.001 et seq. & §§186.801 et seq.)
Florida’s 1972 law required local governments to
adopt comprehensive plans but lacked enforceable
standards. It was amended in 1985 to strengthen the
requirements and to address hurricane response and
capital improvement in hazard areas.
North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act of 1974
(N.C. Gen. Stat. §§113A-106 et seq. (1993))
North Carolina requires planning in coastal counties
and municipalities. It originally focused on protecting
coastal resources but was expanded to include a
broader
range
of
integrated
development
management goals.

The 1994 South Carolina Local Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act (SOUTH CAROLINA CODE ANN. § 629-310 et seq.), for example, consolidated existing authorizations for local land use planning and regulation into a
single location and authorized new zoning powers such as cluster development, performance zoning, and floating
zones. See Douglas Kendall, Preserving South Carolina’s Beaches: The Role of Local Planning in Managing Growth in
Coastal South Carolina, 9 SOUTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 61, 66 (2000).
**
Texas and Washington did not have planning mandates during the time period of the study (pre-1990).
Washington has since adopted state-mandated local planning. RCW 36.70 and 36.70A.
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Structural features are those in which the state guides the content and shape of local plans.
The most obvious structural components are the goals for coastal planning. Such goals should
be clear, specific, and prioritized in order to have the greatest impact on local planning. Clear
and specific goals are those that do not leave too much room for interpretation by local
planners.105 For example, ‘reduce public property loss from hurricanes’ is a clearer goal than
‘mitigate coastal hazards’ and provides greater direction to local governments. The fewer state
level agencies involved in implementing the mandate, the less frequently goals will have to be
re-interpreted and the more likely goals are to be translated into concrete actions at a local
level.106
Prioritization of goals is necessary because local governments are attempting to implement
numerous policies with limited resources (personnel and financial) and need to know where to
invest. 107 For example, state mandates can identify whether economic growth, coastal
resource preservation, or public safety is the highest priority to be pursued by local planners.
According to the multi-state assessment:
[C]lear state mandate goals appear to be important in explaining the high
quality of plans in the North Carolina coastal area. North Carolina’s mandate
specifically suggests that plans should mitigate future disasters by limiting public
infrastructure in hazard zones, decreasing development densities, and
incorporating mitigation during reconstruction. In contrast, California’s mandate
goal simply indicates that communities should adopt plans that protect citizen
safety and reduce property losses. The vague nature of the California mandate
gives local governments too much latitude in addressing these issues.108
Structure also refers to the extent to which a state-mandate is coercive or permissive. A
coercive state mandate is one that ties specific punishments to non-compliance, such as
revocation or non-allocation of funding or state pre-emption. The more coercive a state
mandate is, generally the more likely local communities are to comply.109 State mandates can
have strong coercive language but still be ineffective if implementing state agencies are
reluctant to enforce the mandate. The multi-state assessment found that Florida had the most
coercive language in its mandate but that North Carolina agencies were more likely to use their
enforcement power.110
In order to be as effective as possible in promoting local planning, state legislation that
mandates local planning should:






Identify clear, specific goals;
Prioritize goals and explain how these priorities fit with other state-wide initiatives;
Include clear guidelines and minimum standards;
Simplify oversight mechanisms and reduce the number of interpreting and enforcing
state agencies;
Provide technical assistance where necessary;
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Provide financial resources when feasible; and
Establish punitive measures for non-compliance and encourage enforcement.

Implementation and Buy-In Challenges
Even with all of these factors, the success of local planning (whether state mandated or
voluntary) will depend in large part on the implementation of the plan. The presence of a plan
has been shown to influence the success of local policies,111 but it is not sufficient on its own. In
their multi-state assessment, Burby and May concluded that none of the localities, even those
with state-mandated planning did “a very good job of addressing natural hazards” and on
average the local plans received only a 1.35 out of a 5 point scale for natural hazards.112
Local commitment to the end goals and to the planning process was one of the most
important factors. 113 Political pressures were, of course, important in influencing the
commitment of local officials, and staff capacity to undertake the plan was also a limiting
factor.114
Public participation in the planning process is important both as its own end and as a means
to facilitate implementation.115 Community involvement in local planning and governance
decisions is always important to promote participatory democracy, to achieve fair results, and
to give disadvantaged communities a voice.116 Community participation also raises awareness
of the risks,117 which can be particularly important with respect to climate change, where the
threats are going to change over time and are not the same as those experienced in the past.
Participation gives individuals a sense of ownership and control over the decision-making
process, and it can be useful for creating consensus, which increases the chances of the plan
being implemented in a meaningful way.118
The North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act and Maine Shoreland Zoning Act present
two different approaches to state mandated planning.

North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act
The North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 (CAMA)119 was designed to
protect the state’s disappearing coastal resources by balancing the goals of economic growth
and resource preservation. The Act includes four parts: (1) State-mandated local planning in
the 20 coastal counties (including 5 year updates); (2) State aid grants to local communities; (3)
Coastal area land acquisition, and (4) Regulatory permitting in Areas of Environmental Concern
(AEC). CAMA gives the Coastal Resources Commission (CRC) authority to develop policies and
guidelines for development activities in the AECs.120
In 1994, Governor Hunt established the North Carolina Coastal Futures Committee to
review the success of CAMA and recommend improvements. The Committee published 203
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recommendations in 1994, including several recommendations to improve local land use
planning.121 These recommendations include, among others:









Improve technical assistance for local planning;
Improve financial support for local planning;
Increase public participation in land use planning;
Educate local officials and increase their role in land use planning;
Require implementation provisions in plans;
Perform periodic performance audits of plan implementation;
Tie local government eligibility for growth-related state and federal grants to the
adoption of a land use plan and implementation program; and
Identify key regional issues and encourage regional cooperation.122

Many of these recommendations have yet to be fully implemented. For example, the report
recommended tying eligibility for growth-related funds to the adoption of a land use plan.
Rather than make this a strict requirement, the North Carolina Department of Environment and
Natural Resources offers bonus points to local governments with a plan and additional bonus
points if the plan has an implementation strategy.123
In 1995, “new planning guidelines were approved that addressed many of the CFC’s
concerns,”124 but these new guidelines proved controversial. In 1998, CAMA encountered
substantial resistance from local communities when the CRC considered expanding the area in
which CAMA development controls apply.125 In 1998, the CRC therefore adopted a two year
moratorium on local planning and appointed a Land Use Planning Review Team to review the
guidelines and administrative rules during the moratorium.126 The Team’s final report, released
in August 1999, recommended (among other things) that local land use planning requirements
be extended throughout the river basins (rather than being confined to the coasts), that the
state provide technical and financial assistance to local governments for updating land use
plans, and that land use plans be tied to state funding for infrastructure improvement.127
One possible reason for recommending increased technical support to local governments
would be to reduce their reliance on private consulting firms. In a survey of 40 local coastal
land use plans in North Carolina, 30 were prepared entirely or in part by a private consulting
firm, and at least 15 of those were prepared by the same firm.128 The use of consultants may
overcome a lack of technical knowledge at the local government level, but it also reduces
government engagement with the process, which can reduce officials’ commitment to
implementing the plan.129
North Carolina’s state-mandated planning process has been described as one of the best in
the country, but it still has significant progress to be made in local capacity building and
implementation.

31 | C o a s t a l M a n a g e m e n t P l a n n i n g

Columbia Center for Climate Change Law

A Note on House Bill 819 – Sea Level Rise
In March 2010, the North Carolina Coastal Resource Commission Science Panel on Coastal
Hazards published a report on the predicted rates of sea level rise it expected North Carolina to
experience by 2100.130 The report summarized the conclusions of multiple studies, discussed
upper and lower limits, and concluded that “The most likely scenario for 2100 AD is a rise of 0.4
meters to 1.4 meters (15 inches to 55 inches) above present”.131 It went on, “Given the range
of possible rise scenarios and their associated levels of plausibility, the Science panel
recommends that a rise of 1 meter (39 inches) be adopted as the amount of anticipated rise by
2100, for policy development and planning purposes.”132
In 2011, State Senator David Rouzer (R) added language to the existing House Bill 819 that
would have limited the CRC to using linear, historical data of sea level rise. By mid-2012, the bill
stipulated:
Historic rates of sea-level rise may be extrapolated to estimate future rates of
rise but shall not include scenarios of accelerated rates of sea-level rise unless
such rates are from statistically significant, peer-reviewed data and are
consistent with historic trends.133
This language was extremely controversial, as non-linear, accelerated sea level rise scenarios
are not uncommon in the scientific literature and represent some of the most recent scientific
advancements in the field.134 The graph below illustrates a range of global mean sea level rise
scenarios, as calculated by NOAA for the National Climate Assessment.135 The various scenarios
depend on predicted levels of future global greenhouse gas emissions and melting rates of
glaciers. A linear projection of the historic baseline sea level rise would look most like the
lowest case scenario, which could under-predict sea level rise by as much as 1.8m (the
difference between lowest and highest scenarios).
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The language in House Bill 819 was eventually softened, and, in the end, the legislation does
not limit North Carolina to a linear sea level rise projection. Rather, the law prevents the state
from defining a rate of sea level rise for regulatory purposes before July 1, 2016 and, during the
intervening years, directs the Science Panel to issue an updated report that includes a
“summary of peer-reviewed scientific literature that address the full range of global, regional
and North Carolina-specific sea-level change data and hypotheses, including sea-level fall, no
movement in sea level, deceleration of sea-level rise, and acceleration of sea-level rise.”136
The legislation became law
when it passed both houses and
Governor
Beverly
Perdue
decided to neither sign nor
veto. In a statement, Governor
Perdue said the bill would
become law “because it allows
local governments to use their
own scientific studies to define
rates of sea level change.”137 Of
course, given their resource
constraints
and
technical
limitations, it is unlikely that
many local governments (if any)
will establish their own sea level
rise estimates. As a result, the
four year delay on establishing Rodanthe, North Carolina, Sep. 3, 2011. Hurricane Irene
destroyed homes and eroded beaches to the point that the waves
a sea level rise estimate
now reach under this elevated house.
effectively means that North
Carolina is delaying effective regulation for four years, during which time coastal development
can expand and limit the state’s options when it eventually does turn its attention to sea level
rise response.
State Representative Deborah Ross described the situation this way: "By putting our heads
in the sand literally, we are not helping property owners. We are hurting them. We are not
giving them information they might need to protect their property. Ignorance is not bliss. It's
dangerous."138

Maine Shoreland Zoning Act
The clearest example of state legislation providing direct guidance and minimum standards
for local planning is the Maine Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Act (MSZA).139 The Act requires all
municipalities to adopt, administer, and enforce local ordinances to regulate land use activities
within 250 feet of great ponds, rivers, freshwater and coastal wetlands, and all tidal waters and
within 75 feet of streams. One of the specific purposes of the Act is to “protect buildings and
lands from flooding and accelerated erosion.”140
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The Act authorizes the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) to establish
minimum guidelines for local ordinances. Municipalities are not required to adopt the
guidelines exactly – in fact, they are encouraged to tailor the guidelines to their specific
community. However, the local ordinance must be at least as stringent as the DEP
guidelines.141 The “Guidelines” are actually a model ordinance that enables localities to easily
adopt, modify, or expand on the recommended provisions. If local governments fail to enact a
municipal ordinance that is at least as strict as the guidelines, the Act not only authorizes but
requires MDEP to adopt a suitable zoning ordinance.142 At present, 54 coastal communities in
Maine have state imposed ordinances under this Act.143

A clay bluff on the north shore of
Rockland Harbor failed in 1996. This
landslide formed a new scarp about
200 feet landward of the original
top of the bluff in just a few hours.
Two homes were destroyed. Photo:
Maine Department of Agriculture,
Conservation, and Forestry.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Require planning at all levels. State mandates can improve local planning. Mandates are
particularly effective when they identify clear prioritized goals, establish guidelines, and
provide technical and financial support for local officials.



Coordinate planning efforts. State and local governments need to coordinate their planning
efforts and regulations. The goals at both levels need to be consistent and complementary
in order to be effective.
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CHAPTER 2
ROLLING SETBACKS AND PUBLIC EASEMENTS
Setbacks, buffers, and public easements all require private property owners to locate
structures on shoreline lots some distance from the actual shore. They can be structured to
“roll” a set distance from the shore, which allows them to automatically account for shoreline
erosion and sea level rise without requiring substantial recurring action on the part of state or
local agencies.
Setbacks, buffers, and rolling easements are able not only to protect shoreline properties by
reducing their exposure to coastal floods and storms but also to enact long-term managed
retreat from the coasts and prevent repetitive losses. Homes located on shoreline properties
will still be exposed to some danger from coastal storms (especially as storms increase in
intensity due to climate change), but the setback requirements provide a balance between
development and protection by allowing property owners to build and remain near the coasts
until the risks become unacceptably high.
Rolling setbacks and public easements are discussed together in this chapter because the
mechanisms underlying these tools are similar, but the two approaches differ in the rights they
convey. A setback conveys no rights to the public. Rather, it is a building siting restriction. A
public easement, conversely, in this context actually grants the public a right of access to a
portion of the beach front property. Easements may therefore be subject to greater takings
challenges than setbacks, as will be discussed below.

Public Trust Doctrine
The Public Trust Doctrine was first codified by the
Romans in 500 AD, took root in English law, and was
subsequently brought to the colonies. 144 It is
therefore one of the oldest principles in American
law. The essence of the Public Trust Doctrine is that
the waters of the state (and the lands beneath them)
are a public resource to be managed in trust by the
government on behalf of the public and that all
citizens have a right to access the waters. This trust is
not invalidated by private ownership of the shores
and cannot be abandoned by the state.145

The ability of the public to have
access to and use of coastal lands,
water and resources is a right that
predates the founding of this
country and has been woven into
the fabric of our basic rights and
principles.

-

New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection

In 1953 the U.S. Submerged Lands Act confirmed
state ownership and control of all lands situated
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below the mean low water line.146 Most states also recognize a public trust right to tidal
waterways extending up to the mean high water mark.147 A few states, however, limit the
public trust to only those lands below the mean low water mark (Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia).148 New Jersey and Texas have the most
expansive public trust doctrine, encompassing the dry sand beach up to the first line of
vegetation.149

Public Trust and Beach Nourishment
The mean high water and low water lines – and the relative public and private rights they
confer – fluctuate with the state of the beach and tides. As shores erode and sea levels rise, the
mean high water mark (and, later on, the mean low water mark) will move slowly shoreward.
This means that the coastal property will shrink in size and the public will gain more submerged
land. Conversely, if water levels were to fall or a beach to grow, a private owner could gain
extra feet of property.
Laws that fix a boundary between private and public lands may encounter problems when
sea level rises beyond that boundary: do the submerged lands shoreward of the fixed boundary
belong to the private owner or the public? A number of states have specific statutory
provisions that provide that any land built through artificial beach nourishment activities
belongs to the state.150 The Florida Supreme Court recently held that the erosion control line
established by state law will remain fixed only so long as the state maintains a dry public beach
seaward of that line.151 And the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the government had a right to
fill in the submerged lands it owned, and that this did not violate any rights of the coastal
landowners (even though it meant their beach front properties were beach front no longer).152
Lawmakers introducing new legislation should include language to clarify the future
relationship between private lands and public trust.
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Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al.
560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010)
Destin and Walton County were granted permits by the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection to restore 6.9 miles of beach by filling in submerged lands and adding 75 feet of dry
sand seaward of the former mean high tide line. Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act
governed beach restoration and maintenance (nourishment) and authorized the Department to
set an “erosion control line” where the old mean high water mark had been. This new “erosion
control line” then becomes the boundary between private property and public, state-owned
property.
Several owners of beachfront property in the area formed a nonprofit corporation, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc., to fight the project. They objected because the addition of 75 feet
of sand would mean that their beach front properties would no longer be directly on the coast.
Coastal landowners in Florida have certain “special rights”
with regard to the water, including the right to an
unobstructed view of the water and the right to receive
accretions to their property. The owners argued that the
beach renourishment program would deprive them of
their right to future accretions to their property if the
shore should move seaward.

Accretion – addition or removal
of sand or sediment over a long
period of time, so slowly that
one cannot see the change
occurring, but the difference
becomes apparent over time

Avulsion – a sudden loss or
The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument. It
addition of land, usually in a
held that under Florida law, if the submerged lands
large amount
became dry due to a hurricane or other avulsion, the
lands would still belong to the state. This remains true
even if the state causes the avulsion. Therefore, the state, as a property owner, could choose
to fill in its submerged lands if it wanted. Once a strip of land had been added to the shore
through avulsion, the landowner no longer had a right to subsequent accretions: the sand
would be accreting on the state’s land, not on the private land.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. There could be no taking unless the property owners could
show a right to future accretions or a right to contact with the water that was superior to
Florida’s right to fill in its lands. According to Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the court,
“the showing cannot be made.”
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SETBACKS
Setbacks protect new development from slow-onset
sea level rise and shore erosion by siting buildings on the
upland portions of coastal property lots. Setbacks may
also provide some protection against harm from coastal
storms, though the relatively close proximity of buildings
to the shore will still present significant risks. Setbacks
may be established through state legislation or
municipal codes.
Although setbacks are most often used to protect
coastal development and coastal ecosystems, the U.S.
Supreme Court has also upheld the use of setbacks to
further the goals of open space and access to light and
air.153

Setbacks
are
building
restrictions that establish a
distance from a boundary line
with which a land owner is
prohibited from building or
expanding structures.
Buffers require landowners to
leave portions of their
property undeveloped in
order to ensure that adjacent
development does not impact
natural processes.

Setbacks provide long-term economic benefit by avoiding repetitive loss and repairs. And
setbacks may provide short-term economic benefits by making coastal structures safer and
thereby eliminating the need to invest in costly coastal armoring (see also Chapter 3 on the
benefits of Preventing Coastal Armoring). Avoiding coastal armoring and the associated
damage to natural beach ecosystems is particularly important in states that depend on beach
tourism, the largest tourism industry in the United States.154 This will be discussed in further
depth in the Kaua’i, HI, example below.

Establishing a Setback Distance
The most difficult aspect of establishing a setback is determining the appropriate setback
distance. There are two main methods for establishing a setback line: set distances and
erosion rates.
Set distances are sometimes
called arbitrary setback lines and
these are a standardized set
distance from a specific feature
(e.g., 40 feet from the mean high
tide line).
Erosion rate setbacks are based
on an observed or projected
annual erosion rate of the
shoreline (e.g. 70 times the annual
coastal erosion rate).
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Arbitrary setback lines are simpler to establish,
as they simply require a statute or legislation to
declare a minimum distance from a tideland
landmark or the shoreward edge of the property.
However, set distances may be over- or underambitious. If a distance is too small it will not
provide adequate protection to homes. If it is too
large, it may unnecessarily restrict development.
This will depend to some extent on the rate of
erosion and sea level rise in a given region.155
This problem can be addressed by a routine
updating of setback distances, if a responsible
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agency or official has been given the authority. In
South Carolina, for example, setback lines and erosion
rate data are updated every 8 to 10 years.156

It must be noted that neither set
nor erosion-rate based setbacks
account for natural disasters or
large coastal storms. Setbacks
may provide some level of risk
reduction but are best suited for
dealing with long-term, slowonset erosion and sea level rise.

An alternate solution is to use setback distances
based on historic or projected annual erosion rates.
North Carolina and Florida have both established
setbacks based on erosion rates. North Carolina’s
Administrative Code for Ocean Hazard Areas 157
establishes a setback rate from the first line of
vegetation that depends on the size of the structure.
For all structures less than 5,000 square feet, the setback requirement is 30 times the long-term
average annual erosion rate. For structures between 5,000 and 9,999 square feet, the setback
is 60 times the rate, and for structures above 10,000 square feet, the setback increases
according to size to a maximum of 90 times the erosion rate.158 The erosion rate is specific to
each part of the coastline and is determined through a complex study conducted by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (in North Carolina rates vary from less than
1 foot per year to more than 8 feet per year).159 Establishing an erosion rate is a complicated
and time consuming task. It requires dedicated personnel and funding as well as historic
erosion data.
A number of states, rather than or in addition to updating their erosion rate data at routine
intervals, use a combination of arbitrary setback and erosion rate distances. For example,
North Carolina’s setbacks are based on erosion rate data, but the statute also contains a
minimum setback of 60 to 180 feet, depending on building size.160 Developers must build to
either the erosion rate or the set distance, whichever is greater.
In Minnesota, the North Shore Management Plan (NSMP) – a joint powers project among
ten local governments – used a hybrid of erosion rates and set distances. Where erosion rates
were known, the plan required a
setback of 50 times the erosion
rate plus 25 feet, and where
erosion
rates
were
unestablished, the setback was set
at a standard 125 feet.161

A CABIN ALONG ALASKA'S ARCTIC COAST
WASHED INTO THE OCEAN BECAUSE THE
BLUFF

BENEATH

IT

ERODED

AWAY.

PHOTO: BENJAMIN JONES, USGS.
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Takings Issues – Economic Value of Property
In the seminal case Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, †† the U.S.
Supreme Court specifically addressed the
takings issues related to setbacks. In
1986, David Lucas purchased two vacant
beachfront lots in Charleston, SC. At the
time, building single family homes on the
lots was allowed, and Lucas planned to
develop his lots in this way. However, in
1988 the South Carolina legislature passed
the Beachfront Management Act,162 which
established a 40 year policy of retreat and
Lucas' lots in South Carolina as of Nov. 1994. Photo:
implemented this policy through a setback
163
William
A. Fischel, Dartmouth College, by permission.
40 times the average erosion rate.
In
effect, this prevented Lucas from developing his lot, which the Supreme Court found had
deprived Lucas of “all reasonable investment-backed expectations” in his property. The
regulation was found to be a taking, and the state was required to pay Lucas compensation.164
Lucas is often cited for the principle that a regulation may not deprive a landowner of all
economic value in the property. However, the actual determination as to whether a regulation
has removed all value or only diminished the property in value is difficult, and the outcome
varies from state to state. In Maine, for example, the Maine Supreme Court found that
property owners could still use shorefront property for recreational activities and so the
property had not been deprived of all its economic value (see further discussion in Chapter 4 on
Building Restrictions).‡‡
Governments can minimize the risk of facing a takings challenge by enacting setbacks as
soon as possible so that potential developers are put on notice (reducing their “investmentbacked expectations”) or by including a “savings” clause: a permitting process or other means
165
by which the setback would not be applied so as to remove all economic value.
Minimum Lot Sizes
Setbacks are more likely to be problematic in areas where lot sizes are small and the
setback may entirely preclude building on the lot, rather than requiring structures to be located
near the back of a larger lot. Governments can mitigate this issue by requiring minimum lot
sizes. The Minnesota Administrative Rules, for example, set forth minimum lot sizes for
development on lakefronts.166
††
‡‡

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Wyer v Board of Environmental Protection, 747 A.2d 192 (Me. 2000).
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FLORIDA’S COASTAL CONSTRUCTION CONTROL LINE & HURRICANE OPAL
In the 1980s, recognizing the threat of hurricanes to coastal properties, the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection established a Coastal Construction Control Line
(CCCL).167 The CCCL defines the zone along the coast that is vulnerable to a 100 year storm, and
structures built seaward of the CCCL must obtain a permit from the Department and must meet
strict siting and design requirements. 168 These requirements include elevation and
construction standards that are even stricter than the NFIP coastal V-zone requirements as well
as enhanced wind-load standards beyond.169

Damage from Opal. Photo: FL Department of
Environmental Protection

On October 4, 1995, Hurricane Opal
struck the Florida coastline as a Category 3
hurricane with 111 to 115 mile per hour
winds. Of the 1,366 pre-existing structures
seaward of the CCCL (structures built
before the CCCL was put in place and
therefore not subject to its stricter building
requirements), 768 (or 56%) were
destroyed.170 On the other hand, only 2 of
the 576 structures that complied with the
CCCL
building
requirements
were
171
destroyed (0.2%).

Florida has strengthened its CCCL
program by combining it with a setback line that prohibits major structures seaward of a 30year erosion projection line (the expected position of the seasonal high water line 30 years
from the date of the construction).172

KAUAI, HAWAII – STATE & LOCAL EFFORTS
Kaua’I is the fourth largest of island of Hawaii and home to 113 miles of coastline – the kind
of coastline that draws 7 million tourists to Hawaii each year and accounted for $12.6 billion in
2011.173 Tourism accounts for more than 60% of all jobs in Hawaii.174 However, more than 70%
of the beaches on Kaua’I are eroding.175
Recognizing the economic, cultural, and environmental importance of their beaches, in
2008 the Kaua’i county government adopted the Shoreline Setback and Coastal Protection
Ordinance #863. The ordinance explicitly notes that “The shoreline environment is one of
Kaua’i’s most important economic and natural resources,” and explains the need for regulation:
“beaches and coastal areas are part of the public trust, and it is government’s fiduciary
responsibility to protect beaches and coastal areas.176
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The ordinance uses a combination of set distances and erosion rates depending on building
size and lot size. If the lot is less than 160 feet in depth from the shore, then new buildings
must be set back a set distance from the shore (40-100 feet) in proportion to the length of the
lot. If the lot depth is greater than 160 feet, then the setback is based on an annual erosion
rate. For structures less than 5,000 square feet, the structure must be set back 70 times the
erosion rate plus a buffer of 40 feet. For buildings greater than 5,000 square feet, the setback
increases to 100 times the annual erosion rate plus 40 feet.177
In addition, the ordinance prohibits efforts to
“artificially fix the shoreline.” If a structure is built
seaward of the setback line (having acquired a
variance), it is ineligible for protection by shoreline
hardening for the life of the structure. These
provisions are meant to protect the island’s beaches
against the detrimental effects of coastal armoring
and to prevent property owners from relying on
coastal hardening to protect their developments.
Similarly, state regulations, under the Hawaii
Coastal Zone Management Program Policies for ‘Beach Protection,’ 178 prohibit the
“construction of private erosion-protection structures seaward of the shoreline, except when
they result in improved aesthetic and engineering solutions to erosion at sites and do not
interfere with existing recreational and waterline activities; and (C) minimize the construction
of public erosion-protection structures seaward of the shoreline” (emphasis added).
Despite these statutory provisions against armoring, shoreline armoring has continued to
occur. This is due, at least in part, to “weak linkages between state and county agencies
responsible for beach and shore conservation. Hawaii, in effect, has no widely accepted
program, or plan related to beach conservation.”179 These weak linkages are due to confusing
jurisdictional overlap at the coast. In Hawaii, the state has jurisdiction over lands seaward of
the “shoreline,” 180 and the way in
which shoreline is defined can place
this boundary far inland of the sites
where erosion is occurring. The state
has continued to permit coastal
hardening in these areas,181 and state
actions may therefore be at odds with
local plans. Chapter 205 of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes, Land Use
Commission, allows counties to
extend their jurisdiction to seaward
of the mean sea level, but no county
has done so to date.182
Reduction of beach on Kaua’i due to armoring. Photo: NOAA
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As a result of these problems, Hawaii has suffered extensive shoreline erosion due to
coastal armoring. On the island of Oahu, U.S. Geologic Survey and University of Hawaii
scientists concluded that “the reliance upon shoreline armoring to mitigate coastal erosion on
Oahu has, instead, produced widespread beach erosion resulting in beach narrowing and
loss.”183 In fact, armoring had resulted in the loss of over 9 kilometers of sandy beach, 8% of
the original 72 miles of sandy beach on Oahu, and 95% of that loss occurred in areas with
coastal armoring.184 Greater coordination between state and county governments will be
required to create a unified plan for the future of Hawaii beaches.

CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT
In California, erosion of coastal bluffs is the primary motivator behind setback restrictions.
The California Coastal Commission is one of three agencies that together administer the CA
Coastal Management Program.185 Implementation of the California Coastal Act of 1976186 is
primarily accomplished through the preparation of Local Coastal Programs (LCPs) by local
authorities.§§ All coastal communities are required to prepare a plan, which must then be
reviewed and approved by the Commission. These plans “contain the ground rules for future
development and protection of coastal resources.”187
As the Commission has the
authority to approve or reject LCPs,
the Commission also has the
authority to require setbacks.188 In
the context of coastal bluff
development, the Commission has
established a practice of correcting
any LCP that does not include a
setback of at least 25 feet for bluffs
that are subject to coastal
erosion. 189 Setback requirements
may also be added with respect to
wetlands and other sensitive
habitats. As stated in a Land Use
Plan (LUP) Update authored by
Commission staff:

Pacifica California, 1997, along the 30 meter tall sea cliffs.
Photo: USGS

Setbacks must be established in the LUP in order to determine how development
will affect significant coastal resources including, but not limited to, bluffs, ESHA,
wetlands, public access and recreation areas, and public views.190
§§

An LCP includes a LUP, which may be the relevant portion of the local general plan, and any maps
necessary to administer it, and the zoning ordinances, zoning district maps, and other legal instruments
necessary to implement the land use plan.
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Setback distances in California LCPs are determined based on the expected life of the
structure and known erosion rates. For example, Mendocino County’s LCP191 states:
3.4-7: Setbacks shall be of sufficient distance to eliminate the need for shoreline
protective works. Adequate setback distances will be determined from
information derived from the required geologic investigation and from the
following setback formula:
Setback (meters) = Structure life (years) x Retreat rate (meters/year)
The retreat rate shall be determined from historical observation (e.g., aerial
photographs) and/or from a complete geotechnical investigation.
Marin County’s LCP192 stated that new structures “shall be set back from the bluff edge a
sufficient distance to reasonably ensure their stability for the economic life of the development
and to eliminate the need for shoreline protective works.”193 This assurance is provided by a
calculation that takes into account the economic life of the structure and also factors in a
minimum safety factor:
Determination of bluff setbacks. Adequate bluff setback distances will be
determined based on the information provided in the geologic report required
pursuant to Section 22.64.060.A.2 and the following setback formula (where 100
years represents the economic life of a structure and 1.5 represents a minimum
safety factor):
Setback (meters) = 100 (years) x Retreat Rate (meters/year) + setback to
achieve a slope stability Factor of Safety of at least 1.5 (minimum factor of
safety)194
Marin County’s plan is also notable for including a statement that “predicted bluff retreat
shall be evaluated considering only historical bluff retreat data, but also acceleration of bluff
retreat due to continued and accelerated sea level rise, and other climate impacts according to
best available science.”195
In order to help local planners determine what the “best available science” on sea level rise
and climate change might be, in 2013, the California Ocean Protection Council issued a State of
California Sea-Level Rise Guidance Document.196 The Document made eight recommendations
for the inclusion of sea level rise in coastal planning:
1.
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Use the ranges of SLR presented in the June 2012 National Research Council report
on Sea-Level Rise for the Coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington as a starting
place and select SLR values based on agency and context-specific considerations of
risk tolerance and adaptive capacity.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Consider timeframes, adaptive capacity, and risk tolerance when selecting estimates
of SLR.
Consider storms and other extreme events.
Coordinate with other state agencies when selecting values of SLR and, where
appropriate and feasible, use the same projections of sea-level rise.
Future SLR projections should not be based on linear extrapolation of historic sea
level observations.
Consider changing shorelines.
Consider predictions in tectonic activity.
Consider trends in relative local mean sea level.

Although some of the details in the document are California-specific, the recommendations in
their broad form provide a good foundation for coastal planners in any state. Other states
should consider issuing similar guidance with state-specific information for their own planners.
Enforcement
Setbacks are only an effective means of promoting wise development and managed retreat
if the setback requirements are enforced. The California Coastal Commission is authorized to
take action against any property developer who:
Fails to obtain a Coastal Development Permit before construction; or Fails to
comply with the conditions of the coastal development permit approval and to
remedy violations of those development permits (including restoring sites to
their “pre-violation” condition).197
The Commission first issues a “cease-and-desist” notice for a Coastal Act violation, and if the
order is not complied with, the Commission can pursue enforcement in county courts, who are
authorized to issue fines up to $30,000.198 The Coastal Act also provides for citizen suits to
address violations and to enforce Commission orders.199 However, working through the courts
can be a lengthy process. As of 2013, the Commission estimated that there are more than
2,000 backlogged enforcement cases and that, based on the current rate of resolution, these
would take 100 years to resolve.200
Two 2013 bills introduced in the California legislature would expand the enforcement
authority of the Coastal Commission if adopted. AB 976 seeks to allow the Commission to
directly levy fines and issue holds without resorting to the judiciary.201 Sarah Christie, the
legislative director for the CCC, was quoted as saying the bill would give the Commission an
enforcement tactic already used by “virtually every state regulatory agency and local
government in California, including Malibu.”202
The second bill, AB 203, would prohibit the Commission from “filing as complete” or acting
upon an application for a coastal development permit for a property where there is an existing
violation until the violation is resolved.203 A coalition of opponents raised concerns that the bill
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does not contain sufficient due process and would thus unfairly penalize an applicant based on
the mere assertion by the Commission staff that a violation had occurred. However, the bill
also provides that any unresolved dispute between the executive director and the applicant
regarding the bill’s implementation must be resolved by the Commission at a noticed public
hearing.204
California’s ability to execute a managed retreat from its eroding shores will require not
only continued planning in state and local land use plans but also enforcement in both the
executive and judiciary branches.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Using a combination of set distances and erosion rates for setbacks can provide minimum
standards for areas that lack historic erosion data while also acknowledging that erosion
and sea level rise are unlikely to affect the coastline evenly and that approaches in one area
may be inappropriate in another.



Setbacks should be designed to account for acceleration of erosion and sea level rise due to
climate change. This can be done through the use of a safety factor or by planning for
routine updating of the setback distances. Updating setback numbers would, ideally, not
require a state level legislative response, which could be slow and delay necessary changes.



Setbacks should be established as soon as possible in order to set property owners’
expectations for the value of their property. Minimum lot sizes and “savings” clauses can
also be used to avoid takings challenges. However, when structures are built seaward of
the setback line due to a variance or permit, it should be clear that the owner takes on the
financial risk and that no public funding will be provided for future relief or rebuilding.



Setbacks should be combined with a prohibition against coastal armoring in order to best
implement a policy of managed retreat and protect the long-term health of beaches. See
Chapter 3 on Prohibiting Armoring for more details.



State and local governments must coordinate their planning efforts and regulations. The
goals at both levels need to be consistent and complementary in order to be effective. See
Chapter 1 on Coastal Management Planning for further discussion.



Provide an enforcement mechanism to ensure that setback provisions are complied with
and conduct regular evaluations to determine if the setbacks have been effective.
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FURTHER READING
The California Coastal Commission's Legal Authority to Address Climate Change, CALIFORNIA
COASTAL
COMMISSION
(last
visited
Aug.
16,
2013),
http://www.coastal.ca.gov/climate/whyinvolved.html.
Memorandum from Mark Johnsson to California Coastal Commission (Jan. 16, 2003), available
at http://www.coastal.ca.gov/W-11.5-2mm3.pdf.
(Academic article authored by a Staff
Geologist at the Coastal Commission discussing methodology for establishing bluff setbacks.)
Construction Setbacks, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (Jul. 13, 2012),
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/initiatives/shoreline_ppr_setbacks.html.
MARK RANDALL & HENDRIK DEBOER, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
COASTLINE CONSTRUCTION RESTRICTIONS (2012), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012R-0046.htm.
DAVID SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (2d ed. 1990).
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ROLLING EASEMENTS
Rolling easement is a term sometimes used to refer to any public policy that protects lands
in the public trust as the sea level “rolls” inland. 205 Setbacks, conservation easements,
prohibitions on coastal armoring, and building restrictions can all be written using coastal
markers (such as vegetation lines or mean high water lines) that move with the sea level and
therefore recognize a rolling nature to the public trust lands.
In this chapter, however, the term rolling easement is used more specifically as an
easement that grants the public access to a portion of the dry beach on a private property
owner’s land and that rolls inland with the rising sea.

Texas Open Beaches Act
Texas is traditionally the only state recognized as having enacted a policy of rolling
easements. This is a significant issue in Texas, which has had one of the highest erosion rates in
the nation since 1983, losing five to ten feet of beach every year.206 Texas implements its
rolling easement through the Texas Open Beaches Act (TOBA) of 1959,207 which defines a public
beach as:
[A]ny beach area, whether publicly or privately owned, extending from the line
of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico to
which the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over the area by
prescription, dedication, presumption, or has retained a right by virtue of
continuous right of the public since time immemorial, as recognized in law and
custom.208
The Act also explicitly affirms the right of the public to access the entire public beach, including
any privately owned lands seaward of the vegetation line.209 The Commissioner of the Texas
General Land Office (GLO) is authorized to enforce the TOBA and, in order to provide public
access, is authorized to prohibit or remove any “obstruction, barrier, or restraint that will
interfere with the free and unrestricted right of the public.” 210 This means the Commissioner
has the authority to restrict not only seawalls and coastal armoring but also housing and other
structures that are constructed or that end up seaward of the mean vegetation line due to
beach erosion.
Providing Notice & Assistance
Recognizing the potential impact for landowners, the TOBA also includes a disclosure
provision that requires sales of property along the coast to include specific language regarding
the risks of owning coastal property in the contract (see inset).211 Texas further assists property
owners (and mitigates taking litigation) by providing a $50,000 payment to homeowners to
assist with relocation expenses.212
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Texas Open Beaches Act — Disclosure Requirement — NAT. RES. § 61.025.
[Sales] must include in any executory contract for conveyance the following statement:
The real property described in this contract is located seaward of the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway to its southernmost point and then seaward of the longitudinal line also
known as 97 degrees, 12', 19" which runs southerly to the international boundary from
the intersection of the centerline of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Brownsville
Ship Channel. If the property is in close proximity to a beach fronting the Gulf of Mexico,
the purchaser is hereby advised that the public has acquired a right of use or easement to
or over the area of any public beach by prescription, dedication, or presumption, or has
retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public since time immemorial, as
recognized in law and custom.
The extreme seaward boundary of natural vegetation that spreads continuously
inland customarily marks the landward boundary of the public easement. If there is no
clearly marked natural vegetation line, the landward boundary of the easement is as
provided by Sections 61.016 and 61.017, Natural Resources Code.
State law prohibits any obstruction, barrier, restraint, or interference with the use of
the public easement, including the placement of structures seaward of the landward
boundary of the easement. STRUCTURES ERECTED SEAWARD OF THE VEGETATION
LINE (OR OTHER APPLICABLE EASEMENT BOUNDARY) OR THAT BECOME
SEAWARD OF THE VEGETATION LINE AS A RESULT OF NATURAL PROCESSES SUCH
AS SHORELINE EROSION ARE SUBJECT TO A LAWSUIT BY THE STATE OF TEXAS TO
REMOVE THE STRUCTURES.
The purchaser is hereby notified that the purchaser should:
(1) determine the rate of shoreline erosion in the vicinity of the real property;
and
(2) seek the advice of an attorney or other qualified person before executing
this contract or instrument of conveyance as to the relevance of these statutes and facts
to the value of the property the purchaser is hereby purchasing or contracting to
purchase.

Litigation Experience
When Hurricane Alicia struck Texas August 18, 1983, it moved the public beach easement
nearly 13 feet inland (150 inches). As a result, several homes became located on the public
beach, so their repair or reconstruction was prohibited.213 In Matcha v. Mattox, (1986), the
TOBA was challenged as a taking and was upheld because the beach easement had “migrated
onto their property.”214 As of 2003, Texas allowed homeowners to seek a moratorium against
removal for two years to see if the beach would return to its pre-storm distance, thereby
placing the home back on solely private property.215
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When Hurricane Ike hit in 2008 and destroyed many coastal properties, the General Land
Office first established a temporary line 4.5 feet above sea level for interim permitting and
rebuilding decisions and then later moved back to the vegetation line for establishing the public
beach boundary.216 Then-Texas General Land Commissioner Jerry Patterson explained the delay
at the time by saying, "You want to have at least a complete all four seasons and find out what
Mother Nature is actually going to do until she finishes what she's going to do."217 Although
reasonable from an enforcement perspective, it left homeowners uncertain whether or not to
invest in repairs.
Thirty-seven homes along Pedestrian Beach, near Surfside, Texas, were denied permits to
repair their septic systems and had their access to water shut off.218 The houses were found to
significantly block public access to the beach and were therefore ordered to be removed.
Property owners sued for compensation, claiming this was a government taking of their
property, but the TOBA was upheld by the Texas Court of Appeals in Brennan v. State.219
However, it is important to note that the court in Brennan held that TOBA was not a taking
because the Act itself had not established the easement. Rather, the act was an enforcement
mechanism for a public easement that had been established through custom and historic
dedication.220
Severance v. Patterson – Avulsion v. Accretion
In 2011, the Texas Supreme Court issued a decision in Severance v. Patterson that makes
the future of rolling easements uncertain.*** In Severance, for the first time in Texas law, the
Court distinguished between accretion, in which slow-onset beach erosion moves the beach,
and avulsion, in which a storm or other catastrophic event suddenly moves the beach, and
found that Texas’ rolling easement does not apply to avulsion. Furthermore, the Court held
that unless a public easement was expressly included in the initial land grant, the state cannot
rely on custom alone to secure public access.221 The court looked at TOBA and decided that
the Act did not explicitly recognize a “rolling” easement. This creates significant uncertainty
about the ability of the General Land Office to remove structures from eroding beaches
following storms and to maintain public access.222

***

Severance v. Patterson, 345 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. 2011).
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LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS


A state wishing to implement a rolling easement should explicitly create one in state
legislation. The initial creation of the easement may be considered a taking and require
compensation, either monetary or through an offset.††† However, this compensation will be
far less substantial than that required to purchase a home outright, and it will also secure
public beach access.



A rolling easement could also be acquired through the use of exactions. Private owners
seeking to build or expand coastal properties could be required to allow a public easement
as an offset to the negative externalities of coastal development. (See Chapter 3 on
Prohibiting Coastal Armoring for a further discussion on exactions.)



Rolling easements must be combined with policies to prevent coastal armoring in order to
be effective. Coastal armoring would both destroy the beach (thereby negating the public
access purpose of the easement) and prevent the beach from rolling inland.



Sales of coastal property should include a disclosure requirement that informs prospective
purchasers of the risks they face. This may not prevent takings litigation, but it will promote
awareness of the costs of coastal living, which will assist in the implementation of further
policies.

FURTHER READING
JAMES TITUS, ROLLING EASEMENTS PRIMER (EPA Climate Ready Estuaries, 2011), available at
www.water.epa.gov/type/oceb/cre/upload/rollingeasementsprimer.pdf.
Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and
Public Access along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 533 (2007).
Public Use: Texas Works to Protect Rights and Beaches, NATIONAL OCEANIC
ADMINISTRATION
COASTAL
SERVICES
CENTER
(last
visited
Aug.
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/magazine/2007/06/article2.html.

ATMOSPHERIC
16,
2013),

AND

Severance v. Patterson - Frequently Asked Questions, TEXAS GENERAL LAND OFFICE (last visited Aug.
16, 2013), http://www.glo.texas.gov/what-we-do/caring-for-the-coast/_documents/openbeaches/faq-open-beaches.pdf.

†††

A home with a rolling easement would depreciate in value, but if the loss is expected to occur 100 years from today, it
would only reduce the current property value by 1 to 5 percent, which could be compensated or offset by other permit
considerations (Titus, 1998).
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CHAPTER 3
PREVENTING PRIVATE COASTAL ARMORING
Coastal armoring is one of the most prevalent structural solutions to the risks posed by
erosion and sea level rise. The term ‘coastal armoring’ encompasses a number of practices that
are generally divided into soft and hard approaches. Soft armoring refers to the use of organic
materials to strengthen and protect the shoreline. Because soft armor uses living materials, it
can imitate natural systems, interact with the local ecosystem, and adapt to changes in the
environment.223 Hard armoring refers instead to structures like retaining walls and bulkheads
that physically block wave and current action from reaching the vulnerable shoreline.224 Hard
armoring has traditionally been employed by private owners and local governments who want
to preserve coastal development and its associated economic benefits.
This chapter will focus on methods to prevent the use of hard armoring by private
landowners. State legislatures and executive agencies can limit the ability of private
landowners to install hard armoring solutions by enacting strict requirements for building
permits or by simply banning the use of hard armoring. Preventing hard armoring will allow
sea level rise, erosion, and other natural processes to take their course without impediment
and the resulting changes to the shoreline will encourage landowners to build further inland.
This can be particularly effective in promoting managed retreat when coupled with a setback or
rolling easement (see Chapter 2). Preventing armoring will allow the beach to recede landward,
and the setback or rolling easement will require the relocation or removal of structures that
become located too close to the coast.
A number of states, including Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Texas, have banned shoreline armoring or imposed significant restrictions.
There are three general approaches to controlling hard armoring: enact a statute that prohibits
it entirely, require a rigorous permitting process, or obtain exactions from coastal landowners.
States generally avoid a strict prohibition,
but examples of permitting, restrictions and
exactions will be discussed in greater detail
below.

The effect of a bulkhead on adjacent property.
Photo: US Fish and Wildlife Service.
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Common Hard Armoring Structures

Example

Seawalls:
Shore-parallel vertical structure, generally
concrete, wood, or steel, that primarily protects
the shore against the force of waves.
Photo: Nigel Chadwick (Creative License)

Bulkheads and Retaining Walls
Shore-parallel vertical structure, generally
concrete, wood, or steel, that prevents erosion by
separating land and water and retaining soil..
Photo: Kings County WA

Revetment:
A slope of stone or other material built to protect
an embankment or other coastal structure by
absorbing the energy of incoming waves.
Revetments built out of smaller rocks are known
as riprap (a term that also applies to the stone
used to build the riprap).

Photo: Federal Highway Administration

Groin:
A narrow, shore-perpendicular structure built to
interrupt water flow, reduce longshore currents,
and limit the movement of sediment.
Photo: NC Department Environment and Natural
Resources

Breakwater:
An offshore, beach-parallel structure usually
consisting of large (several ton) rocks designed to
reduce intensity of wave action.
Photo: Seattle Department of Transportation

Levee:
A raised embankment, usually earthen, parallel to
the water, designed to contain or divert the flow
of water.
Photo: FEMA
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Costs and Harms of Hard Armoring
Hard armoring has significant costs and limitations. In additional to the financial cost to
build and maintain armoring structures, hard armoring can damage property, harm ecosystems,
destroy public beach access, and encourage development in risky areas.
Hard armoring structures can be expensive to build: millions of federal, state, and private
dollars have been expended annual on shore armoring, which can cost anywhere from $500 to
$7,600 per linear foot of coast.225 A proposal
Costs of Armoring
to install harborwide barriers to protect New
York City could cost $25 billion just to build and
In California, between 1985 and 1990, 45 miles
take two to three decades to complete.226 As
of armoring was installed at an average cost of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers notes, even
$1,500 per foot for a total of $60 million per
choosing a ‘low cost’ hard armoring solution
year. By 1998, coastal armoring had been
installed to protect 12% (roughly 1/8) of the
“does not necessarily mean they are
227
coastline statewide and California residents
‘cheap’.”
In addition to the initial
were paying more than $75 million per year.
construction costs, hard armoring structures
228
can also be expensive to maintain, and many
have a finite lifespan and will need to be replaced once or even twice before the end of the
century.229 Rising sea levels due to climate change will increase the chance that walls will need
to be raised or rebuilt higher at additional expense.
In addition to the construction and maintenance costs, hard armoring structures have social
and environmental costs. The presence of a hard structure on the shore disrupts the natural
interaction of sand and waves. Indeed, this is its purpose: to prevent erosion due to this
interaction. However, hard structures can have unintended consequences that actually
accelerate beach erosion in front of the structure, cause additional erosion on neighboring
properties, narrow the beach (thereby restricting public access to the beach), and harm coastal
ecosystems.230

On eroding beaches
without armoring structures,
the beach will naturally
migrate inland while often
retaining its original width.
But the presence of an
armoring structure prevents
this migration and results in
the narrowing of the original
beach and, eventually, the
loss of the beach entirely
(see image at left).231
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Seawalls, bulkheads, and breakwaters can redirect
wave action towards neighboring shores, causing damage
to neighboring properties (see image below). And
longshore currents (parallel to the shore) can cause
“flanking” erosion along the edges of the armoring,232
damaging nearby properties and in some cases causing
instability of the seawall.233 Some structures may increase
the energy of waves in front of and alongside the
structure, thereby accelerating the very beach erosion
they were meant to prevent. 234 Vertical seawalls and
bulkheads can cause vertical erosion in front of the Narrowed beach in front of a bulkhead.
Photo: WA Department of Ecology.
structure, called scour, as illustrated below. By changing
the wave and current dynamics and preventing beach migration, barriers can also cause
additional flooding in nearby areas that are unprotected, making those communities more
vulnerable than they would have been before the installation of the armoring structures. 235
These harmful effects can extend far beyond the immediate reach of the armoring.236

Source: UNEP, Technologies for Climate Change Adaptation: Coastal Erosion and Flooding (2010).
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"Do you want the whole coastline to look
like a wall? I try to be neutral when I’m
analyzing a structure or problem, but my
aesthetic sense says we deserve something
better than that.”

— Gary Griggs, Director, Institute of
Marine Sciences237

Effect of bulkhead on surrounding land. Photo: WA
Department of Ecology.

On the environmental side, coastal armoring disrupts coastal ecosystems by blocking
natural sediment flows, displacing vegetation (construction often destroys local vegetation,
which does not always recover), preventing driftwood accumulation, and upsetting the natural
food web upon which the ecosystem depends.238
Coastal armoring can also increase risk to coastal communities. As described by the United
Nations Internal Strategy for Disaster Reduction:
Protective works have a tendency to increase the level of development in
floodprone areas, as the assumption is made that it is now safe to build and
invest in areas that are protected. However, it must be recognized that at some
point in the future the design event will likely be exceeded and catastrophic
damages will result.239
Some communities believe they are protected by a seawall or bulkhead and therefore decline
to spend additional funds on other protection measures (such as setbacks and building codes).
But, if the coastal armoring fails (as has
happened in the past, in New Orleans240
and Japan 241 most recently, and is
possible in the future) the resulting
damage to the community can be
extreme. Policy makers should be
careful to avoid this hazard by raising
awareness on the risks of flooding and
catastrophic failure and requiring
redundancies in flood protections.
Failed Sea Wall in the 9th Ward of New
Orleans. Photo National Park Service.
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A Note on the Common Enemy Doctrine
The Common Enemy Doctrine is an old legal principle that considers waters to be a
“common enemy” of landowners and therefore gives a landowner the right to repel or capture
water without becoming liable for the adverse effects this might have on neighbors. 242
Landowners seeking to build hard armoring structures have raised this doctrine as a defense
against the damage their seawalls might cause to neighbors (see inset).
Washington
In recent years, there has been a shift
toward replacing the common enemy
Common Enemy Doctrine Does Not Apply to
doctrine with a reasonable use test, which
Seawater
holds landowners liable if their actions are
Grundy v. Thurston County, 55 Wn.2d 1 (2005)
unreasonable or result in unreasonable harm
Evelyne Grundy’s neighbors, the Bracks, raised
to neighboring lands. 243 Roughly half the
their existing seawall by 16-18 inches, making it 4
United States has adopted the reasonable
inches higher than hers. Grundy sued the Bracks
use test. 244 Some states use a modified
for creating a nuisance, arguing that the uneven
common enemy doctrine that, in practice,
seawalls would make her property vulnerable to
often ends up resembling the reasonable use
flooding. The Washington Supreme Court held
test.245
The remaining states apply the
that the common enemy doctrine did not apply to
civil law rule, 246 which is effectively the
seawater, which meant that the Bracks could not
opposite of the common enemy doctrine.
use the doctrine as a defense for their actions.
Under the civil law rule, a landowner must
accept the natural drainage of the land.
Almost every development affects drainage patterns, so most courts implementing this rule
attempt to balance the interests of neighboring land owners against the benefit of
development.

Policymakers may want to learn more about the doctrines in their particular state before
designing a prohibition on hard armoring.247 These doctrines may prevent state agencies from
preventing armoring without clear legislative guidance. Nothing in these doctrines, however,
should prevent a state legislature from enacting a law to limit hard armoring.

Hard structures, such as the
Galveston seawall, can increase
erosion of adjacent beaches. Source:
USGS.
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Prohibition and Permitting
Total prohibition of coastal armoring would be most effective for protecting the long-term
health of public beaches and for promoting managed retreat. However, most states that
prohibit armoring actually prohibit armoring only in designated areas or under certain
conditions. Courts in Oregon and North Carolina have upheld armoring prohibitions against
takings challenges. 248 For discussion of how prohibition of armoring relates to setback
requirements, see the case study of Kaua’i, Hawaii, in Chapter 2 Setbacks.

Texas Coastal Coordination Council249
Texas (see inset) places a general prohibition on the construction of erosion response
structures. This is then tempered by a clause that permits shore protection projects under
certain limited circumstances. Specifically, the Coastal Coordination Council regulation that is
cited (§ 501.14(k)(2), replaced by § 501.26 (b)(2)) provides that shoreline protection projects
are only permitted in order to protect community developments, public infrastructure, and
“shall not be used solely to protect individual structures or properties.”250 The regulations
therefore effectively prohibit private shoreline armoring but allow government agencies to
build armoring structures to defend public areas. Additional requirements in the Texas Open
Beaches Act and Texas Dune Protection Act (Texas Natural Resources Code, Chapter 63), apply
to structures that may affect dunes and public access to the beach.

TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 15.6
Concurrent Dune Protection and Beachfront Construction Standards
(c) Prohibition of erosion response structures. Local governments shall not issue a permit or
certificate allowing construction of an erosion response structure. Notwithstanding the
general prohibition on constructing erosion response structures, a local government may
authorize the construction of a structural shore protection project that conforms with the
policies of the Coastal Coordination Council promulgated in 31 TAC §501.14(k)(2). However, a
local government may issue a permit or certificate authorizing construction of a retaining wall,
as defined in §15.2 of this title (relating to Definitions), under the following conditions. These
conditions only apply to the construction of a retaining wall; all other erosion response
structures are prohibited.
(1) A local government shall not issue a permit authorizing the construction of a retaining
wall within the area 200 feet landward of the line of vegetation.
(2) A local government may issue a permit authorizing construction of a retaining wall in the
area more than 200 feet landward of the line of vegetation.
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Maine Coastal Sand Dune Rules251
In 1979, following the most destructive
storm Maine’s coast had ever experienced, the
state legislature passed a landmark bill known
as the Coastal Sand Dune Rules, 252 which
established a permit program for building on
sand beaches. The Maine Coastal Sand Dune
Rules
preclude
construction
that
“unreasonably” creates a flood hazard, causes
erosion to the beaches and dunes, interferes
with sand movement or storage, or adversely
impacts wildlife or recreational uses of
beaches.

Fichter v. Board of Environmental
Protection, 604 A.2d 433 (Me. 1992)
The Fichters wanted to build a house on
their vacant oceanfront lot, but the house
would be located on a frontal sand dune, in
violation of what is now § 6(B), and the DEP
denied the construction permit.
The
Fichters applied for a variance, but they are
entitled to a variance only if they prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the
proposed project meets the standards of
Sections 5 and 6. The DEP denied the
Fichters’ application for a variance for
having failed to prove that the proposed
house would not be damaged within the
next 100 years.

The Sand Dune Rules have two particularly
interesting features relating to shore armoring
(see excerpts from the Rules below). First, § 5
(E) prohibits the building of new seawalls and
the expansion of existing seawalls unless the
expansion would be less damaging to the coastal sand dune system. This strikes a compromise
between allowing existing seawalls to remain and protect the buildings that rely on those walls
and preventing additional walls and new development in a vulnerable area.
The second notable feature, § 5 (D), also acts to prevent new risky development. § 5 (D)
prohibits new development in shore areas that will be at risk from erosion or a two-foot sea
level rise within 100 years. [It is important to note that this is a conservative estimate of sea
level rise for the region.253] The law places the burden on the landowner to prove that a
structure will not be vulnerable to erosion, and “reliance upon an existing seawall is not
sufficient evidence of site stability” (see Fichter inset). Placing the burden of evidence on the
private property owner both encourages private owners to learn about the hazards and
preserves government resources.
Section 5 (D) also reduces the construction and armoring cycle that is usually presented by
seawalls – in which a landowner is allowed to build a seawall, builds structures that raise the
value of the property and necessitate the building of further seawalls that enable the building
of further structures. By not allowing a landowner to rely on the presence of a seawall, the
Maine Sand Dune Rules reduce the risk that landowners will develop in risk areas believing that
the seawalls will protect them. This also reduces the risk of damage from a catastrophic failure
of the seawall.
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MAINE SAND DUNE RULES
§ 5. Standards for All Projects
(C) Shoreline changes within 100 years
A project may not be permitted if, within 100 years, the property may reasonably be
expected to be eroded as a result of changes in the shoreline such that the project is likely to
be severely damaged after allowing for a two foot rise in sea level over 100 years. Beach
nourishment and dune restoration projects are excluded from this requirement.
(D) Building size restrictions
No building greater than 35 feet in height or covering a ground area greater than 2,500 square
feet may be constructed in a coastal sand dune system unless the applicant demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) The site will remain stable after allowing for a two foot rise in sea level over 100 years,
and
(2) The increased height will not have an unreasonable adverse effect on existing uses that
rely on access to direct sunlight including, but not limited to: native dune vegetation and
recreational beach use.
Reliance upon an existing seawall is not sufficient as evidence of site stability . . .
(E) Seawalls and similar structures
No new seawall or similar structure may be constructed. No existing seawall or similar
structure may be altered or replaced except . . . with a structure of different dimensions or in a
different location that is farther landward . . . No existing seawall or similar structure may be
altered or replaced except as provided below.
(1) Permanent alteration of different dimensions or location. With a permit from the
department, a seawall or similar structure may be replaced with a structure of different
dimensions or in a different location that is farther landward if the department
determines that the replacement structure would be less damaging to the coastal sand
dune system, existing wildlife habitat and adjacent properties than replacing the existing
structure with a structure of the same dimensions and in the same location.
Note: The DEP encourages landowners to consider removing a seawall or similar structure and
covering the area with sand and dune vegetation, or replacing the structure in a more landward
position to reduce its influence on the beach and sand dune system.
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Exactions
An exaction, in this context, is a condition tied to the granting of a development permit by
the government. The exaction requires a landowner to take some action or refrain from some
action in order to mitigate the expected negative effects of the development. The rationale is
that new development causes some external costs that the developer should be required to
internalize.
In the context of coastal management, a state or local government could condition the
granting of a permit on an agreement from the landowner not to build new coastal armoring.
Exactions have become common development regulation tools and could also be useful for
establishing rolling easements or implementing setbacks or building restrictions. 254 For
example, regulators could use exactions to require landowners to dedicate lands to buffer
against flood risks or require landowners to remove structures as they become threatened.255
Exactions could also be used to limit redevelopment of damaged structures by granting
redevelopment permits subject to conditions that structures be relocated as far inland on the
lot as buildable space will allow, prohibit armoring, and require removal of threatened
structures.
The California Coastal Commission uses exactions to limit future armoring. As a
condition of a coastal development permit, landowners must agree not to seek a permit to
protect structures with hard coastal armoring.256 A sample permit may specify, among other
requirements, that:
A. By acceptance of this permit, the applicants agree, on behalf of themselves
and all successors and assigns, that no bluff or shoreline protective device(s)
shall ever be constructed to protect the development approved pursuant to
this Coastal Development Permit, including, but not limited to, the residence
with the attached garage, foundations, well, septic system, and driveway in
the event that the development is threatened with damage or destruction
from waves, erosion, storm conditions, bluff retreat, landslides, ground
subsidence or other natural hazards in the future. By acceptance of this
permit, the applicants hereby waive, on behalf of themselves and all
successors and assigns, any rights to construct such devices that may exist
under Public Resources Code Section 30235 or under Local Coastal Plans.
…
C. In the event the edge of the bluff recedes to within 10 feet of the principal
residence but no government agency has ordered that the structures not be
occupied, a geotechnical investigation shall be prepared by a licensed
geologist or civil engineer with coastal experience retained by the applicant,
that addresses whether any portions of the residence are threatened by
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wave, erosion, storm conditions, or other natural hazards. The report shall
identify all those immediate or potential future measures that could stabilize
the principal residence without shore or bluff protection, including but not
limited to removal or relocation of portions of the residence. The report shall
be submitted to the Executive Director and the appropriate local government
official. If the geotechnical report concludes that the residence or any
portion of the residence is unsafe for occupancy, the permittee shall, within
90 days of submitting the report, apply for a coastal development permit
amendment to remedy the hazard which shall include removal of the
threatened portion of the structure. 257

Close Nexus and Rough Proportionality Requirements
Three U.S. Supreme Court cases on exactions have established that exactions, particularly
those that create a public easement across private property, are compensable takings unless
they have both a “close nexus” between the purpose of requiring a permit and the requested
exaction and a “rough proportionality” between the burden on the private property owner and
the benefit to the public.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
The Nollans owned beachfront property in Ventura County, California. A concrete seawall
separated the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The building on the lot
was a small bungalow, but the Nollans wanted to replace the bungalow with a larger house. In
order to do so, the Nollans were required to obtain a coastal development permit from the
California Coastal Commission. The Commission granted the permit subject to the condition
that the Nollans allow a public easement to pass across a portion of their beach property
between the mean high tide line and the seawall. This easement would allow the public easier
access to larger public beaches in the area. The Nollans objected to the easement and argued
that the imposition of the easement constituted a taking of their property without just
compensation.
The Commission argued that the new house would block the ocean view and contribute to
“a ‘wall’ of residential structures that would prevent the public psychologically…from realizing a
stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit.”258 This negative effect of
the Nollans’ development could be offset by the requested public easement. As discussed in
the Takings Overview in Preliminary Matters, a regulation is generally not a taking if it
substantially advances a legitimate government interest and if it does not deny the owner the
economically viable use of his land. However, in the Nollan case, the Supreme Court held that
the reducing the “psychological barrier” to public beach access was not a sufficiently legitimate
state interest to be upheld.
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In a subsequent exactions case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Supreme
Court further held that an exaction must have an “essential nexus” to the public policy being
advanced and the burden on the private landowner must be roughly proportionate to the
benefit to the public.
The Court decisions in Nollan and Dolan have not been consistently applied, and several
state and federal courts have limited the principles in Nollan/Dolan to apply only to exactions
that establish a public easement or require a public dedication of private land.259 The status of
these rules has been further complicated by the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Koontz (see
discussion of Koontz in Preliminary Matters). This case law does not necessarily prevent the use
of exactions to prohibit the building of seawalls and coastal armoring. Rather, it means that
agencies must be careful when they shape the exaction and explain the public policy that they
are trying to further with the exaction.

Mitigation Fees
Although not strictly speaking a managed retreat tool, mitigation fees can help
governments fund other expensive managed retreat projects. Mitigation fees are fees that are
assessed to landowners whose development actions burden or cause harm to other
landowners or to the public.
In 2008, the California Court of Appeal for the 6th District upheld a $5.3 million mitigation
fee intended to compensate the public for the lost recreation value of a beach that is expected
to completely erode due to shoreline armoring that was approved for a poorly sited
condominium development built before the Coastal Act.260 This demonstrates that even when
armoring is allowed, it does not need to relinquish public rights to the coast. Mitigation fees,
as mentioned, can help offset the costs of coastal development and make developers
internalize some of the harms of their construction. However, policy makers should not rely on
mitigation fees alone to regulate coastal development as, in the absence of other regulatory
schemes, this could create a situation in which developers feel they can buy the coast.
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MASSACHUSETTS ARMORING
Massachusetts has about 1,500 miles of tidal shoreline (including seacoast, offshore islands,
sounds, and bays).261 Almost 70% of the state’s population resides in coastal counties and,
excluding major urban areas such as Boston, 36,000 people live within 500 feet of the shore.262
Approximately 78% of the Massachusetts ocean-facing shore is exhibiting a long-term
erosion trend.263 Statewide, the coastal shoreline is eroding roughly 0.56 feet per year.264 In
some areas, though, this rate is substantially increased. The southwest shore of Nantucket, for
example, is eroding at an average of 10-12 feet per year.265 The beach near Scituate has been
eroding at a rate of 2 feet per year.266
Despite the threat this erosion poses to Massachusetts landowners and infrastructure,
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 91, the Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act, requires
authorization in order to build or alter structures constructed seaward of the mean high water
line.267 Chapter 91 authorization is required for a range of engineering structures including
piers, wharves, revetments, dams, and bridges. The Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (MassDEP) manages Chapter 91. Armoring coastal dunes is also
implicitly prohibited by a regulatory performance standard that requires structures and
activities not to interfere with the natural migration and constant changing of shape of coasts.
Furthermore, an activity may not prevent a coastal dune from eroding and providing sand to
other coastal resources. Massachusetts’ regulatory prohibition on hard armoring is based on
the recognition that hard armoring structures interfere with sedimentation and dune cycles
that are vital to the coastal ecosystem.
Despite the presence of these regulations, almost 27% of Massachusetts’ ocean-facing
shoreline is protected by hard armoring, a number that does not include regions that may be
protected by shore-perpendicular structures (such as groins). 268 Approximately 140 miles of
shoreline are covered by publicly owned coastal structures, and an additional 230 miles are
covered by privately-owned structures.269 Many of these structures were built prior to modern
coastal policies and regulations and until recently, no centralized database of coastal structures
existed. 270 A recent survey of Massachusetts identified 6,611 privately-owned coastal
structures.271 The final inventory included 2,967 bulkheads/seawalls, 1,660 revetments, 1,969
groins/jetties, and 15 sandbag structures. The Boston Harbor region has the highest
percentage of protected coastline at 58%.272
Prior to construction of these shore protection structures, sediment contained in the
coastal banks was available to replenish downdrift shorelines.273 The build-up of armoring along
the coast has prevented this replenishment and has resulted in extensive loss and narrowing of
recreational beaches, reduction or loss of lateral beach access, and the elimination or alteration
of marine habitat in many areas, particularly along the South Shore of Massachusetts.274
Protection of private on-shore infrastructure has resulted in a loss of public access to these
beaches and the public and ecological benefits they provide.
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The loss of public lateral beach
access due to shoreline armoring
along the shore of Chatham,
Massachusetts. Prior to revetment
construction, a dry sandy beach
provided lateral public beach
access to a U.S. Fish and Wildlife
property. Photo O’Connell, USGS.

In addition to the environmental costs, hard armoring structures present an on-going
economic cost. According to a 2009 statewide study of public infrastructure along the
Massachusetts coastline, almost 80% of coastal structures have outlived their supposed 50year
lifespan.275 Unfortunately, the same survey shows that 85% of the infrastructure has gone
unrepaired from 1958 to 2009.276 Based on 2006 figures, it is estimated that it would cost $31.5
million a year for 20 years to make high priority fixes.277 After 2012’s Hurricane Sandy, the
surveyed costs are sure to be underestimated.
In the town of Salisbury, with only 4 miles of shoreline exposed to the open ocean, 12
structures of a total of 5,570 feet of protection would require approximation $1.8 million to
bring all coastal structures to the condition as last repaired or originally constructed.278
Newbury, with only 1 mile of shoreline exposed to the open ocean, has 17 structures covering
5,025 that would require $2.1 million to become optimal.279 All told, the price tag to fix the
seawalls in Massachusetts was more than $600 million in 2006 dollars.280 This $600 million
would only repair the walls; it would not be sufficient to expand their length or raise their
height to protect against sea level rise and the increased intensity expected from future
storms.281 For that, more than $1 billion would be required.282
In an interview with the Boston Globe, S. Jefress Williams, a coastal marine geologist and
scientist emeritus with the U.S. Geological Survey Woods Hole Science Center, said, “We are
now facing a societal debate about how much people want to pay — and who pays — for
coastal defense.’’283 In the same article, Rick Murray, a professor of earth science at Boston
University and a Scituate selectman, put it more bluntly: “Not everything we love can be
saved.’’284
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LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Take strong action. Coastal armoring has significant external costs to the long-term health
of the shoreline and to public access to the coasts. A statewide prohibition or rigorous
permitting requirements for coastal armoring is an effective method for preserving the
coasts in those areas where feasible. (In many locations, such as certain kinds of urban
waterfronts, this is not feasible.)



Act quickly. Legislation and regulations should be enacted as soon as possible in order to
limit the number and scope of existing structures that will be grandfathered in under the
old permissive standards. Legislation should also limit, to the extent possible, the repair,
rebuilding, and expansion of existing armoring. It should also transfer responsibility for
funding the maintenance and replacement of existing structures to private landowners so
that the costs of maintaining coastal armoring are internalized by coastal landowners.



Use multiple tactics. Legislation, exactions, or agency policies prohibiting armoring should
be coupled with setbacks, rolling easements, rebuilding restrictions and other managed
retreat tools.



Place the burden of proof on the landowner. Coastal development permits should not
allow the existence of a seawall or other hard armoring to be sufficient evidence of the
safety and stability of a development site. Placing the burden of proof on the landowner
serves both to raise awareness with the development community and to save government
resources. This will also limit harm in the case of a catastrophic event or failure of the
armoring.



Break the sea wall cycle whenever possible by preventing development that relies on the
continued existence of coastal armoring. Such development will require substantial ongoing funding to repair, rebuild, and expand coastal armoring to keep it safe. Managed
retreat is not only about re-locating existing communities but also about preventing new
development in vulnerable areas.



Requiring landowners to promise not to build coastal armoring in order to receive a
development permit can be a powerful coastal development tool and can be used broadly
to accomplish managed retreat. When exactions are used, agencies should be careful in
how they spell out the legitimate government interest that is being served by the exaction
and should be sure that the burden on the landowner is proportionate to the benefit to the
public.



Pursuing mitigation fees for public harms resulting from hard armoring (such as lost access
to public beaches) can provide needed revenue to pursue other managed retreat policies
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but should be used only in combination with other regulatory policies so as to avoid the
appearance of selling the coast.


When coastal armoring has proven ineffective, been substantially damaged by storms, or
encroached on public lands, governments can take this opportunity to require the removal
of existing structures.
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Commission, 859 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Mo. 1993)); Nevada (County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1980));
New Hampshire (Dudley v. Beckley, 567 A.2d 573, 574 (N.H. 1989); Franklin v. Durgee, 51 A.911 (N.H. 1901)); New
Jersey (Sheppard v. Frankford, 617 A.2d 666, 668 (N.J. 1992)); New Mexico (Gutierrez v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc.,
605 P.2d 1154 (N.M. 1980)); North Carolina (BNT Company v. Baker Precythe Dev. Co., 564 S.E.2d 891, 896 (N.C.
2002)); North Dakota (Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, v. Benson County Water Resource
District, 618 N.W.2d 155, 160 (N.D. 2000)); Ohio (McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo Development
Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1980)); Rhode Island (Zannini v. Arboretum Development, 1998 WL 1017288 (R.I.
Super. July 7, 1988) (unpublished)); Utah (Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985));
West Virginia (Graham V. Beverage, 566 S.E.2d 603, 612 (W. Va. 2002)); and Wisconsin (Wisconsin v. Deetz, 224
N.W.2d 407 (Wisc. 1974)).
245

States that maintain a modified common enemy doctrine include: Alabama (Peak v. Parks, 2003 WL 21489412
(Ala. Civ. App. June 30, 2003) (requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant acted with wontonness); District of
Columbia (Ballard v. Ace Wrecking Co., 289 A.2d 888, 890 (D.C. 1971)); Indiana (Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369
(In. 2003)); Kansas (Williamson v. Hays, 64 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2003)); Maine (Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me
1978)); Montana (Montana Dept. of Highways v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182, 184 (Mont. 1988)); Nebraska (Schott v.
Hennings, 2000 WL 279898 (March 14, 2000)); Oklahoma (Mattoon v. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Ok.
1980)); South Carolina (Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 543 S.E.2d 563 (S.C. 2001)); and Virginia (Mullins v.
Greer, 311 S.E.2d 110, 112 (Va. 1984)).
246

States that use the civil law rule include: Arizona (Gillespie Land & Irrigation Co. v. Gonzalez, 379 P.2d 135, 146
(Az. 1963) ( holding that one who alters a natural watercourse will be liable for its inability to carry away waters
flowing into it); Colorado (Bittersweet Farms, Inc., v. Zimbelman, 976 P.2d 326 (Colo. 1998); Hoff v. Ehrlich, 511
P.2d 523 (Colo. 1973) (finding that dominant estate has easement in lower estate for drainage of surface water;
the court does not use the term Civil Law, but the stated rule is similar); Georgia (McMillen Development Corp. v.
Bull, 188 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1972)); Idaho (Utter v. Gibbins, 48 P.3d 1250 (Idaho 2002)); Illinois (Dessen v. Jones, 551
N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ill. 1990)); Iowa (Grace Hodgson Trust v. McClannahan, 569 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1997); O’Tool v.
Hathaway, 461 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1990)); Louisiana (Crr v. Oake Tree Apartments, 786 So.2d 230, 235 (La. 2001));
Maryland (Mark Downs, Inc., v. McCormick Properties, Inc., 441`A.2d 1119 (Md. App. 1982)(explaining that the
civil law rule, while still applicable, has been modified by a reasonableness of use qualifier)); Michigan (Kernan v.
Homestead Development Co., 591 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Mich. 1998)); Oregon (Wellman v. Kelley, 252 P.2d 816, 821
(Oregon 1953)); Tennessee (Zollinger v. Carter, 837 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. 1992)); and Texas (Jefferson County
Drainage District No. 6 v. Lower Neches Valley Authority, 876 S.W.2d 940 (Texas 1994)).
247

Outliers to the common enemy doctrine, modified doctrine, reasonable use test, and civil law rule, include:
Pennsylvania, which adheres to the Common Enemy doctrine without modification (and then only in urban areas)
(Fazio v. Fegley Oil Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 510 (Penn. 1998)); Vermont, which uses nuisance language and trespass
analysis to determine liability (Canton v. Graniteville Fire District No. 4, 762 A.2d 808 (Vt. 2000)); and Wyoming,
which relies on negligence laws rather than adopting any of the standard rules (Tompkins v. Byrtus, 267 P.2d 753
(Wyo. 1954).
248

See Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217 (1999); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
317 Or. 131 (1993).
249

31 TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Part 16, § 501 et. seq.
Full text
http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=3&ti=31&pt=16.

is

available online at

250

31 TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 501.26(b)(2)(k)(2). For more information on the repeal of § 501.14 and adoption
of §§ 501.16 – 501.34, see 29 TEXAS REGISTER 7038 (July 23, 2004), and notice at
http://texinfo.library.unt.edu/texasregister/html/2004/oct01/adopted/31.NATURAL%20RESOURCES%20AND%20CONSERVATION.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
251

Natural Resources Protection Act, 38 M.R.S. §§ 480-A to 480-GG (2008) (Maine).
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252

Maine Department of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources Protection Act, Chapter 355, Coastal Sand
Dune Rules (1983), available at http://www.seagrant.umaine.edu/coastal-hazards-guide/permitting-andrules#355.
253

See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, SECOND NATIONAL ASSESSMENT (2009), noting that “Sea level rise in this
region [Northeast U.S.] is projected to rise more than the global average” (Northeast), and that “recent estimates
of global sea-level rise substantially exceed the IPCC estimates, suggesting sea-level rise between 3 and 4 feet in
this century” (Coasts), but noting that melting of the Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets could yield even higher
estimates (Global Climate Change).
254

See J. Peter Byrne and Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
(Michael Gerrard and Katrina Kuh, eds., 2012).
255

These types of exactions impose one form of “rolling easement” policy. See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal
Erosion, and the Takings Claus: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MARYLAND
LAW REVIEW 1279, 1309, 1357-58 (1998); see also Meg Caldwell, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem
Loss, and Public Access along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 564-66 (2007); EPA, ANTICIPATORY
PLANNING FOR SEA-LEVEL RISE ALONG THE COAST OF MAINE 6-12 (1995), available at
http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/downloads/maine_0.pdf.
256

20 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30235, 30607; see also Caldwell, supra note 255, at 565-66.

257

See Caldwell, supra note 255, at 564.

258

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987) (internal quotations omitted).

259

See W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., Recent Developments in Exactions and Impact Fees: Public Dedications Required of
th
Private Land, 44 THE URBAN LAWYER 667 (2012); Iowa Assurance Corp. v. City of Indianola, 650 F.3d 1094 (8 Cir.
th
2011); West Linn corporate Park, LLC v. City of West Linn, 428 F. App’x 700 (9 Cir. 2011); Conklin Development v.
th
City of Spokane Valley, 448 F. App’x 687 (9 Cir. 2011) (noting that “Nollan/Dolan has not been extended ‘beyond
the special context’ of adjudicative land use exactions that involved dedications of property so onerous that,
outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical takings.” Id. at 689); Krupp v. Breckenridge
Sanitation District, 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001); Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park & Recreation District, 62 P.3d 404,
411 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
260

Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 163 Cal. App. 4th 215 (2008).

261

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 225, Table 364 (2012).

262

THE HEINZ CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS: PREPARED FOR THE
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 23 (2000).
263

See O’Connell, Shoreline Armoring Impacts, supra note 154.

264

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Evaluation of Coastal Erosion Hazards: Results from a national Study
and a Massachusetts Perspective, August 2001, https://www.whoi.edu/fileserver.do?id=74547&pt=2&p=88768;
James O’Connell, Historic Shoreline Change Mapping and Analysis Along the Massachusetts Shore, Proceedings of
the Tenth Symposium of Coastal and Ocean Management, Coastal Zone, Boston, MA (1997).
265

Woods Hole, supra note 264.

266

Id.

267

Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 91 §§ 1 et. seq.

268

See Massachusetts Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, StormSmart Coasts- Inventories of Seawalls and
Other Coastal Structures, available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/czm/program-areas/stormsmartcoasts/seawall-inventory/ (Last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
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269

JEREMY FONTENAULT, NATHAN VINHATEIRO, KELLY KNEE, MAPPING AND ANALYSIS OF PRIVATELY-OWNED COASTAL STRUCTURES
MASSACHUSETTS SHORELINE 1 (2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/czm/programareas/stormsmart-coasts/seawall-inventory.
ALONG THE
270
271

Id.
Id.

272

J.F. O’Connell, Shoreline Armoring Impacts and Management Along the Shores of Massachusetts and Kauai,
Hawaii , in PUGET SOUND SHORELINES AND THE IMPACTS OF ARMORING—PROCEEDINGS OF A STATE OF THE SCIENCE WORKSHOP,
MAY 2009 65, 65 (H. Shipman et al. eds., 2010), citing State of Massachusetts, 2010, South shore coastal hazards
characterization atlas: Boston, Mass., Office of Coastal Zone Management, available at
www.mass.gov/eea/docs/czm/stormsmart/seawalls/boston-harbor/boston.pdf.
273

Id.

274

Id.

275

See Beth Daley, Fighting a losing battle with the sea, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 2011,
http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2011/04/03/fighting_a_losing_battle_with_the_sea/?page=2 (last
visited Aug. 9, 2013); Jessica Bartlett, Sandy puts South Shore’s seawalls in spotlight, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4,
2012,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/south/2012/11/04/sandy-puts-south-shore-seawallsspotlight/Y1LPUWFRFgBlj2mHW2WL2J/story.html (Last visited Aug. 9, 2013). See also MASSACHUSETTS COASTAL
INFRASTRUCTURE INVENTORY AND ASSESSMENT PROJECT: SUMMARY REPORT (Massachusetts Department of Conservation and
Recreation, Office of Waterways, 2009), available at www.mass.gov/eea/docs/czm/stormsmart/seawalls/publicinventory-report-2009.pdf (noting that only 15% of coastal armoring structures in Massachusetts are less than 50
years old).
276

See MASSACHUSETTS SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 275; Bartlett, supra note 275.

277

See Bartlett, supra note 275.

278

MASSACHUSETTS COASTAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVENTORY AND ASSESSMENT PROJECT: NORTH COASTAL II-A-1 (Massachusetts
Department of Conservation and Recreation, Office of Waterways, 2009), available at
www.mass.gov/eea/docs/czm/stormsmart/seawalls/north-shore/salisbury-essex.pdf.
279

Id., at III-A-1.

280

The Commonwealth is responsible for 38.41 miles of structure and the municipalities are responsible for 100.73
miles of structure. The total assessed value for repairs in 2006 dollars is $626,798,185. MASSACHUSETTS SUMMARY
REPORT, supra note 275, at 6.
281

Daley, supra note 275.

282

Id., quoting the Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation.

283

Id.

284

Id.
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CHAPTER 4
REBUILDING RESTRICTIONS
Catastrophic events raise questions not only about how to respond to the immediate
damage to physical structures but also how to prevent future damage from reoccurring.
Rebuilding restrictions – policies and guidelines that shape owners’ responses to property
damage – have the potential not only to promote repairs and modifications that will protect
against future disasters but also to encourage property owners to retreat from vulnerable
shoreline.
Rebuilding restrictions generally fall into one of two categories:
i.

Limited Resilient Rebuilding policies require that damaged structures be
replaced by more resilient structures, be built at higher elevations, or be moved
further from the coast.

ii. Conditional Rebuilding policies require that property owners agree to certain
conditions before they are allowed to rebuild structures. Owners might be asked
to agree not to build protective armoring, to purchase insurance, to remove
structures when threatened by erosion or inundation, or to be limited in the
number of times they can rebuild. See Chapters 2 and 3 on Setbacks and
Prohibiting Armoring for further discussion.
Policies that prohibit rebuilding entirely may constitute takings under the 5th Amendment
(see Takings Discussion in Preliminary Matters) and may therefore require governments to
compensate landowners for the loss of their property.285 As a result, most governments use
one of the two categories above. Policies restricting a property owner’s ability to rebuild are
also less likely to be considered takings if the guidelines or legislation clearly states the public
safety and cost avoidance goals of the policy.
Rebuilding restrictions gradually phase out high-risk uses of coastal property, providing
long-term cost savings by avoiding repetitive repairs to private property and public
infrastructure.286 Rebuilding restrictions can also be used to promote managed retreat by
requiring property owners to build further from the coasts (using setback requirements) or by
raising the costs (financial and time) of rebuilding such that landowners relocate further inland.
Building or rebuilding restrictions may be implemented at the state level by adding
conditions to public funding or passing specific legislation and at the local level by updating
building codes, creating land use plans that designate coastal areas, or changing zoning
regulations, among other possibilities.
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Prior Non-Conforming Use
Zoning law has an established practice for prior non-conforming uses. Once a use has been
permitted on a property, the landowner has an expectation that the use will be permitted to
continue to exist, even if the regulations change.287 This same principle applies to building
codes and regulations.288 The old uses and buildings are grandfathered in under the old
regulations. In some states, when a building is demolished and rebuilt (as in the aftermath of a
coastal storm) or modified extensively the non-conforming use is still permitted to continue,289
but in others, once a building is destroyed, its successor must comply with the latest
regulations.290
In the case of managed retreat, policy makers should put new zoning requirements and
building code regulations into place as soon as possible so as to apply to the most new
developments. Any delay will mean more development grandfathered in under the old
regulations. Furthermore, policy makers should make clear guidelines to establish under what
circumstances the new regulations will apply. For example, does a house have to rebuild to the
new regulations if it is damaged 50% of its value, or only 25%? Making these decisions and
setting these guidelines in place before a disaster will facilitate enforcing them later.

FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
Building restrictions are primarily a state and local issue, implemented through state
legislation and local zoning regulations and building codes. However, federal agencies that
provide disaster relief funding often place limitations on that funding that affect rebuilding
decisions.

National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
Created by Congress in 1968 and
administered by FEMA, the NFIP encourages
states and municipalities to manage
development in floodplains by offering
flood insurance in areas that have adopted
minimum regulations.291 This is a significant
incentive, as homeowners are not eligible to
receive federally backed mortgages without
flood insurance, and private insurers have
largely abandoned the market. Through
mapping, insurance rate-setting, and
developing minimum floodplain regulations,
the NFIP affects how state and local
governments adapt to sea-level rise.
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A community participating in the NFIP must adopt and enforce a floodplain management
ordinance that minimizes future flood risks to new or existing construction.292 The NFIP
requires communities adhere to building requirements or set standards for construction in
flood-prone areas (see inset for example of NFIP requirement). Communities that participate
in NFIP but fail to enforce these standards are prohibited from receiving flood insurance,
federal grants and loans, federal disaster assistance, federal mortgage insurance, or federal
funding for the acquisition or construction of structures located in the floodplain. 293
Unfortunately, the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) and Special Flood Hazard Areas
(SFHAs) that are used to implement the NFIP policies and identify vulnerable areas are often
out of date.294 New digitized maps are being created, but they are often based on data from
paper maps decades old and are slow to be created. Congress has cut map funding by more
than half since 2010, from $221 million down to $100 million in 2013.295 Additionally, new
maps do not account for increased future risks that will be presented due to sea level rise.296
Thus, the more stringent NFIP regulations often do not apply to endangered areas.
Furthermore, the NFIP has been criticized for providing subsidized insurance to
homeowners in vulnerable areas, thereby providing the means and incentive for owners to
build and rebuild in flood-prone areas. The Biggert-Waters National Flood Insurance Reform
Act of 2012 has addressed some of these concerns by directing FEMA to raise flood insurance
rates to reflect actuarial risk, but this will be slow to phase in and to change the public mindset.
(Read more about NFIP reforms in the NFIP overview in Preliminary Matters.)

NFIP Requirements for Participation of Communities in NFIP 60.3(c)(5)
Communities must: Require, for all new construction and substantial improvements, that
fully enclosed areas below the lowest floor that are usable solely for parking of vehicles,
building access or storage in an area other than a basement and which are subject to
flooding shall be designed to automatically equalize the hydrostatic flood forces on exterior
walls by allowing for the entry and exit of floodwaters. Designs for meeting this requirement
must either be certified by a registered professional engineer or architect or meet or exceed
the following minimum criteria: A minimum of two openings having a total net area of not
less than one square inch for every square foot of enclosed area subject to flooding shall be
provided. The bottom of all openings shall be no higher than one foot above grade.
Openings may be equipped with screens, louvers, valves, or other coverings or devices
provided that they permit the automatic entry and exit of floodwaters.
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NFIP – Building Requirements in Special Flood
Hazard Areas (SFHAs)
A local permit is required for all development in the
SFHA 297 as it is designated on a local FIRM. Proposed
development projects must meet all NFIP and local
requirements in order to obtain a permit298 and additional
federal and state permits may be required, especially in
areas of particular environmental conservation importance.
Federal permits, for example, may be required by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers for development near wetlands,
barrier islands, or navigable waterways.299
The NFIP also requires that proponents of new
development ensure that the structure will not increase the
flood hazard to other properties.300 For example, all projects
in the regulatory floodway must undergo an encroachment
review to determine what effect they will have on flood
flows.301

NFIP – Building & Rebuilding Requirements
When damage to a building exceeds 50% of a structure’s
pre-disaster value, the NFIP places conditions on rebuilding
to promote resiliency and prevent repetitive losses.302 This
could include raising the house above the flood elevation.303
The elevation requirement can be met by using elevation on
fill, piles, posts, piers, columns, walls or a crawlspace.
New construction (including repairs, remodeling, and
additions) in coastal flood hazard zones (V and A zones)
must meet minimum NFIP and community standards.304 A
summary of general construction requirements set forth by
FEMA can be found in the table on page 90.‡‡‡
Construction requirements in V zones are more stringent
than those in A zones because V zones face increased flood,
wave, flood borne debris, and erosion hazards. However, as
can be seen in the table on the next page FEMA strongly
recommends that buildings in Coastal A zones be designed
and constructed to V zone standards.305
‡‡‡

Useful Definitions
Substantial Damage
Damage of any origin
sustained by a structure to
its pre-damaged condition
would equal or exceed
50% of the market value or
replacement cost of the
structure
before
the
damage occurred.
V Zone
Coastal areas subject to
inundation by the 100year-flood event with
additional
hazards
associated with storminduced wave action (V for
velocity).
Both A and V zones are
subject to mandatory
insurance
requirements
and building restrictions.
Coastal A Zone
Coastal areas subject to
inundation by the 100year-flood event. A zones
are generally found further
inland than V zones, but in
some areas, particularly
riverine areas, no V zones
are present and A zones
are located immediately
along the shore.

For a complete guide of requirements and recommendations for new constructions as well as repairs,
remodeling, and additions, see FEMA Technical Fact Sheet No. 2, Home Builder’s Guide to Coastal
Construction: Summary of Coastal Construction Requirements and Recommendations (2005).
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FEMA requirements set a baseline, but local governments can and often should impose
more restrictive requirements in floodplains. For example, local governments should
encourage or require new construction in the Coastal A zone to comply with V zone standards,
as climate change will often redraw the map lines on vulnerability and buildings in A zones may
find themselves faced with V zone level hazards. Building restrictions are a proactive measure
and do not affect existing buildings, so implementing strict standards now will help ensure
that buildings can withstand the hazards they will face in the future.
Disasters may present an opportunity to improve resilience by enforcing recent rebuilding
restrictions in areas with pre-existing development. If a building is located below the 100-year
flood elevation and is substantially damaged (or substantially improved), even if the building
was constructed before any elevation requirements were issued, NFIP regulations state that the
home must be brought into compliance with the local government’s flood damage prevention
regulations.306
NFIP rebuilding conditions emphasize accommodation – adapting a structure to permit
future flooding to occur without causing damage – rather than retreat. This limits the amount
of repetitive damage that communities experience, but it does not remove the risk of future
flood events and it does not reduce the burden on local governments to continue to provide
and maintain public infrastructure in vulnerable areas. NFIP also does not require communities
to limit population densities or use intensity in flood-prone areas, so communities would have
to take additional actions beyond the NFIP requirements in order to truly reduce their exposure
to flood-damage.

Example of building restrictions in V and coastal A zones. Graphic:
FEMA Region II.
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FEMA General Requirements and Recommendations for New Construction
V Zone

Design

Free of
Obstructions

Materials

Siting
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Building and its foundation
must be designed,
constructed, and anchored to
prevent floatation, collapse,
and lateral movement due to
simultaneous wind and water
loads.

The space below the lowest
floor must be free of
obstructions (e.g. free of any
building element, equipment,
or other fixed objects that can
transfer flood loads to the
foundation, or that can cause
floodwaters or waves to be
deflected into the building) or
must be constructed with
non-supporting breakaway
walls, open lattice, or insect
screening.
Structural and non-structural
building materials at or below
Base Flood Elevation (BFE)
must be flood-resistant.
All new construction shall be
landward of mean high tide.

A zone areas
with potential for
breaking wave
and erosion during base
flood
Building must be designed,
constructed, and anchored
to prevent flotation,
collapse, and lateral
movement resulting from
hydrodynamic and
hydrostatic loads, including
the effects of buoyancy.
Recommendation:
Follow V-zone requirement
None

A zone areas
with shallow
flooding only
where potential for
breaking waves and
erosion is low
Building must be
designed, constructed,
and anchored to prevent
flotation, collapse, and
lateral movement
resulting from
hydrodynamic and
hydrostatic loads,
including the effects of
buoyancy.
None

Recommendation:
Follow V-zone requirement

Structural and nonstructural building
materials at or below BFE
must be flood-resistant.

Encroachments into
floodways designated
along rivers and streams
Recommendation:
are prohibited unless they
Site new construction
will cause no increase in
landward of long-term erosion flood stage.
setback and landward of area Recommendation:
subject to erosion during 100- Follow the V-zone
year costal flood event.
requirement
Table. FEMA General Construction Requirements

Structural and nonstructural building
materials at or below
BFE must be floodresistant.
Encroachments into
floodways designated
along rivers and streams
are prohibited unless
they will cause no
increase in flood stage.
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STATE RESTRICTIONS
Establishing building codes and revising zoning restrictions are land use planning decisions
often considered to be the province of local governments, but some problems, such as
addressing long-term vulnerability to coastal hazards, have been increasingly viewed as beyond
the scope or capacity of local governments, and states can play a significant role in adopting or
strengthening land use and development management plans.307 See Chapter 1 on Coastal
Management Plans for a more in-depth discussion on the influence state plans can exert on
local governments and for an assessment of the Maine Shoreland Zoning Act that required local
governments to adopt minimum standards for local coastal zoning.

Maine Coastal Sand Dune Rules§§§
The Maine Coastal Sand Dune Rules, as the name would imply, govern private and public
development on the Maine sand dune system.308 Section 6 governs the standards for building
and re-building on frontal dunes. Excerpts are provided on the following page.
Section 6 of the Maine Coastal Sand Dune Rules has several notable features. First, sections
6 (B) and (C) prohibit new construction “on or seaward of a frontal dune” and in a V-Zone.
Section (C) even limits vertical additions to a building in a V-zone, recognizing that winds and
waves are threats to buildings in the V zone as well as floods. Sections (D-F) all include
rebuilding standards that limit the size of a replacement building to the dimensions of the
previous building. These provisions both work to limit the intensity of use in these areas. They
prevent, for example, a developer from acquiring a single-family home property and turning it
into a higher-density subdivision. This limits the number of people and amount of property at
risk in these regions.
Sections (D-F) also incorporate Maine’s setback requirement into the rebuilding restrictions.
The new building “must be moved back from the beach to the extent practicable, as
determined by the department given setback requirements and site limitations.” This helps to
avoid repetitive losses by moving buildings away from the most vulnerable coastline. (See
Chapter 2 on Setbacks and Easements for more information.)
The most interesting provision is Section 6 (E), which states “A building may not be
reconstructed more than once…if the building is located in a V-Zone.” This is the most direct
effort to limit repetitive losses and it does so by the straightforward means of recognizing that
V zones are vulnerable areas likely to be exposed to repeated hazards. These regulations have
had the positive outcome of limiting repetitive losses to new construction in the V-zone.309

§§§

For more on the history of the Maine Coastal Sand Dune Rules and how the Rules restrict the construction of
coastal armoring, see Chapter 3 on Preventing Armoring.

91 | R e - B u i l d i n g R e s t r i c t i o n s

Columbia Center for Climate Change Law

MAINE SAND DUNE RULES
§ 6. Standards for Frontal Dune Projects
(B) New construction in frontal dunes. A new structure or addition to an existing structure
may not be constructed on or seaward of a frontal dune…
(C) Construction in V-Zone. No new structure or addition to an existing structure, including
but not limited to vertical additions may be constructed in a V-zone except for ramps and
elevators providing handicap access as outlined in Section 6(B)(3), open fences and fire
escapes constructed on existing buildings or similar structures as required by local fire codes.
A building in a V-Zone may only be reconstructed under Section 6(D) if it was involuntarily
severely damaged by fire or some other force majeure not to include wave action from an
ocean storm. If only a portion of a building is located in a V-Zone, this section applies to the
portion of the building that is in the V-Zone.
(D) Reconstruction of buildings not severely damaged by wave action from an ocean storm.
Reconstruction of a building not severely damaged by wave action from an ocean storm must
meet the following standards.
(1) The building must be moved back from the beach to the extent practicable, as
determined by the department given setback requirements and site limitations…
(2) The area and dimensions of the footprint of the building may not exceed the area and
dimensions of the footprint of the previously existing building when the building is
reconstructed in the same location. The area of the footprint of the building may not
exceed the area of the footprint of the previously existing building if the building is moved
farther back from the beach.
…
(E) Reconstruction of buildings severely damaged by wave action from an ocean storm
. . . A building may not be reconstructed more than once in accordance with this section if
the building is located in a V-Zone. A building located outside a V-Zone may not be
reconstructed more than once without complying with the standards outlined in Section 6(F).
[Similar restrictions are imposed to those in § 6(D).]
(F) Reconstruction of buildings severely damaged by wave action from an ocean storm that
have already been reconstructed once. Buildings in the frontal dune, but outside of the VZone that are severely damaged by wave action from an ocean storm must meet the
following minimization and mitigation standards. [Imposes set back, lot coverage restrictions,
and mitigation requirements.]
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Maine’s tidally influenced shoreline is both the longest and the most privately owned (97%)
along the U.S. East Coast.310 One of the main challenges facing Maine coastal planners is
therefore how to influence private landowners to implement risk management policies on their
private property. When the Maine Sand Dune Rules were introduced, and during their early
implementation, state officials conducted a strong public education effort to raise awareness
about the reality of sea level rise and beach erosion and the dangers posed to private
property.311
The Maine Sand Dune Rules allow variances to the straightforward prohibitions established
in Section 6.312 Specifically, Section 9 allows for the Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP), which administers the act, to grant variances and allow construction in V zones and on or
seaward of frontal dunes. Variances are on occasion a necessary reality to balance the strict
prohibition against rebuilding with a recognition of private property rights (and a need to avoid
takings claims – see below).
One further rebuilding provision of the Maine Sand Dune Rules that is worth note is Section
10, which provides that any structure that encroaches on a coastal wetland for six months or
more must be removed.

MAINE SAND DUNE RULES
§ 10. Standard conditions of permits
(A) Shoreline recession
If the shoreline recedes such that a coastal wetland, as defined under 38 M.R.S.A. § 480B(2), extends to any part of the structure, including support posts, but excluding seawalls,
for a period of six months or more, then the approved structure along with appurtenant
facilities must be removed and the site must be restored to natural conditions within one
year.
Note: This contingency is applied to all projects that receive a permit for construction in the
coastal sand dune system and is appended to the property deed and passed on to
subsequent property owners when a title is transferred. [Note is part of DEP Rules]
Takings and the Maine Sand Dune Rules
In the seminal case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that a regulatory action could be a taking, requiring government to compensate the
private landowner, unless the regulation advanced a legitimate government interest and did
not deprive the property owner of all “reasonable investment-backed expectations” in the
property.313
Maine has had relatively little outcry surrounding the Sand Dune Rules, in part because the
state has not been challenged, to date, with a major disaster affecting large portions of the
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population. There have been a significant number of court challenges to the Sand Dune Rules,
but the Maine Supreme Court has continued to support the constitutionality of the rules and
their enforcement. The Court’s decision in Wyer in 2000 was particularly notable because the
court found that uses that were not economically optimal, such as picnics, parking, and
recreation, could be considered as benefits to the property owner even if the property owner
was denied the right to build permanent structures thus preventing the takings claim. This case
highlights the uncertainty that surrounds takings issues.

Wyer v Board of Environmental Protection, 747 A.2d 192 (Me. 2000)
William Wyler was denied a variance to build on a coastal property. The Maine Supreme
Court ruled that denial of the variance was not a government taking because the denial of
the variance had not “rendered the property substantially useless and stripped it of all
practical value.” The court reasoned that “because of the property’s close proximity to
Higgins Beach in Scarborough, the [trial] court properly considered the uses of the
property for parking, picnics, barbeques and other recreational uses as beneficial uses
available to Wyer despite the restrictive regulation.” Moreover, the court “had
competent evidence to support its findings that the property had a value of $100,000
before the Department of Environmental Protection denied the variance and $50,000
after it denied the variance.”

LOCAL RESTRICTIONS
Local governments can also implement zoning and building code regulations that restrict
property owners’ ability to construct buildings in the coastal area and to rebuild damaged
buildings after a disaster. This can be achieved through zoning acts,314 building codes, or other
planning ordinances.

Example – City of Waveland, Mississippi
The state legislature in Mississippi delegated the authority to local governments to adopt
regulations designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare.315 Drawing on
this authority, the City of Waveland, MS, adopted a series of floodplain management
regulations that included building restrictions, including Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance
Number 342.316 Ordinance 342 clearly states that “It is the purpose of this ordinance to
promote the public health, safety and general welfare and to minimize public and private losses
due to flood conditions in specific areas.”317 This specific statement of purpose draws on health
and safety, which are broadly recognized as legitimate government interests that can be
pursued even if they place some burdens on private landowners.
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City of Waveland, MS Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance Number 342:
Located within areas of special flood hazard areas established in Article 3, Section B are Coastal
High Hazard Areas, designated as Zones V1-V30, VE and/or V. These areas have special flood
hazards associated with high velocity waters from surges and, therefore, in addition to meeting all
provisions in this ordinance, the following provisions shall also apply:
1. All new construction and substantial improvements in Zones V1-V30 and VE (V if the base
flood elevation is available) shall be elevated on pilings and columns so that:
a. The bottom of the lowest horizontal structural member of the lowest floor (excluding the
pilings or columns) is elevated one foot or more above the base flood level; and
b. The pile or column foundation and structure attached thereto is anchored to resist
flotation, collapse and lateral movement due to the effects of wind and water loads acting
simultaneously on all building components. Wind and water loading values shall each
have a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year (100-year
mean recurrence interval).
2. A registered professional engineer or architect shall develop or review the structural design,
specifications and plans for the construction, and shall certify that the design and methods of
construction to be used are in accordance with accepted standards of practice for meeting the
provisions of Section G (l)(a) and (b).
…
4. All new construction shall be located landward of the reach of mean high tide.
5. Provide that all new construction and substantial improvements have the space below the
lowest floor either free of obstruction or constructed with non-supporting breakaway walls,
open wood latticework, or insect screening intended to collapse under wind and water loads
without causing collapse, displacement, or other structural damage to the elevated portion of
the building or supporting foundation system. For the purpose of this section, a breakaway
wall shall have a design safe loading resistance of not less than 10 and no more than 20
pounds per square foot.… Use of breakaway walls which exceed a design safe loading
resistance of 20 pounds per square foot (either by design or when so required by local codes)
may be permitted only if a registered professional engineer or architect certifies that the
designs proposed meet the following conditions:
a. Breakaway wall collapse shall result from water load less than that which would
occur during the base flood; and, coastal building sites for landscaping and site
grading as long as the fill does not interfere with the free passage of floodwaters
and debris underneath the building or cause changes in flow direction during
coastal storms such that will cause additional damage to buildings on the site or
to any adjacent buildings. …[continued]
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Rebuilding Restrictions Post-Sandy in New York and New Jersey
In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, which struck the east coast October 2012, rebuilding
restrictions were enforced in New York and New Jersey. A tangled mix of federal, state, and
local requirements confused homeowners and illustrated the importance of pre-planning and
coordination.
In New York City, FEMA released provisional updated flood maps to serve as a guide for
where and how homes and businesses could be safely rebuilt. These were the first updates to
those maps to be issued since 1983, and the new maps placed thousands of buildings into Zone
A and V areas.318 In order to build according to the FEMA regulations, structures would need to
be elevated above the Advisory Base Flood Elevation (ABFE), a requirement that would conflict
with city height restrictions for buildings.319 In response, the Bloomberg administration issued
an executive order suspending certain zoning restrictions, such as building heights, in order to
remove obstacles for property owners to rebuild in conformance with the new federal
restrictions.320

Zoning Changes
Local governments can limit damage in coastal areas by limiting the intensity of use in
vulnerable locations. Overlay zoning and downzoning are two possible methods to modify
existing zoning laws.

Overlay Zoning
Overlay zoning works in concert with existing zoning laws to apply an additional layer of
regulation in special areas, such as coastal hazard areas. Overlays can set development
densities, building regulations, setback requirements, or water-dependent use requirements. 321
Greenwich, Connecticut, using the authorization of the Connecticut Coastal Management
Act,322 has implemented a Coastal Overlay Zone whose purpose is to “limit the potential impact
of coastal flooding and erosion patterns on coastal development so as to minimize damage to
and destruction of life and property and to reduce the necessity of public expenditure to
protect future development from such hazards.”323 Development projects within the zone
require a Coastal Site Plan detailing the project’s water-dependent activity and a “description of
proposed methods to mitigate adverse effects on coastal resources.”324
Del Mar, California, has enacted a Floodplain Overlay Zone specifically to address coastal
flooding:
The purpose of the regulations of this Chapter is to promote the public health,
safety and general welfare by ensuring that new development, as defined
herein, is appropriately sited and constructed so as to avoid hazards to those
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who will occupy the development; and to avoid damage or hazards to the
surrounding area. These regulations are also intended to ensure that
development within the Floodplain Overlay Zone will not obstruct flood flow; will
be designed to reduce the need for construction of flood control facilities that
would be required if unregulated development were to occur; and to minimize
the cost of flood insurance to Del Mar residents.325
The regulations applied to the Floodplain Overlay Zone include building restrictions (such as
elevations and location of electrical equipment), siting requirements (no new building seaward
of the mean high tide line), and information disclosures (including insurance requirements).326

Downzoning
Downzoning reduces the use intensity of an existing zone by reducing densities or
permitted uses in the area.327 Existing structures and permitted uses within a down-zoned area
are allowed to remain, but if a building is damaged or destroyed, its reconstruction must
conform to the most current zoning and building requirements, which are likely to be more
stringent.328 Specific down-zoning measures could include changing the classification of a zone,
for example from “residential” to “conservation” or reducing the allowed residential density
from three units per acre to one unit per acre.
State authorization for downzoning may be required.
The Connecticut Coastal
Management Act, for example, explicitly authorizes municipalities to use tools such as
downzoning to regulate development in coastal areas.329 This authority was not available under
the previous Zoning Enabling Act.330

Uninhabitability
Coastal storms, sea level rise, and beach erosion all have the potential to threaten the
stability and safety of coastal homes. In some cases, homes will be uninhabitable due to safety
concerns about the stability of foundations or the function of sewage and water connections.
In Sandwich, Massachusetts, following storms in winter 2013, several homes were declared
uninhabitable after winds and waves washed away foundations.331 In Pacifica, California, the
1997-1998 El Nino storms accelerated erosion on coastal cliffs and left homes exposed and in
some cases projecting over the edge of the cliff. Seven houses had to be demolished in one
neighborhood. 332
In Isla Vista, California, in 2004, five large apartment complexes, worth almost $20 million
were condemned due to cliff erosion that had made the homes uninhabitable.333 The houses
were built primarily in the 1960s and 1970s, when the area still had a beach (reportedly large
enough to play volleyball on) and the threat seemed distant.334 Today, the problem persists, in
part because Isla Vista is home to a large student population from the nearby University of
California Santa Barbara, and apartment complexes along the threatened cliffs command a
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premium rent. Reportedly, the college students themselves seem unaware of the threat or rely
on information from their landlords, which can be at odds with that provided by the county. 335
Building restrictions on coastal homes should be carefully monitored in order to detect
when coastal erosion has made properties unlivable. This should also be coupled with a
setback requirement so that homeowners do not simply patch the damage following each
storm but when feasible relocate the property inland to prevent repeated future damage.

Isla Vista in 1987 (left) and 2007 (right). Notice how two homes have had to cut back away from the
cliff. Photo: USGS.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Implement building restrictions and zoning decisions as soon as possible. These actions will
only affect structures built after the regulations are put in place, so to avoid having
buildings grandfathered in under old regulations, these need to be put in place promptly.



Draft building and rebuilding requirements with future hazards in mind as well as current
hazards. Sea level rise and climate change are likely to exacerbate the risks faced by coastal
communities. Buildings in some A zones will soon have to face V zone-like hazards, so
regulations should require buildings in A zones to comply with all V zone requirements.
Consider implementing regulations not only for the 1 in 100 year flood but also for the 1 in
500 year flood.



Prohibit repetitive repairs. Limit the number of times a building may be severely damaged
by coastal events before it has to be removed entirely. This is an excellent way to prevent
the costly public expenditures that will be required by repetitive losses along the coasts.
Stating these requirements explicitly in advance of a disaster will put the community on
notice.
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Educate the public about the risks associated with coastal living and the ways in which
building restrictions address those risks. Conduct education campaigns when and where
possibly. Partner with scientists and policy experts from universities, environmental groups,
and other advocacy organizations.



Place the burden of proof on the private property owner. This will both require the
property owner to educate him or herself about the risks facing the property and will
reduce the resource burdens on government agencies.



Coordinate zoning, building restrictions, setbacks, easements and other coastal
management tools within a coherent coastal management plan to ensure that all tools are
working towards complementary goals.



Coordinate federal, state, and local building and rebuilding requirements to the extent
possible. Conduct this review and coordination before a disaster so that property owners
will be able to begin repairs as soon as possible after a disaster.

FURTHER READING
FEMA, Help after a Disaster, Applicant’s Guide to the Individuals & Households Program (July
2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/assistance/process/help_after_disaster_english.pdf.
FEMA, Know the Facts about the NFIP before Repairing or Rebuilding (February 2006),
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2006/02/23/know-facts-about-nfip-repairing-orrebuilding.
Jessica Grannis, Julia Wyman, Meagan Singer, Jena Shoaf, Colin Lynch, Coastal Management in
the Face of Rising Seas: Legal Strategies for Connecticut 5 Sea Grant Law & Policy Journal 59, 72
(2012).
New
York
City,
Information
about
Rebuilding
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2013/eo_qa_013013.pdf.

after

Hurricane

Sandy,

Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 8
A.L.R.5th 391, 412-22 (1992).
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CHAPTER 5
ACQUISITION: EASEMENTS, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND BUYOUTS
Acquisition programs are the most commonly used tool to reduce community vulnerability
to littoral and riverine flooding. They are also the most expensive options, as the government
must use public funds to purchase the lands. Buyout programs, in particular, may have longterm economic costs in terms of lost tax revenue if landowners relocate outside the tax district.
However, acquisition programs also give the government the greatest degree of control and
have additional benefits as they not only remove the threat of repeated flood damage to
infrastructure but also reduce public expenditures on risk mitigation and enable the creation of
natural buffers that benefit the broader community.

Fee Simple or Easement
Acquisition programs are used by government agencies to acquire an interest in private
property. Some acquisition programs acquire a conservation easement, in which a landowner
donates or is compensated for development rights on the property. Conservation easements
are most effective when the landowner desires to maintain the current level of development on
the property or where lots are large enough such that the government can obtain an easement
on a portion of the lot and still permit development to occur in other portions. In areas of
heavy development and small lot size, acquisition programs more often purchase a fee simple,
or title, to the property, and the government therefore becomes the titled landowner.
Although there are other types of acquisition, these two are the main examples used for
managed retreat and will be discussed in further detail.

Conservation easements on small-acreage rural properties in Boulder, CO, act as buffers from
encroaching development and help retain agricultural traditions in the area. Photo: City of Boulder.
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CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A conservation easement is a voluntary legal agreement between a landowner and an
organization that restricts specific activities on a piece of property in order to protect
conservation values such as ecosystems, wildlife habitat, biodiversity, or open space.
Conservation easements have been used in every state and protect millions of acres of land.
Easements may be held by federal, state, or local government agencies as well as local and
regional nonprofit organizations. Numerous federal agencies hold conservation easements
throughout the United States: as of 2004, the National Park Service alone held easements on
253,348 acres.336 In Pennsylvania, 6,276 conservation easements held by federal, state, local,
private, and nonprofit organizations cover 495,952 acres and maintain the land for
environmental purposes or as open space for farming, forests, and recreation.337 Conservation
easements are binding on all future owners for the duration of the easement, which is often in
perpetuity, although conservation easements can be negotiated for shorter periods of time, as
will be discussed.

Compensation
Conservation easements can be established through a voluntary
donation of development rights by the landowner or through purchase
of the development rights by the government (or other organization).338
Purchased development rights (PDRs) are attractive to landowners
because they provide direct financial compensation. The Coastal and
Estuarine Land Conservation Program (CELCP) administered by NOAA
provides a limited amount of funding (roughly $3 million annually) to
help protect coastal and estuarine areas that have significant
conservation value and are threatened by conversion to another use.339
In addition to direct purchase, there are other incentives for landowners
to pursue conservation easements including tax credit programs and
estate tax benefits.

Photo courtesy of the
Maryland Department
of Natural Resources.

Tax Credits
The federal government has offered a tax deduction for easement donations since 1964,340
and in 1983, North Carolina became the first state to establish a state tax credit program for
conservation easements. In 1999, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, and Virginia enacted their
own state programs, and several other states have followed since. However, for landowners
with little income subject to state taxation, a tax credit provides little real incentive for a
landowner to reduce the value of his real property by donating his development rights. In
order to address that concern, Colorado amended its tax credit to make the credit transferable:
the landowner can sell her credit to a third party at a discounted value.341
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In 2002, Virginia also established transferability for its conservation tax credits,342 and its
transferable credit program is the largest in dollar value of property conserved.343 Virginia’s tax
credit program operates statewide, and in only nine years it has generated over 2,000
individual land conservation donations, protecting over 434,000 acres of land. The appraised
value of the protected land is over $2.2 billion and represents more than $970 million in tax
credits.344 Virginia caps the amount of credit an easement can generate: only 40% of the value
of the easement may be claimed, and up to $100,000 per year for the year of the sale and the
ten subsequent tax years. In states where such credit programs exist, free markets have arisen
to exchange credits and brokers have begun to specialize in conservation easement credit
transfers.345

Estate Taxes
Conservation easements reduce the value of land to which the owner retains title and may
therefore be useful in reducing estate taxes. This can be of particular concern to families to
want to keep land intact but who are faced with high estate taxes due to the development
potential of their land and the therefore high value. A conservation easement can help in these
ways:
1. Reduce the value of the land. Estate taxes will be lower because the value of the land
will be reduced by the value of the potential development.
2. Estate exclusion. The federal tax code provides an estate tax incentive for donated
conservation easements. Up to an additional 40% of the value of the land (subject to a
$500,000 cap) may be excluded from the estate when the landowner dies. 346 This is in
addition to the reduction in land value mentioned above.

Land Use
Conservation easements can be used to prevent development and retain land parcels in
their natural state. However, easements can also be tailored to prevent only specific types of
development or activities. Conservation easements in rural areas are often constructed to
permit agriculture, timber extraction, and recreation.347 As a result, conservation easements
are most often used in less developed areas where they can be designed to maintain current
levels of development. As easements are voluntary and often un-compensated, these involve
the support of the local community, who wish to maintain the natural state of the area either
to maintain traditional livelihoods or to support local tourism.
What is important to remember is that easements are negotiated agreements and can be
tailored to specific situations. In the context of coastal development, it is not necessary for land
to be entirely abandoned. It could be limited to season or small dwellings that would not be
expensive to rebuild in the case of a storm but would still permit a landowner to enjoy the
beach access of his or her property.
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The timing of the easements is also a negotiable term. Most conservation easements run in
perpetuity with the property. However, it is possible to negotiate easements for shorter
periods of time. The Fish and Wildlife Service enters into short-term conservation easements
(10 to 30 years) in order to enable wildlife restoration without removing all future development
potential of an area.348 These shorter conservation easements can build into permanent
agreements once trust has been established and the benefits proven. Similarly, short
easements could be used in coastal areas to prevent immediate development of areas that are
believed to be vulnerable to sea level rise. As sea levels rise and the dangers of the coast
become more established, landowners may become increasingly willing to enter into more
permanent managed retreat arrangements.
A sample National Park Service conservation easement is included in the Appendix. See
Iowa Flood Case Study, Wapello Levee District for an example of conservation easements in an
acquisition post-disaster scenario.

This 110,000-acre conservation easement in the New York Adirondack Mountains allows continued
sustainable forestry and opens some of the land to public recreation. Photo: New York Department of
Environmental Conservation.
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A note on Transferable Development Rights (TDRs)
TDRs (sometimes called Transferable
Development Credits; TDCs) are a marketbased mechanism intended to guide dense
development toward preferred, urban areas
while preserving rural areas and open spaces.
TDRs have not been used in a managed retreat
context, but they have the potential to
effectively address coastal hazards by shifting
development away from vulnerable shores.349
The legal premise of TDRs is that the right
to develop land is a separate and severable
right from ownership of the land.350 Developers
Photo: King County, WA
in areas where development is desirable can
purchase TDRs from landowners were development is not allowed and use those rights on their
own properties (see image below). The land that sold its development rights then has that note
recorded in its deed as a conservation easement or a restrictive covenant to prevent future
development.351
TDR programs have not yet been employed to mitigate hazards caused by sea level rise, but
they have been used to achieve a wide range of land use goals including the protection of
agricultural lands, preservation of wildlife habitats and coastal resources, and control of
development densities in areas with limited infrastructure or public services.352 In these
contexts, TDR has achieved widespread implementation throughout the United States.
According to one estimate from 2012, there are 239 TDR programs in 35 states. 353

Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
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In a traditional, non-market based TDR program, the zoning authority limits the allowed
development density in a high density area (such as an urban neighborhood). The authority
then requires developers who want to build in the area to pay a fee, and the revenue is used to
purchase development rights or conservation easements in rural, low density areas.354 This
kind of traditional model, however, was costly for public administrators and it resulted in
inefficient land allocation. In short, these programs were often failures.355
However, it is also possible to create a market for TDRs, similar to the market established
for the sale of tax credits generated by conservation easements discussed above. Sometimes
such TDR programs are called Marketable Development Right (MDR) programs.356 In theory,
the program is simple: authorities designate areas in which development is completely or
partially curtailed (where TDRs are severed from the land) and areas in which development is
promoted (where TDRs can be purchased and attached to the land).357 These are termed
sending sites and receiving sites, respectively.358 TDRs are allocated to owners in the sending
sites, who can then sell their severed development rights to developers in the receiving sites or
use them themselves in the receiving site.
Identifying Sending and Receiving Sites
Identifying a suitable receiving site is particularly important for the success of the
program.359 The receiving site should be considered suitable both from the developers’
perspective (as in desirable for building and having a market) and from the public authority’s
point of view. The public authority might consider the existing transportation infrastructure,
public services, employment, schools, etc. 360 Often these spaces are both within the
jurisdiction of just one authority, but TDR programs can be structured to work across
jurisdictions, such as from a county to an incorporated city.361
Shaping Political Perception
Although TDR programs do not actually inhibit overall development, they can create a
perception of economic loss in the sending sites.362 The Rural Lands Stewardship Program in
Collier County, Florida was able to address political resistance and preserve 31,400 acres by
separating new-town receiving sites from existing development.363 The new receiving sites
were therefore seen as encouraging new development rather than expanding on existing sites
and were seen as an economic boon for the region. Another approach, adopted in Calvert
County in Maryland, is to establish a number of possible receiving zones including a low density
rural receiving area.364 Again, this can change the perception to one of guided economic
development rather than a prohibition of development.
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BUYOUT PROGRAMS
Acquisition v. Buyout
Acquisition is a general term that covers a variety of programs in which the government
purchases land. Buyout programs are a specific type of acquisition program in which the
government uses public funds to purchase title of privately held lands, demolishes existing
structures on the land, and maintains the land in an undeveloped state for public use in
perpetuity. Buyout programs can be conducted without the consent of the landowners by
using eminent domain to acquire the lands, but most often buyout programs are conducted
with voluntary sales from landowners who have recently experienced one of the disasters to
which they are vulnerable. Buyout programs can be structured to provide financial incentives
for owners who are uncertain about selling their property.

Buyout Program Goals
Buyout programs are designed to achieve several goals:


Reduce the exposure of people to dangerous conditions.



Reduce future disaster response costs by removing buildings and structures
from the path of flooding.



Restore natural buffers such as wetlands to a natural state in order to reduce future
flooding levels.



Eliminate the need to maintain and repair flood control structures.



Reduce future flood insurance payments.365



Assist homeowners by providing them with financial means to move from
the floodplains.366



Eliminate emergency response, garbage collection and other municipal
services in the area.



Provide open space for the community.

According to FEMA, “voluntary buyouts in the 30 top repetitive loss communities cost $1 for
every $2 saved in future insurance claims,” an estimate which does not include money saved on
actions “such as local flood fighting, evacuation, and rescue and recovery expenses that will not
be incurred in the future.”367
One critical advantage provided by a buyout program is the opportunity to use the acquired
space to create a natural buffer. A natural buffer, such as a restored wetland or park space, is
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Advantages of Floodplains
Floodwater Storage
Floodplains in their natural state
are designed to hold floodwaters.
A one-acre floodplain can store 1.5
million gallons of floodwaters that
would otherwise damage nearby
structures.

Pollution removal
Wetlands slowly drain excess
floodwaters back into rivers,
oceans, and groundwater. In the
process, wetlands filter out
pollutants like sediment, excess
nutrients and some harmful
chemicals.

Urban Park Space
Restored floodplains are wellsuited to serve as parklands with
greenway trails for recreation.
Increased green space in urban
areas can also combat the urban
heat island effect and reduce the
severity of extreme heat events.

Wildlife Preservation
Floodplains often contain wetlands
and marshy areas that provide
feeding and breeding grounds for
many types of wildlife.
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an area that will soak up storm and flood waters
and thereby reduce or even prevent flooding
further inland. In order to maximize the potential
of the natural buffer, the buyout needs to acquire
a continuous swatch of land along the coastline or
river that can be turned into a buffer zone, and the
government needs to maintain the land in an
undeveloped space (or use it as parkland or other
low maintenance and low infrastructure
recreational space).
Developing public parklands provides not only
intangible social benefits but also a potential
economic investment.
Development is often
considered the best use of land, as it raises
property values, but development also requires
expenditures and provision of public services,
which may be more expensive than the increase in
property value.368 Parks themselves may actually
increase the value of existing developed
properties. Homes near green spaces have a
higher value – potentially a full third higher – than
their more distant neighbors.369 These benefits
are present even in dense cities with high property
values.
Acquisition strategies that permit redevelopment of acquired land parcels fail to take
advantage of these important benefits. This is one
of the reasons that federal buyout programs
require local and state governments to not
redevelop acquired lands.

Funding a Buyout Program
A buyout program can be entirely funded
through state or local funds, but most often
buyout programs occur after a nationally
recognized disaster and use a combination of
federal and state funds. The Federal Emergency
Management
Agency
(FEMA)
administers
programs to help with buyouts under the Stafford
Disaster Act, and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) administers another
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through Community Development Block Grants
(CDBG) (see inset).
Federal funds generally cover 75% of the
expenses. The remaining 25% must come from
state and local resources, which can be a financial
burden for communities recovering from a disaster.
In some cases, HUD CDBG funding can be used to
cover the 25% cost. In order to raise the necessary
revenue, some states and municipalities have
imposed property taxes or enacted new sales taxes,
the proceeds of which flow into a fund specifically
designated for buyouts. In all cases, it is important
to recognize that funds used for a buyout are being
spent to mitigate future disasters and their
associated costs and should therefore be
considered an investment in the community.

FEMA Funding
• The Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP) provides a
percentage of total disaster
assistance funds for mitigation
measures to be implemented
during the immediate recovery
after a disaster.

Federal Funding – Section 404 Stafford
Act

• The Flood Mitigation Assistance
(FMA) Program provides funding
to states and communities for
measures that reduce or eliminate
the long-term risk of flood damage
to buildings, manufactured homes
and other structures insured under
the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP).

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the President
to issue major disaster and emergency declarations.
This allows federal agencies to provide assistance to
states overwhelmed by adverse events. Section 404
of the Act is known as the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP) and is one of the primary funding
sources for large buyout programs.

• The Pre-Disaster Mitigation
(PDM)
Program
provides
competitive grants to states, tribal
governments
and
local
governments for cost-effective
hazard
mitigation
that
complements a comprehensive
mitigation program.

Eligibility

HUD Funding

HMGP funding is only available to communities
in a presidentially declared disaster area. Under
the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, local
communities must have a FEMA-approved Local
Mitigation Plan in place in order to receive funding.
Individual homeowners may not apply to the
program. The program is intended to fund state and
locally administered programs on behalf of
homeowners.

• Community Block Development
Grants (CBDG) provide flexible
funding to help cities, counties, and
States recover from presidentially
declared disasters, especially in
low-income areas. Funds can be
used for a variety of activities,
including acquisition of damaged
properties.
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Steps in the HMGP
Applying for funding through the HMGP is a multistep process that requires coordination of
local, state, and federal officials.
1. State officials determine priorities for disaster response and identify restrictions on
flooding financial assistance;
2. Local officials prepare and collect buyout applications from homeowners whose properties
were severely damaged or destroyed;
3. Local officials submit applications to the state, who reviews the applications and submits to
FEMA;370
4. FEMA reviews the applications and determines whether the application: a) satisfies FEMA’s
rules, b) is environmentally sound,371 and c) is a cost-effective use of funds.
5. Upon approval, local officials begin purchasing land and demolishing existing structures.

HMGP Requirements
The HMGP has particular requirements and conditions that must be met in order to secure
funding. Among the most important are:


The buyout must be a cost-effective measure that will substantially reduce the risk
of future flooding damage;372



Properties must be acquired at pre-disaster prices;



Acquired lands must be maintained as open public space, used for recreational
purposes, or used for wetlands management practices.373 This may require local
officials to deed restrict all property using FEMA’s Model Deed Restrictions
(available on the FEMA website) and submit a sample deed restriction to FEMA;374



No new structure may be built upon the acquired property, aside from small
recreational facilities (picnic coverings, rest rooms) that are functionally related to
open space, and flood control structures;375



No future disaster assistance funds may be applied for or received from the federal
government with respect to this property; and



Buyouts must be voluntary in order to use HMGP funds.376

HMGP Administration
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A state must demonstrate to FEMA that it has the ability to manage the program, an approved
mitigation plan, and a demonstrated commitment to mitigation activities377 in order to
administer the buyout program. State administration provides the state with greater control
and direction, especially the power to review and approval local mitigation plans. However, it
also requires state resources that might be scarce during a disaster recovery period.

Bay Shore, N.Y., 2013 -FEMA Mitigation Outreach
Teams visit Lowe's and Home
Depot stores in the New York
area to offer information on
Flood Insurance Rate Maps,
repairs and rebuilding. Photo
credit: K.C. Wilsey FEMA.
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Other HMGP Projects:
Although the focus in this handbook is on managed retreat, it should be noted that HMGP
funds may be used for a variety of projects that will reduce or eliminate losses in future
disasters. Projects must provide a long-term solution to a problem, for example, permanent
elevation of a home to reduce the risk of flood damages as opposed to buying sandbags and
pumps to fight the flood. In addition, a project's potential savings must be more than the cost
of implementing the project.
Examples of projects include, but are not limited to:


Acquisition of real property for willing sellers and demolition or relocation of buildings to
convert the property to open space use



Retrofitting structures and facilities to minimize damages from high winds, earthquake,
flood, wildfire, or other natural hazards



Localized flood control projects designed specifically to protect critical facilities



Post-disaster building code related activities that support building code officials during the
reconstruction process

Relocation
An essential, but often overlooked, aspect of a successful buyout program is a plan for
relocation. Managed retreat often emphasizes movement away from the vulnerable coasts
without identifying areas that are available for development. This is true of most of the tools in
this handbook but is particularly true of buyout programs where landowners are selling their
homes and divesting their entire interest in the land. Having a relocation plan is crucial for
maintaining communities, for gaining public support, and for long-term economic development.
Government planners can do one or more things to assist in relocation:


Identify areas preferred for development;



Provide a financial incentive for residents to relocate within the city or county; this can be
particularly helpful in maintaining the local tax base and preserving the larger community.
For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo
proposed a buyout plan that would pay owners an additional five percent above full market
value if they relocated within the same county;378



Build new housing developments to replace the demolished homes (see Grand Forks Case
Study) where practicable; new housing developments should be similarly structured and
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priced as the demolished homes (e.g., replace single family homes with single family homes,
not with apartment buildings); this can help maintain neighborhoods if they move together;


Relocate the community as a whole to a new location (see Soldiers Grove inset below); in
this approach the plan is to physically relocate the community as a block to a new location;
buildings may be relocated or built new but in a similar pattern to the old neighborhood if
suitable land is available.

GRAND FORKS, NORTH DAKOTA – 1996 RED RIVER FLOODS
Flood
In 1996, the Red River reached a remarkable 54 feet, 5 feet above the heights predicted for
the storm by the National Weather Service. It topped the city dikes in Grand Forks, North
Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota. 90% of Grand Forks had to be evacuated – the
largest evacuation in the United States since Atlanta during the Civil War (50,000 people). 83%
of the homes were damaged, including some that were completely wiped away by the river.
4.5 million acres were flooded by the river, causing more than $3.5 billion in damage, the 8 th
most expensive disaster in U.S. history at the time. A fire broke out in downtown Grand Forks,
causing further extensive damage to the city infrastructure.
Steve Gander, President of the East Grand Forks planning-and-zoning commission, said
about the rebuilding process: "The river had been our friend for all these years. It had been like
an old dog, sleeping comfortably at our feet, and then one day it jumped up and bit us. We had
to decide: Do we put it to sleep or try to make amends?” In the aftermath, President Clinton
assured the state that the federal government would provide 100% of the funding through
FEMA (instead of the usual 75%) and requested $5.5 billion from Congress.

Buyouts
Grand Forks used $171 million in CDBG funding from HUD to purchase 802 property lots
located near the Red River in the center of town.**** The city physically relocated salvageable
homes and destroyed the remaining homes. It turned the empty space into the Greater Grand
Forks Greenway (see image on next page), a park 2,200 acres large (more than twice the size of
Central Park in New York City) that contained 20 miles of trails, 2 golf courses, boat ramps,
campgrounds, ice rinks, basketball and tennis courts, soccer, baseball, and football fields.
One neighborhood, Lincoln Drive Park, was hit particularly hard and many homes were
literally swept away in the river bend. Those homes were purchased and that entire curve of
****

East Grand Forks, Minnesota, across the river border, also implemented a buyout program and did so with
impressive speed, acquiring 407 properties within 75 days of the disaster declaration and an additional 100 rental
properties in a second program.
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the river bend became part of the Greenway. This expansion of the green space in the city was
viewed by the residents as an opportunity for the city to grow, by promising people the
amenities they wanted in an urban environment. This communal space was seen and
presented as a one way to revitalize the city while rebuilding.

Relocation
Using further CDBG funding, Grand Forks entered into a partnership with a private
development company to help finance the construction of 180 new homes in an
underdeveloped area of Grand Forks. The 180 homes would not replace all 802 lots that were
purchased and demolished, but their construction would help relocate some of the people who
lost their homes in the buyout. The prices of the single family homes ranged from $105,000 to
$147,000. This was substantially higher than the $50,000 to $80,000 value of the homes that
had been demolished. As a result, even though homeowners had been paid the pre-flood value
of their homes, they were not able to purchase the new homes in this area. The homes were
actually even more expensive than the average home in Grand Forks at the time (in 1994,
$94,000).
The homes were also isolated from the main city and had no local schools. So by February
1999, only 12 of the 180 homes had been sold. Eventually, the city reduced prices by $17,500
and the homes sold. In part, this sale was due to population growth in Grand Forks and the
subsequent rise in housing prices.
Today, Grand Forks and East Grand Forks have recovered their populations and are growing,
but in the initial recovery, it was difficult for homeowners to find places to live away from the
river. That transition time was critical because that was the time when many families decided
whether or not to remain in the metropolitan area.
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Greater Grand Forks Greenway. Google Maps.
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COMPLETE RELOCATION & IMPROVEMENT – SOLDIERS GROVE, WISCONSIN 379
“Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, pioneered the three-cornered strategy of relocation, renewable
energy and sustainable development starting in 1975.” – Department of Energy

In 1975, following a series of devastating floods from the Kickapoo River, Soldiers Grove
residents proposed that, rather than spend $3.5 million to build a levee that would
protect only $1 million worth of property, they use the $3.5 million to relocate the town
and rebuild on higher ground. Federal assistance amounted to 60% of the total $6
million in costs, with state, local, and private investments making up the balance.
Soldiers Grove used a small planning grant to hire a team of University of Wisconsin
specialists to study the feasibility of relocation. After receiving a favorable report, in
1977 the village invested $90,000 of its own funds to purchase a site for the new
downtown and began to extend utility services.
However, federal agencies were slow to respond, until Soldiers Grove was hit again by a
devastating flood in 1978. Finally, HUD released $900,000 in Community Development
Block Grants to begin relocation. While federal funding was still uncertain, the state took
on a major role.
By 1983, the project was complete. Thirty-six business, three municipal facilities, and 22
homes were relocated closer to U.S. Highway 61, providing a much-needed economic
boost to the town. During the relocation, village officials decided to incorporate solar
heating in all of the buildings constructed in order to address rising energy costs. They
enacted an unprecedented ordinance requiring all new commercial buildings to obtain a
least 50% of their heat from the sun, and another law that prohibited any new structure
from blocking sunlight to another building. As a result, Soldiers Grove is often referred to
as “Solar Village.”
In 2007 and 2008, the area formerly occupied by the town was hit by extreme flooding,
destroying the parkland that had been created on the site of the former town. However,
the new town avoided the damage. According to locals, this was obvious proof that the
relocation had been the right decision. "The recent flood devastation reinforced that we
did the right thing. I don't ever want to go through another flood like 1978,” said John
Young, a local merchant.

379
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IOWA CASE STUDY – 1993 MISSISSIPPI RIVER FLOODS
The Flood
The 1993 Midwest flood was one of
the most significant and damaging natural
disasters ever to hit the United States at
the time. Damages totaled $15 billion, 50
people died, a thousand levees failed, and
thousands of people were evacuated, some
for months. 380 The flood affected people
across North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois. Nearly
150 major rivers and tributaries were
River Rise During the 1993 Floods. Photo: USGS
affected, and the flood became one of the
largest and most significant floods ever to occur in the United States. At least 15 million acres of
farmland were inundated, some of which were not useable for years after, and 75 towns were
totally submerged under flood waters.
A rainy autumn in 1992 was followed by a winter with heavy snowfall, so when heavy
rain began to fall in April, the ground soon became saturated, and additional rain ran off into
streams and rivers instead of soaking into the ground. 381 From April 1 to August 31,
precipitation in east-Iowa reached 48 inches, well above the area’s normal annual precipitation
of 30-36 inches. And the rain fell nearly continually: many areas experienced rain on 20 days or
more in July.382
In Iowa alone, the floods caused approximately $3.4 to $5.7 billion dollars in damage
and destroyed 25,000 homes.383 President Clinton issued two separate disaster declarations for
Iowa, the second of which covered all ninety-nine Iowa counties.384
Federal Response
“In Iowa, we must never lose a
healthy respect for the force and
rhythms of nature. We can work
with nature but we can never
fully control it. Our closeness to
the land gives us a sensitivity to
the environment.”
— Governor Terry Branstad
January 11, 1994

In response to the unprecedented scope of the
destruction, the federal government decided to push
the strategy of buying out vulnerable properties
located in the floodplain to prevent repeat
damage.385 As part of its buyout strategy, President
Clinton signed the Hazard Mitigation and Relocation
Assistance Act of 1993, which propelled more
buyouts.386 The Act amended Section 404 of the
Stafford Act in two ways:
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It increased the percentage that FEMA may contribute for hazard mitigation measures from
fifty percent to seventy-five percent (thereby decreasing the state’s required contribution
from fifty percent to twenty-five percent).



It increased the amount that FEMA could contribute to mitigation measures from ten
percent of total federal grants made under the Stafford Act to fifteen percent of total grants
for a particular major disaster.

Iowa Buyouts
To administer the new Section 404 buyout program, Iowa divided itself into ten Housing
Recovery Zones based upon a review of the flood damage (see image below).387 In each zone, a
lead county was appointed and an administrative plan was prepared. The plans laid out the
conditions that buyouts must satisfy and the types and amounts of compensation that would
be offered to accepted homeowners. The lead county also contracted with a Council of
Governments, which managed the program.388
Funding for the buyout program came from a variety of sources. First, FEMA provided the
vast majority of funds through the Section 404 program. Second, a large portion of the funds
came from a variety of other federal sources: the Community Development Block Grant
program, the HOME Investment Partnership Program, the Economic Development
Administration, and the Department of Agriculture’s Emergency Wetlands Reserve Program.389
Third, some funds came strictly from state sources: for example, the City of Davenport funded
a preexisting acquisition program through a sales tax.390
1,013 structures throughout Iowa were eventually purchased, which is a small number
when compared to the 25,000 homes damaged.391 This ratio of damaged homes to purchased
structures
shows
that
governments do not need to
buy a large number of affected
structures for a program to
improve community resilience.
As further evidence of the lack
of need to buy a large number
of structures, consider the
experiences of the city of Ames
and Louisa County. The city of
Ames acquired twenty-eight
houses 392 and is considered a
success due to rates of
participation and improved
resilience of the community.393
Louisa
County
Iowa Housing Recovery Zones in the 1993 Flood Recovery. Google Meanwhile,
Maps.
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purchased 200 homes, 394 but its program was much-maligned as an attempt to acquire
structures that suffered from a sanitation problem and not to address flooding risks. 395
Each of the ten Housing Recovery Zones encountered challenges and pursued different
tactics that determined the relative success or failure of the program. Three of these zones –
Ames, Wapello, and Cherokee – will be discussed in further detail below.

Ames Buyout Program
During the 1993 Great Flood, Squaw Creek and Skunk River flooded half a foot higher than
the 100-year flood level (see image on the next page). Residents reported flooding as much as
three feet above anything in their memory, and the force of the river washed some home clean
off their slab foundations.
After the floods, Ames City decided to implement
a buyout strategy for those homes in particularly floodprone neighborhoods. $2 million was awarded to the
city through a combination of FEMA HMGP, CDBG,
State, and local resources. Iowa Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Division administered the
funds.396

“Our goal as well as that of FEMA is to
promote safety. It’s best that people
are not living in the flood-prone
area.”
Vanessa Baker Latimer, Housing
Coordinator, Ames City’s Department
of Planning

The program was structured to acquire continuous blocks of land in the most vulnerable
areas and to retain population in the city. The buyout focused on homes in the most vulnerable
areas of the floodplain and purchased 28 homes.397 Property owners were paid the assessed
value of their pre-flood land plus ten percent.398 If a homeowner agreed to relocate within the
city but outside of the floodplain, the homeowner earned an additional $8,500 to cover the
down payment on a new home, plus moving expenses.399
Purchased homes were demolished, and the land became an extension of the existing
Stuart Smith Park. The large, undeveloped, open space provides additional storm water
management assistance and acts as a flood barrier to help prevent future damage to other
homes. The park also contains extensions of trails for biking, jogging, and walking, that improve
the town’s recreational facilities.
The Ames buyout proved its efficacy when the town received a 100-year flood in 1996, and
again in 2008. And it was put to the test again when the town received a record flood in
2010—a greater than 500-year flood event. In the Arrowsmith Development alone, where six
purchased properties were acquired and turned into a natural habitat, FEMA estimates that the
acquisition saved $541,900 in costs avoided every time it floods.400
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Image from the City of Ames: Flood Mitigation Study Presentation. 401

Wapello Buyout Program – Conservation Easements & Fee Simple Acquisition
The Wapello Levee District (Levee District 8) buyout program was notable because it
developed a novel land-transfer system and engaged government agencies and non-profit
organizations in order to execute the effective program. The program was particularly complex
because it included a number of agencies and organizations: Natural Resources Conservation
Service (administering EWRP), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), FEMA, and Iowa Natural Heritage
Foundation (INHF) coalition.
The Wapello Levee District is an area of the Iowa River that was extensively flooded during
the 1993 floods. The lands were supposed to be protected by a series of levees, but those
levees were overcome during the floods. Repairing the levees would have cost $3.1 million.
Floods of the 1993 levels were generally considered a 1 in 500 year storm, but in this area they
were a one in 50 or one in 100 year event. Repeat failure of the levees would mean repeat
flooding on these lands.
Following the 1993 floods, the U.S. Corps of Army Engineers was preparing to rebuild and
repair the levees at a cost of $3.1 million. If the Levee District properties were acquired and
demolished, then this levee repair work would become unnecessary, but only if every property
in the Levee District was acquired and the Levee District could be dissolved. A working group of
various state and federal agencies concluded that the best solution would be to buy all the
homes in the levee and drainage district so that the levee district could be statutorily dissolved
and the government would not be required to spend the $3.1 million to repair the levee
infrastructure, then or in the future.402 The landowners voted to dissolve Levee District 8,403
and the buyout program proceeded, focused on properties in an area along the Iowa River at a
point where the river seeks to take a natural bend, in the hope that the buyout would help
restore a more natural flow to the river as well as restore other natural features of the
landscape.
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Congress had authorized a
special bill, the Emergency
Wetlands Reserve Program
(EWRP) 1993, specifically for
the 1993 Great Floods that
authorized
the
Natural
Resources
Conservation
Service (administering EWRP)
and the FWS to purchase
conservation easements on
vulnerable land and return
the property to wetlands.
However, landowners in
Levee District 8 did not like
the program because many of
them farmed the land they
When the levee broke (for the 17th time since its installation in 1910) the
owned and did not want to
Louisa Levee District 8 flooded, including nearby farms. Photo: US FWS
maintain ownership of unfarmable lands for which they
would be expected to pay real estate taxes and perform maintenance. Rather, they wanted inkind land trades so that they could continue to live and farm on nearby lands. An in-kind land
trade with a federal agency, however, was not possible under the EWRP.
In order to overcome this problem, the government working group collaborated with the
Iowa Natural Heritage Foundation (“INHF”), a nonprofit conservation organization, to actually
purchase the land.404 The landowners received payment for an EWRP conservation easement
on the property (restricting future development to preserve wetlands). Then INHF purchased
the lands, using $500,000 on loan from FWS to pay for the remaining value of the land.405
Then INHF transferred the land to FWS.
Overall the program purchased 2,700 acres, which are today preserved as a green space:
the Horseshoe Bend Division of Port Louisa National Wildlife Refuge as a restored river flood
plain.406 In 2008, the land held 6-15 feet of water during the floods, preventing damage to
nearby areas.407
A number of factors were critical to the Wapello buyout program’s success. First, the
federal and state agencies quickly formed their working group, which gave the program
momentum.408 The working group then maintained good relations through a Memorandum of
Agreement, which established that agency members could go up the ladder if they encountered
problems working with each other.409 Second, INHF’s role as the intermediary between
landowners and the government agencies was very important: landowners were somewhat
hesitant to engage in sales of land with government agencies, so the use of a nonprofit agency
facilitated land sales.410
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Third, the purchasers of the land used a formulaic approach in setting the price to be paid,
applying the same formula to all landowners in order to determine what price to pay for the
land.411 This formulaic approach contributed significantly to the success of the program
because purchasers didn’t need to negotiate prices with each separate landowner412 and
because it got rid of the incentive for landowners to hold out for a better deal from the INHF. 413
Fifth, the working group set a short time frame to accept the buyout offer, which limited the
ability of landowners to consider their other options.414 The total buyout time was 16 months
from start to finish, which was extremely rapid considering the number of agencies involved
and the extent of the land. This was in some ways expedited because the Corps of Engineers
was going to start work on the levee
soon and if they started, the whole
project would be called off, so
landowners had a short decision
time.
Horseshoe Bend Division of Port
Louisa National Wildlife Refuge.
Image: Google Maps

Cherokee Buyout Program
The city of Cherokee organized the largest buyout program in Iowa. The end result was a
sixty-seven-acre area of land that is primarily green space and is limited to open space uses. 415
The success of the program was mainly attributed to the extensive community participation. In
all, the city of Cherokee’s acquisition program in the low-lying Little Sioux River flood area
included 187 residential properties of which 156 were purchased and demolished, and 31
homes were relocated to higher ground.416
Under the guidance of the National Park Service’s Rivers, Trails, and Conservation
Assistance Program, the cities of Cherokee, Nevada, and Audubon involved the community in a
multi-step process aimed at deciding how to structure their buyout programs.417 In each city,
the goal was to use the buyout program “to restore the floodplain to a more natural state and
to create recreational and other benefits for local residents.”418 The first step was to appoint a
community group to head the entire process. Another step was to hold a public workshop and
then prepare a plan. The NPS then reviewed the technical feasibility of the cities’ plans and
helped them find a funding source for the plans.
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Cherokee organized a local Greenspaces Advisory Committee and held a series of
workshops to get people input on how to use the acquired area.419 The city and the NPS also
recruited students to help with the buyout effort: the NPS trained students on how to conserve
open space and manage floodplains, and the students then presented their own ideas on how
to use the city’s open space to the community.420
The city of Cherokee’s grassroots approach was also unique because program
administrators not only negotiated with buyout targets, but also worked with buyout
candidates to ensure that they had adequate opportunities for relocation and replacement
housing. Bought-out families could either sell their property and buy or build a home
somewhere else or sell only the land and relocate the structure if the structure survived the
flood.421 The city also ensured that there was space for the new or relocated structures: the
city bought property outside of the floodplain and platted it specifically for homeowners
relocating from the floodplains; other homeowners were moved either to rural sites or infill
sites within the city.422 The city purchased property on higher grounds, within the Cherokee
city limits, known as Colony Addition and established it specifically to provide an improved site
for 22 of the 31 relocated homes. The houses were upgraded with better basements and
foundations. As a result, most homeowners remained in the city, and the flood-prone, rundown
properties are gone. Further, the city also implemented a down payment assistance program
for low-income residents that provided as much as $22,000 for a down payment on a new
home.423
As a result of the program, most homeowners remained in the city,424 which may have
added to the desire of homeowners to participate in the program, thereby contributing to its
successfulness. Only a few homeowners in the targeted buyout area remained behind.425
When floods again hit the city in 2010, the damage in the buyout area was “much less severe,”
even though the flooding was arguably worse than it was in 1993.426 The city of Cherokee's
total acquisition cost was about $7.2 million.427 FEMA, through its Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP), funded 75%of the project. The remaining 25%of the project cost was shared
between the city of Cherokee and the state of Iowa. The Iowa Homeland Security and
Emergency Management Division administered the funds.428
Cherokee’s experience demonstrates the importance of relocation in a buyout program and
the need for government to ensure enough open, platted land within the city for residents to
move to. Of course, identifying open land spaces will not always be possible, particularly in
denser, more populated cities, but local officials should take some steps to identify alternate
development sites, whether physical land space or high occupancy apartment buildings, in
order to supplement the housing market.
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Compiled Comparison of Iowa Buyout Programs.
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SOLVING THE CHECKERBOARD – CHARLOTTE, NC429
From 2000 to 2012, Storm Water Services in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg metropolitan
area in North Carolina administered a series of buyout programs resulting in the
acquisition of 200 buildings at greatest risk of repeat flood damage from nearby creeks
using FEMA HGMP funding and an additional 60 buildings using local funds. In some
cases, one house would qualify for a buyout because of interior flood damage, but the
house next door did not qualify because its living space is above flood heights. This
resulted in a “checkerboard” pattern with some isolated “orphan” properties in the
regulated floodplains.
In 2012, the Board of County Commissioners in Charlotte, North Carolina, approved an
Orphan Property Floodplain Acquisition Plan to acquire these orphan properties and
complete the floodplain acquisition. This was a complementary and simultaneous effort
to the Flood Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction Plan that continued to evaluate new
floodplain areas.
Storm Water Services identified 17 homes in 5 neighborhoods whose property touched
on the floodway and whose removal would allow the street to be abandoned and the
roadway removed. The 17 homes were located on seven dead end streets, three of
which had only one orphan property. On those streets with multiple homes, offers were
made to homes closest to the dead end first, so that some portion of the roadway could
be abandoned. Owners are offered fair market value and sale of property is voluntary.
Property owners are being contacted in 2013.
Estimated costs: $2.056 million (includes appraisal, acquisition and demolition)

429

SOLVING THE CHECKERBOARD – CHARLOTTE, NC

EMINENT DOMAIN
The buyout programs discussed above are all voluntary programs, in which the homeowner
has agreed to sell coastal property. However, the government can acquire shoreline properties
using eminent domain, even without the consent of the owner, if the government pays the
owner compensation and is pursuing a legitimate public purpose.430
What constitutes a legitimate public purpose is usually left to the discretion of the
implementing government agency so long as the purpose has clear public benefits. Public
safety, served by removing homes and other structures from vulnerable areas, and preserving
public funds by not spending on infrastructure in vulnerable coasts, are clear public purposes
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that the government can use condemnation to pursue.431 This will be especially true if the
government can show a history of repetitive loss or that the property as an elevated risk of
exposure to coastal hazards.432 It is not even necessary for the public benefit to accrue
immediately. According to the Supreme Court, “In determining whether the taking of property
is necessary for public use not only the present demands of the public, but those which may be
fairly anticipated in the future may be considered.”433
Eminent domain is a legally well-established too, but buying property outright, especially
when owners oppose the purchase, is likely to be an extremely expensive proposition, and it is
also politically controversial.434

Condemnation with a Conditional Lease
Rather than purchase property today or delay a political decision until the threat is
imminent, policy makers could take a middle road. Specifically, government could purchase
property and lease the property back until it becomes uninhabitable due to changes in the
shoreline or increased threat from coastal storms.435 The Supreme Court has specifically
recognized that eminent domain can apply to property rights that are less than total ownership
in fee: “The taking by condemnation of an interest less than the fee is familiar in the law of
eminent domain.”436 Importantly, payments from conditional leases would substantially offset
the cost of acquiring the property – reducing the cost by more than 99%.437
Conditional leases have the potential to address the future harms of slow-onset sea level
rise and beach erosion. However, they do nothing to address the present dangers of coastal
storms and thus, if implemented, would need to be combined with other protective measures
in order to ensure the safety of coastal dwellers.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Relocation is key. Municipalities and states considering a buyout program must consider
where they want development to occur, identify those areas, and build in elements of their
buyout program that assist homeowners in relocating to those desired areas. Some ways to
do this are providing incentives for relocation within the district, providing assistance for
down payments for low-income residents, and identifying areas of safe growth in a
development plan. Areas for targeted development should be identified well in advance of
a disaster. And new housing should be priced to be equally or less expensive than the
housing that was acquired.



Incentivize homeowners to remain nearby. This will not only assist in maintaining the tax
base but also retain a greater sense of community. Government agencies can do this by
offering bonus payments for homeowners to relocate nearby or by developing new housing
areas.
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Move quickly. Buyout programs are most successful when initiated immediately after a
natural disaster. Have the plan in place in advance so that it can be implemented quickly.
Place a deadline on accepting offers in order to make homeowners make a decision.
Dedicate staff to process applications quickly.



Identify priority homes based on greatest vulnerability.
particularly cost-effective areas for buyout programs.



Make homeowners aware of the benefits of acquisition. This is true for both conservation
easements and buyout programs. Conduct a targeted information campaign to educate
homeowners on the dangers and costs associated with remaining in a vulnerable area.



Keep the program cost effective. Place a cap on the amount offered for homes or
easements. Use a standard formula to determine property value in order to avoid long
negotiation periods and hold-outs.



Create floodplains. Attempt to buy large continuous areas of land in order to create
floodplains that can act as barriers to future flooding. Return to areas after the fact and
offer programs targeted at ‘orphan houses.’ Offer incentives for neighborhoods to move as
a complete block. Target small locations: a program does not need to be large to be
successful.



Take the opportunity to invest in improvements. When buying properties, consider public
spaces that would most improve the community. When rebuilding in safer locations,
consider new building codes, solar power, and other design changes that would make those
areas more desirable and resilient.



Publicity and transparency are key. Working with NGOs can increase flexibility of programs,
and working with the public builds trust and allows the community to have a voice in how
the acquired land is used.



Consider a combination of options such as acquisition through eminent domain coupled
with the use of a conditional lease in order to lower costs. However, recognize that this
path will provide protection only against the future harms of sea level rise and not against
coastal storms that are affecting coastal properties even today.



Be flexible and creative. Conservation easements can be designed to adapt to everyone’s
needs, making them more beneficial to landowners while still achieving the buffer needs.
Working with NGOs and other agencies can give the project greater flexibility.

Repetitive loss areas are
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE CONSERVATION EASEMENT AGREEMENT
For a Save America’s Treasures Grant (Historic Building)
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
INTRODUCTION. This conservation easement agreement is made the day of ____, 20____ ,
between Organization, as GRANTOR of a conservation easement (hereafter referred to as the
“Grantor”), and the SHPO/Covenant Holder, as GRANTEE of the conservation easement
(hereafter referred to ask the “Grantee”). This conservation easement agreement is entered
under State Law/Regulation for the purpose of preserving the Name of Property, a building that
is important culturally, historically, and architecturally.
1. The Subject Property. This agreement creates a conservation easement in real estate legally
described as ____Property Description_____________________________________________.
The Subject Property is the site of the Name of Property, located at __Street Address, City,
County, & State
(hereafter referred to as the “Property”).
2. Grant of conservation easement. In consideration of the sum of $______________ received
in grant-in-aid financial assistance from the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior, the Grantor hereby grants to the Grantee a conservation easement
in the Subject Property for the purpose of assuring preservation of the Property.
3. Easement required for Federal grant. This conservation easement is granted as a condition
of the eligibility of the Grantor for the financial assistance from the National Park Service of the
United States Department of the Interior appropriated from the Historic Preservation Fund for
the Save America’s Treasures Grant Program.
4. Conditions of easement:
a. Duration. This conservation easement is granted for a period of fifty (50) years commencing
on the date when it is filed with the ___County _____________ County Recorder.
b. Documentation of condition of the Property Name at time of grant of this easement. In
order to make more certain the full extent of Grantor’s obligations and the restrictions on
the Subject Property, and in order to document the nature and condition of the Property,
including significant interior elements in spatial context, a list of character-defining
materials, features and spaces is incorporated as Exhibit “A” at the end of this agreement.
The Grantor has provided to the Grantee architectural drawings of the floor plans. To
complement Exhibit “A”, Grantee personnel have compiled a photographic record, including
photographer’s affidavit, black and white photographs and negatives, color digital prints,
photograph logs, and a keyed location map. The Grantor agrees that the nature and
condition of the Property on the date of execution of this easement is accurately
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documented by the architectural drawings and photographic record, which shall be
maintained for the life of this easement in the Grantee’s conservation easement file for the
Property.
c. Restrictions on activities that would affect historically significant components of the
Property. The Grantor agrees that no construction, alteration, or remodeling or any other
activity shall be undertaken or permitted to be undertaken on the Subject Property which
would affect historically significant interior spaces and features identified in Exhibit ”A”,
exterior construction materials, architectural details, form, fenestration, height of the
Property, or adversely affect its structural soundness without prior written permission of
the Grantee affirming that such reconstruction, repair, repainting, refinishing,
rehabilitation, preservation, or restoration will meet The Secretary of the Interior’s
Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties (hereinafter referred to as the
“Standards”).
d. Restrictions on activities that would affect archeological resources. The Grantor agrees that
no ground disturbing activity shall be undertaken or permitted to be undertaken on the
Subject Property which would affect historically significant archeological resources
identified in Exhibit ”A” without prior written permission of the Grantee affirming that such
work will meet The Secretary of the Interior’s "Standards for Archeology and
e. Maintenance of recovered materials. The Grantor agrees to ensure that any data and
material recovered will be placed in a repository that will care for the data in the manner
prescribed in the Standards for Archeology and Historic Preservation or will comply with the
requirements of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and with 36
CFR 79 and 43 CFR 10.
f. Maintenance of recovered materials. The Grantor agrees to ensure that any data and
material recovered will be placed in a repository that will care for the data in the manner
prescribed in the Standards for Archeology and Historic Preservation or will comply with the
requirements of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and with 36
CFR 79 and 43 CFR 10.
g. Duty to maintain the Property. The Grantor agrees at all times to maintain the Property in a
good and sound state of repair and to maintain the subject Property, including the Other
structures or features of the site, according to the Standards so as to prevent deterioration
and preserve the architectural and historical integrity of the Property in ways that protect
and enhance those qualities that make the Property eligible for listing in the National
Register of Historic Places.
h. Public access. The Grantor agrees to provide public access to view the grant-assisted work or
features no less than 12 days a year on an equitably spaced basis. The dates and times
when the property will be open to the public must be annually published and provided to
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the Grantee. At the option of the Grantor, the relevant portions of the Property may also be
open at other times by appointment, in addition to the scheduled 12 days a year. Nothing in
this agreement will prohibit a reasonably nondiscriminatory admission fee, comparable to
fees charged at similar facilities in the area. Right to inspect. The Grantor agrees that the
Grantee, its employees, agents and designees shall have the right to inspect the Property at
all reasonable times, with twenty-four hours written notice, in order to ascertain whether
the conditions of this easement agreement are being observed.
i. Anti-discrimination. The Grantor agrees to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000 (d), the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 12204), and with Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794). These laws prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, national origin, or disability. In implementing public access,
reasonable accommodation to qualified disabled persons shall be made in consultation with
the Grantee (or State Historic Preservation Office if another organization is holding the
easement).
j. Easement shall run with the land; conditions on conveyance. This conservation easement
shall run with the land and be binding on the Grantor, its successors and assigns. The
Grantor agrees to insert an appropriate reference to this easement agreement in any deed
or other legal instrument by which it divests itself of either the fee simple title or other
lesser estate in the Property, the Subject Property, or any part thereof.
k. Casualty Damage or Destruction. In the event that the Property or any part of it shall be
damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, windstorm, earth movement, or other casualty, the
Grantor shall notify the Grantee in writing within 14 days of the damage or destruction,
such notification including what, if any, emergency work has already been completed. No
repairs or reconstruction of any type, other than temporary emergency work to prevent
further damage to the Property and to protect public safety, shall be undertaken by the
Grantor without the Grantee’s prior written approval indicating that the proposed work will
meet the Standards. The Grantee shall give its written approval, if any, of any proposed
work within 60 days of receiving the request from the Grantor. If after reviewing the
condition of the property, the Grantee determines that the features, materials, appearance,
workmanship, and environment which made the property eligible for listing in the National
Register of Historic Places has been lost or so damaged that its continued National Register
listing is in question, the Grantee will notify the Keeper of the National Register (or the
SHPO if the Grantee is not the State) in writing of the loss. The Keeper of the National
Register will evaluate the findings and notify the Grantee in writing of any decision to
remove the property from the National Register. If the property is removed, the Grantee
will then notify the Grantor that the agreement is null and void. If the damage or
destruction that warrants the properties removal from the National Register is deliberately
caused by the gross negligence of the Grantor or future owner, then the Grantee will
initiate requisite legal action to recover, at a minimum, the Federal grant funds applied to
the property which will then be returned to the U.S. Treasury.
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l. Enforcement. The Grantee shall have the right to prevent and correct violations of the terms
of this easement. If the Grantee, upon inspection of the property, finds what appears to be
a violation, it may exercise its discretion to seek injunctive relief in a court having
jurisdiction. Except when an ongoing or imminent violation will irreversibly diminish or
impair the cultural, historical and architectural importance of the Property, the Grantee
shall give the Grantor written notice of the violation and allow thirty (30) days to correct the
violation before taking any formal action, including, but not limited to, legal action. If a
court, having jurisdiction, determines that a violation exists or has occurred, the Grantee
may obtain an injunction to stop the violation, temporarily or permanently. A court may
also issue a mandatory injunction requiring the Grantor to restore the Property to a
condition that would be consistent with preservation purposes of the grant from the
National Park Service. In any case where a court finds that a violation has occurred, the
court may require the Property to reimburse the Grantee and the State Attorney General
for all the State’s expenses incurred in stopping, preventing and correcting the violation,
including but not limited to reasonable attorney’s fees. The failure of the Grantee to
discover a violation or to take immediate action to correct a violation shall not bar it from
doing so at a later time.
m. Amendments. The parties may by mutual written agreement jointly amend this easement,
provided the amendment shall be consistent with preservation purpose of this easement
and shall not reduce its term of duration. Any such amendment shall not be effective unless
it is executed in the same manner as this easement, refers expressly to this easement, and
is filed with the __county__ County Recorder.
n. Effective date; severability. This conservation easement shall become effective when the
Grantor files it in the Office of the Recorder of ___County____ County,_____ State , with a
copy of the recorded instrument provided to the Grantee for its conservation easement file.
If any part of this conservation easement agreement is held to be illegal by a court, the
validity of the remaining parts shall not be affected, and the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be construed and enforced as if the conservation agreement does not contain
the particular part held to be invalid.

GRANTOR: __________________________________________
By: ________________________________________
Name and Title
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STATE OF ______, _______________ COUNTY, ss: On this day of , 2006, before me the
undersigned, a Notary Public for said State, personally appeared Name of Person, to me
personally known, who stated that he is Title and Organization, that no seal has been procured
by said corporation, and that the foregoing instrument was signed on behalf of said corporation
by authority of its Board of Directors, and that as such officer, he acknowledged that he
executed the foregoing instrument as his voluntary act and the voluntary act of the
corporation.
________________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC
GRANTEE: __________________________________________
By: ________________________________________
Name and Title
STATE OF ________, __________ COUNTY, ss: On the _______ day of __________, 2006,
before me, a Notary
Public for said State, personally appeared Name of Person, who stated that he is the duly
appointed and actively serving Title and Organization, and that he executed the foregoing
conservation easement agreement as his voluntary act and as the voluntary act of the State
Department of Cultural Affairs.
________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC
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